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Legal scholars rarely focus on student First Amendment rights, and general public 
understanding of the extent of these rights is vague at best.  While media scholars 
have focused much attention on newspaper coverage of more mainstream issues, no 
notable attention has been given to examining the way news media cover student First 
Amendment rights.  As future leaders in a democracy, students at public schools are 
inculcated with notions of civic duty, independent thinking, and a respect for the 
freedoms that distinguish the U.S. from other countries.  However, many public 
school students are consistently denied their rights to the very same freedoms they are 
expected to value.  When students seek legal action to guarantee First Amendment 
protections, how U.S. newspapers frame these lawsuits and the students involved can 
greatly impact public perception of these issues. 
 
  
 This study examines newspaper coverage of eight court cases that set precedent on 
student free speech and press rights.  The cases are Tinker v. Des Moines, Papish v. 
Board of Curators, Healy v. James, Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, Kincaid v. Gibson, 
Dean v. Utica Community Schools, Hosty v. Carter, and Morse v. Frederick.  Using a 
grounded theory approach and relying on agenda setting literature, a textual analysis 
of these eight court cases answers the central research question: How do U.S. 
newspapers frame high school and college students’ right to freedom of speech and 
press?  This study finds U.S. newspapers fail to adequately cover student First 
Amendment cases in four distinct ways. Most significantly, by framing the 
infringement of students’ First Amendment rights as everything but “censorship,” 
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When junior high school student Mary Beth Tinker wore her black armband to 
school in December of 1965 to protest the Vietnam War, she had no idea her act of 
civil disobedience would culminate in a 1969 Supreme Court ruling that set precedent 
on student rights (Johnson, 1997).  When students at Hazelwood East High School in 
Missouri were prohibited almost two decades later from printing articles on divorce 
and pregnancy in the school newspaper, journalists and educators had no way to 
know the Supreme Court would overrule a decades-old standard that guaranteed 
freedom of speech, press, religion, petition and assembly for public school students.  
And when high school student Joseph Frederick unfurled his “BONG HiTS 4 JESUS” 
banner outside a schoolhouse in Juneau, Alaska, in 2005, student rights advocates had 
no reason to predict his act would instigate a two-year court battle that would 
drastically alter the legal limits against school censorship as established decades 
earlier in the Tinker case.  
Context of the Problem 
As these and other significant court cases addressing the extent of students’ First 
Amendment rights have progressed through the court system, U.S. news media have 
given them varying levels of attention.  As the “fourth estate” or “watchdog” of 
government, the news media are tasked with doing exactly that: covering what 
happens in the three branches of government as it affects and is relevant to the public.  
In The Press (Overholser and Jamieson (eds), 2005), scholars W. Lance Bennett and 




Watchdog, record keeper, coauthor of history, citizen’s guide to action, 
purveyor of daily social sensation: all of the above are part of the job 
description of the American Press, and have been for some time.  But what is 
the proper role of the press in a democracy?  Of all the established functions 
of the press in American public life, the watchdog role is among the most 
hallowed. (p. 169) 
 
Bennett and Serrin contend that the watchdog role is fragile and lacks 
institutionalization within the news media.  They argue that to be a watchdog requires 
(1) independent scrutiny by the press of the activities of government, business 
and other public institutions, with an aim toward (2) documenting, 
questioning, and investigating those activities, in order to (3) provide publics 
and officials with timely information on issues of public concern. (p. 169) 
 
The watchdog function of the news media may demand coverage of certain events, 
but undoubtedly, some issues generate more attention and news coverage than others.  
High-profile crime cases and corrupt politicians are standard material for page 1A, 
while often less-sensational issues of policy are pushed to the inside of newspapers.  
Since news media have limited space and time to present information, they must 
make decisions about what receives attention, what doesn’t, and the extent and nature 
of that attention.   The manner in which stories are covered is an indication of how 
important the news media perceive these topics to be and their opinion of these 
topics’ places in a larger national conversation.  News media are the first filter of 
public debate because they seek information from across the country and world and 
make a calculated decision about what is most important on any given day. 
 
This “modern notion of a political journalism which is adversarial, critical and 
independent of the state,” as described by media scholar Brian McNair in The 




culture in the U.S. (Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch, 2009, p. 237).   However, it 
would be naïve to assume the news media actually cover all facets of democratic 
culture equally.  Instead, the news media create a hierarchy—often a hierarchy of 
power—in which those groups with the least political or social power, and thus the 
least ability to instigate change or direct movement, are often relegated to the bottom 
of the news media coverage hierarchy.  Often, students in public high schools and 
universities are at the bottom of this hierarchy.   
 
Adults often consider students, such as Mary Beth Tinker and Joseph Frederick, as 
“citizens-in-training,” not fully-formed participants in all facets of society.  They are 
understood to be a subclass of citizens with less (if any) political and social influence 
and less stake in the larger power struggles at the upper echelons of society.  Students 
are perceived to lack agency in the social structure (indeed, most high schools 
students are not even of age to vote), so student issues are marginalized.  When 
students do insert themselves in these larger power struggles—say, by suing their 
school districts for First Amendment rights—their actions should alert the 
“watchdog” news media tasked with evaluating these dynamics at all levels of 
government.  Yet, news media coverage of student issues—when coverage even 
exists—often lacks depth and context.  This oversight can have serious implications 
in instances when students challenge their place in a power structure. 
 
The suggestion that news media can impact public perception of an event or situation 




setting nature of news media is discussed in Chapter One.  Historically, key moments 
in American history have been defined by the news media coverage of the time, and 
how the news media write about and broadcast those events has shaped public 
perception.  The 1960s-era Civil Rights movement, for example, illustrates the role of 
news media coverage in documenting the struggle for human rights.  President 
Lyndon Baines Johnson demonstrated his understanding of the power of the press 
when he advised Martin Luther King, Jr., to have the press cover the most violent 
instances of abuse against blacks and to televise these events.  Doing so helped 
Johnson to pass the 14th amendment.   Johnson realized the power of an aggressive 
news media to shift public sentiment about Civil Rights. 
 
The news media has at times played an important role by covering power struggles 
involving the right to freedom of expression or other First Amendment freedoms.  For 
instance, journalist and CBS broadcaster Edward R. Murrow’s investigations of 
McCarthy’s 1950s Cold War campaigns against prominent public figures 
demonstrated exactly the importance of news media probing and thoroughly covering 
government and politics.  With core American values—such as freedom of political 
association and political expression—at stake, Murrow’s coverage exemplified the 
“watchdog” news media at work. 
 
Whether the news media write about stories involving personal freedoms and 
government action matters greatly; without journalists’ coverage, the public would 




way in which these stories are written or constructed is also important; journalists 
provide information and context to the public in a way that is useful and relevant.  
News media coverage, at times, acts as ‘the court of public opinion.’   In this court, 
how the news media portray fact or fiction can sway public perception of what is 
happening in any given circumstance.  One need not look far to see how news media 
coverage influences public understanding of a government-related event.  Most 
recently, studies of news media coverage prior to the U.S. invading Iraq in 2003 
document how inadequate, slanted and at times entirely inaccurate press coverage 
fueled a misguided public support for the war1.  Distinguishing the nuances in news 
media reporting that could contribute to such changes in public perception is a 
difficult process, but it begins with an examination of the news media themselves.   
 
This study aims to provide exactly that kind of examination by analyzing news media 
coverage of court cases regarding student freedom of speech and press.  Unlike the 
hot-button topic of war—on which countless studies exist analyzing news media 
coverage of the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts—issues of student freedom receive 
much less attention.  As such, this study seeks to answer a specific central research 
question: How do U.S. newspapers frame high school and college students’ right to 
freedom of speech and press? 
 
The research presented here examines an intersection of spheres in today’s society: 
education, politics, culture, and the media.  By relying on vast scholarship regarding 
                                                
1 Overholser, G. and Jamieson, K.H. (eds)(2005). The Press. Oxford: Oxford 




the news media’s agenda-setting function and utilizing a grounded theory approach, 
news media coverage was analyzed for the themes and frames presented.  This study 
analyzes coverage of court cases involving students who claimed their First 
Amendment rights to speech or press were violated and deciphers how, exactly, 
newspapers framed these battles.  Using agenda-setting literature to contextualize the 
findings, this study suggests that how news media cover these cases creates a unique 
frame of reference for public perception of these issues.  It is this baseline, this 
conceptual framework established through news media coverage, that is the focus of 
this study.  Future research on audience effects, as discussed in the final chapter, is 
outside the major scope of this research. 
 
Why News Media Coverage Matters 
When so much of the public’s knowledge of government action and policy issues is 
gleaned from news media reports, the news media play an important role in shaping 
and extending (sometimes truncating) public debate.  And when that debate requires a 
basic understanding or appreciation of the personal liberties extended to people in the 
U.S., the stakes are high.   
 
As First Amendment scholars David Alistair Yalof and Kenneth Dautrich (2002) 
point out in The First Amendment and the Media in the Court of Public Opinion, “in a 
democracy, civil liberties are a precious commodity” (p. viii).  Yalof and Dautrich 
liken civil liberties to any other market “good” that must bear the ebb and flow of a 




this metaphor by addressing common economic factors, like supply and demand and 
identified the danger of treating personal freedoms like an everyday market good.  
Baker noted that in a capitalistic economy, when demand for a good sinks, this good 
ceases to be produced, thereby diminishing its inherent value.  Applied to the market 
“good” of civil liberties, this model suggests that the failure of citizens to appreciate 
and sufficiently demonstrate a desire for these goods (freedoms) would likely result in 
a market response—that is, a decrease in production and value of the goods 
(freedoms).   The societal translation of this economic philosophy is summed up in 
the ever-popular phrase: use it or lose it.  In short, the less we use and value our 
freedoms, the more they become obsolete (Baker, 2002). If an agenda-setting media 
fails to value these same freedoms, there is real potential for a similar public 
response.   
 
Further, public knowledge and understanding of core American values and laws such 
as the First Amendment is an essential prerequisite to actually expressing these basic 
rights (Yalof and Dautrich, 2002): 
Stated simply, a mass public that is more knowledgeable about this liberty is 
less likely to hold back its support of those rights.  Finally, awareness and 
knowledge of free expression rights such as those embodied in freedom of the 
press are important precursors to the exercise of those liberties.  If the public 
is encouraged to exercise liberty to promote democracy, it must know what 
liberty is at its disposal. In short, knowledge of liberty may well contribute to 
the exercise of liberty. (p. 40) 
 
While the notion of a “mass public” likely oversimplifies the ways in which 




and Dautrich’s key point is this: knowing that certain freedoms exist facilitates 
individual use in both personal and public ways.   
 
Building on this premise, the authors determine that “the more attention people pay to 
news reports related to free expression rights, the higher and more stable will be the 
levels of public support for those rights” (p. 43).  They argue that heightened 
exposure to freedom of expression issues allows readers and viewers of news reports 
to develop a deeper understanding of free expression rights.  Although making an 
astute connection between exposure and understanding, Yalof and Dautrich ignore 
the agenda-setting function of the news media in the way the news media report on 
free expression rights.   
 
Essentially, Yalof and Dautrich gloss over an important factor: how those news 
reports cover free expression rights.  It would be hard to argue that if news reports 
were to cover free expression rights in an almost exclusively demeaning or 
marginalizing way that public support would grow or become more stable.  Instead, 
the scholars’ observation is most fitting when those news reports already reflect a 
high and relatively stable level of support.  So, to extend their argument, this study 
hints at important questions that Yalof and Dautrich, among other scholars, largely 
ignore: what happens if news reports devalue free expression rights? Or, the 
corollary: what happens if news reports extol free expression rights?  Before 




freedom of expression issues—namely speech and press—are covered in the news 
media.  The main intent of this study is to answer this “how” question. 
 
While Yalof and Dautrich (and others) have focused their research around issues 
relating to adults and the general public, this study focuses specifically on news 
coverage of student freedom of expression issues.  The rationale is simple: today’s 
students are tomorrow’s leaders.  They are the foundation “on whom the future of our 
democratic system rests” (Dautrich, Yalof & Lopez, 2008, dedication).  The net effect 
of how students are treated is not only apparent in the functioning of student 
newspapers or the attitudes of petulant or anti-authority college students, but in the 
actions of the country’s next generation of civic leaders.  These freedoms “serve as a 
foundation for the next generation of citizens’ knowledge of and appreciation for their 
own First Amendment rights” (p. 128).   
 
The purpose of this study is to ask the central research question: 
RQ1: How do U.S. newspapers frame high school and college students’ right 
to freedom of speech and press? 
 
This question generates six secondary research questions that guide this study’s 
textual analysis: 
RQ2: How do U.S. newspapers characterize high school and/or college 
students who initiate legal action to protect freedom of speech or press rights? 
 
RQ3: To what extent do U.S. newspapers provide a legal framework to 
contextualize the speech and press rights high school and college students 
currently possess? 
 
RQ4: How do U.S. newspapers characterize the role and importance of free 





RQ5: How do U.S. newspapers characterize the role and importance of free 
speech and free press in college? 
 
RQ6: Do U.S. newspapers support high school students’ freedom of speech 
and press? If so, to what extent? 
 
RQ7: Do U.S. newspapers support college students’ freedom of speech and 
press? If so, to what extent? 
 
Because each secondary research question (RQ2-7) deals with only one aspect of news 
media’s larger “framing” of students’ First Amendment rights, the findings for each 
research question provide a comprehensive picture of how U.S. newspapers cover 
issues of freedom of expression for high school and college students. 
 
Design of the Study 
This study is an analysis of U.S. newspaper coverage of eight court cases in which 
high school and/or college students have claimed a First Amendment right to speech 
or press in school.  The court cases were chosen for their significance in setting legal 
precedent regarding First Amendment protections in public schools.  The study 
focuses on both straight news and editorial coverage of the cases—four involving 
high school students and four involving college students—as they progressed through 
the court system.  Chapter Four contains a thorough review of the methods, including 
case selection.  
 
But first, a brief note on commonly used terms seen in Chapters Two and Three.  
Some of these terms, such as news media and framing, are further explicated in the 





Freedom of expression: Any combination of the five freedoms outlined in the First 
Amendment (religion, speech, press, assembly and petition), but especially the 
combination of speech and press. 
 
Democracy: the philosophical construct, not the government structure.  The U.S. 
government is structured as a Republic but assumes the cultural principles associated 
with a democracy: providing citizens the right to vote; freedom from government 
mandated political and religious ideology; the pursuit of individual ideals and 
lifestyles; active participation in civic life; and vibrant, public debate over 
government policies and actions. 
 
News media:  newspapers published in the U.S, including local, state, and national 
daily newspapers.  This construct denotes media scholar Barbie Zelizer’s (2004) 
reference “to mediating agencies” used to transmit information and relies on U.S. 
newspapers as those mediating agencies.  This construct also eliminates any and all 
broadcast media for the purpose of limiting this study to newspaper coverage only. 
 
Frames and framing:  For the purpose of this study, framing considers the strategies 
and approaches through which journalists create and convey meaning in their articles.  
These strategies include ordering of the narrative structure of newspaper articles, 
word choice, sources, quotations and context used to package a story for ease of 




media frame a story by “taking into account their organizational and modality 
constraints, professional judgments, and certain judgments about the audience” 
(Neuman, Just and Crigler, 1992, p. 120 as cited in Scheufele, 1999, p. 105).  
 
Framing recognizes that discrete parts of news media accounts create a whole, 
constructing impressions of truth and angles of understanding for readers who have 
no first-hand knowledge of the situation or event itself.  Media scholar Dietram A. 
Scheufele argued “frames have to be considered schemes for both presenting and 
comprehending news” (p. 106).  In this way, he considers what framing scholar 
Robert Entman (1993) describes as  “salience,” or the extent to which certain facets 
of a news story are made more prominent.  By promoting the salience of some facts 
or circumstances over others in a story, the reader is essentially predisposed to 
consider what the author has deemed most important. As Entman (1993) argued:  
To frame is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more 
salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation. (p. 50) 
 
Chapter Four presents a more thorough discussion on framing as used in this study. 
 
Layout of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of six chapters, beginning with this introduction.  Chapter 
One explores the state of the First Amendment, scholastic journalism, and media’s 
role in society as both an agenda setter and a watchdog of minority rights.  This 




appreciation for the First Amendment in the U.S. and discusses prevailing scholarship 
on how news media coverage shapes public discussion.  Finally, this chapter 
examines what it means for news media to act as a watchdog and the responsibilities 
this role assumes. 
 
Chapter Two explores First Amendment theory from many philosophical 
justifications and discusses scholarly, legal and professional attitudes toward media, 
the First Amendment and student freedoms.  This chapter moves through six major 
interpretations of the First Amendment and makes suggestions for how these 
interpretations are manifest in social and education settings.   
 
Chapter Three provides a detailed legal account of case law pertaining to student 
freedom of speech and press.  It outlines major cases that have set precedent for 
student First Amendment rights, including the eight cases used in this study. 
 
Chapter Four presents the methods used in this study and further examines the 
notions of agenda setting and framing.  It discusses the grounded theory approach 
used in this research and also addresses limitations of the study.  It provides a 
scholarly framework for the textual analysis approach while justifying the data sets 
used.   
 
Chapter Five documents the findings of this study with sections devoted to each of 




news media coverage to elucidate trends in word choice, construct, context, and news 
media attitude.  Each case section begins with a summery of developments in politics, 
media and technology over the course of the legal proceedings that may have affected 
news media coverage of the cases.  
 
Chapter Six aggregates the findings from Chapter Five and makes distinctions about 
the overall frames news media used to cover the eight cases.  This chapter suggests 
that news media coverage fails to adequately cover student First Amendment issues in 
four distinct ways and discusses those ways across the cases.  Finally, this chapter 











Chapter 1: The First Amendment, Media and Society 
 
Before expanding the discussion begun in the introduction on the role of 
media in society, this chapter will start by surveying research on how adults and 
students perceive the First Amendment in society and schools.  Major studies in the 
last decade have demonstrated just how ambiguous respondents in the U.S. feel about 
the First Amendment.  Moreover, research increasingly shows just how little high 
school students (and the U.S. population in general) know about the First Amendment 
and other basic tenets of U.S. government and democracy.  The confluence of these 
realities has created a situation wherein it would be easy for the public to lose 
appreciation for civic participation and personal freedoms. 
The State of the First Amendment  
The extended findings of a 2005 survey released by the Knight Foundation 
demonstrate respondents’ ambiguous attitudes toward the First Amendment.  On one 
hand, the concept of freedom is at the forefront of U.S. diplomacy: two concurrent 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan bear the word ‘freedom’ in their military namesakes 
(Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom).  Still, 
the 2005 Knight survey findings suggested most students are unable to decide 
whether they would support or deny basic First Amendment freedoms in the U.S., or 
under what conditions those freedoms even exist.  The Knight Foundation surveyed 
more than 100,000 high school students, 8,000 teachers and 500 administrators and 
principals at both public and private high schools.  Of those, three-fourths of student 




that they take it for granted.  The study also found that almost three-fourths of 
students surveyed believe flag-burning is illegal (it is not), and nearly 50% believe the 
government currently has the legal jurisdiction to censor the Internet (it does not). 
 
And it is not just students who demonstrate a mixed understanding about the First 
Amendment.  Since 1997, the First Amendment Center has conducted an annual State 
of the First Amendment survey.  In 2008, only 3% of 1,005 respondents could name 
“petition” as the fifth and final right guaranteed by the First Amendment.  The 2009 
survey found that 39% of Americans could not name any of the five freedoms 
guaranteed by the First Amendment.  This prompts the question: how likely are 
citizens to promote or defend freedoms they cannot identify?  The Center’s 2007 
study found that 25% of adults surveyed agreed with the statement “the First 
Amendment goes too far in the rights it guarantees.”  This number is lower than the 
49% who agreed with that sentiment in the 2002 survey (after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks in 2001), but the 2007 figure is a jump from 18% of adults in 2006 who said 
the First Amendment goes too far in the rights it guarantees.  In other words, the 
overall trend is toward increasing skepticism over how far the First Amendment goes 
in the rights it guarantees. 
 
These figures illustrate a progression in which adults are increasingly wary of First 
Amendment rights.  In the 2007 survey, respondents were also asked questions 




respondents agreeing that the respondents would “prevent public school students from 
wearing a T-shirt with a slogan that might offend others.”   
 
And it is not just adults who favor restricting students’ freedoms; in the 2007 Knight 
report, only 58% of students agreed that student journalists should be able to publish 
controversial issues in school newspapers without administrative approval; roughly 
27% of students disagreed with that statement, and 14% said they did not know if 
they agreed or disagreed.  That students would restrict the freedoms of their peers, 
especially student journalists, demonstrates the low esteem in which students hold the 
First Amendment.  As a part of many schools’ co- and extra-curricular programming, 
students who participate in scholastic journalism—including student-produced 
yearbooks, newspapers, and television and radio stations—directly use the First 
Amendment.  By participating in journalism and journalism-related activities while in 
high school or college, students learn first-hand how the words of the First 
Amendment translate into real-life protections for their work.  It is while engaging in 
scholastic journalism that many students encounter their first experiences with 
censorship or restraint of those freedoms.  In fact, some of the most seminal student 
First Amendment cases have originated from an individual student’s practice of 
scholastic journalism.  Therefore, to understand why it is important how news media 
cover issues of freedom of expression for high school and college students requires an 





“In this day and age, when school systems are so concerned about academic 
performance, no school can justify not having a student newspaper and yearbook.”  
These are the words of Kent State University’s Mark Goodman, who holds the Knight 
Chair in Scholastic Journalism and is the former director of the Student Press Law 
Center, as quoted in a 2008 report on the benefits of high school journalism.  The 
Newspaper Association of America published the report, High School Journalism 
Matters.  Among other things, the report compared the ACT scores of 31,175 high 
schools students, over a span of five years, to those of 6,137 student journalists, 
finding that the latter “earn higher grade point averages, score better on the ACT 
college entrance examination and demonstrate better writing and grammar skills in 
college” (High School Journalism Matters, 2008, n.p.) than their non-journalism 
peers.  A report in 1994 titled Journalism Kids Do Better by Jack Dvorak yielded 
similar results.  The studies echo what secondary journalism teachers already claim: 
their students are more responsible, more engaged, more creative, and more likely to 
be active in their community and school (Dvorak, 1994).  While it’s unclear whether 
scholastic journalism attracts higher-performing students or creates them, Dvorak’s 
report shows that students who do partake in secondary and collegiate media are 
positively influenced by their participation (Dvorak, 1994). 
 
Even so, in the era of standardized tests and with increasing financial pressure on 
schools to justify every program that lies outside the proverbial “core,” scholastic 




many programs are being reduced or eliminated altogether.   A 2004 resolution from 
the National Council for Teachers of English (NCTE) elucidated these trends:  
Many school districts have recently cut or eliminated journalism courses and 
student media.  Budget cuts, emphasis on state curriculum standards, and 
remedial classes, as well as attempts to restrict students’ speech and press 
rights, have contributed to the decline in the number and the quality of 
journalism programs.  Their loss is a blow to English curricula; journalism 
classes, including publications classes, are valuable courses. (NCTE Position 
Statement: Resolution on the Importance of Journalism Courses and Programs 
in English Curricula) 
 
The resolution addressed the benefits of journalism and journalism education, such as 
enhancement of critical thinking and communication skills and an increased civic 
awareness.  Recognizing the positive effects of participating in scholastic journalism, 
NCTE resolved to develop a policy statement that “promotes the value of journalism 
programs that, under the guidance of a qualified journalism educator, give students a 
voice and allow them to exercise their constitutional right of free speech.” 
 
The Knight Foundation and First Amendment Center’s studies, coupled with the High 
School Journalism Matters and Journalism Kids Do Better reports and the NCTE 
resolution, paint a bleak image—one in which a nation of adults and students are 
apathetic about the First Amendment and the rights it guarantees.  However, none of 
the aforementioned scholarship draws any conclusions about why the apathy exists.  
What’s more, the above research fails to contextualize the findings by examining 
attitudes toward the First Amendment that might exist within major societal 
institutions, such as education and the press.  Instead, the aforementioned research 





The research presented here is situated precisely within this gap, but it cannot fill it 
entirely.  Instead, the findings of this study aim to uncover a missing link in the 
contextualization of why these mindsets—specifically those related to student 
freedoms—are so prevalent.  A major consideration, this research contends, is U.S. 
news media coverage of cases in which high school and college students have sought 
First Amendment protection from the courts.  In analyzing the way news media cover 
and frame issues of student freedom of expression at both the high school and 
collegiate levels, this study seeks to make a contribution to existing First Amendment 
scholarship.  Current research and scholarship regarding scholastic speech and press 
rights is lacking an analysis of the way media cover these issues.   
 
Media and Society 
This study is premised on a concept well-established in media research: news media 
play an important role in society by providing information necessary to keep society 
functioning and to make the public aware of the goings-on in the government.  Both 
scholars and professional journalists have their own expectations for exactly how the 
news media should accomplish these tasks.  This section explores those expectations 
and deconstructs the news media’s role in society in order to give context to the 
central research question—How do U.S. newspapers frame high school and college 





This section will look at the agenda-setting function of the news media and their role 
as mediators of information in a democracy2 by discussing those scholars whose work 
on agenda setting is highly relevant and significant to this study. 
 
This study borrows media scholar Barbie Zelizer’s (2004) definition of media: “the 
mediating agencies that allow the relay of information to take place” (p. 26).  City, 
state, and national newspapers are the preferred news media.  In reference “news 
media,” forms of media used solely for entertainment, including but not limited to 
parodies, arts and entertainment magazines, and other lifestyle press and publications 
are eliminated.  Because this study aims to understand an inherent, and perhaps 
institutional, attitude of the U.S. news media in covering student freedom of speech 
and press, this definition of news media is appropriate.  The definition at once 
represents an institutional view, the inference being that “the practices and institutions 
[of media] are seen as agencies for quite other than their primary purposes” 
(Raymond Williams as quoted in Zelizer, 2004, p. 26).  In other words, according to 
this perspective, the news media as a whole and through their parts can be “seen as 
agents of empowerment or disempowerment, of marginalization of certain groups” (p. 
26).  This perspective, then, views news media not only as tools for disseminating 
information—their primary purpose—but also as agencies that convey standards 
(community, political, even moral) and viewpoints to readers and viewers.  Thus, a 
                                                
2 There is neither the space nor the need to include here a comprehensive discussion 
on the nature of agenda setting. For an unabbreviated discussion of agenda setting, 




construction of the term “news media” that invokes its mediating, empowering, or 
disempowering qualities guides this study. 
 
Media, Society and the First Amendment: Setting the Agenda 
Journalists are “sensemakers,” according to journalists Bill Kovach and Tom 
Rosenstiel (2001, p. 24).  Journalists inform the public about what is happening in the 
world around them, and they provide a wealth of information for the casual and ritual 
consumer alike.  Journalists not only tell the public what is happening, but Kovach 
and Rosenstiel argue that ideally, they provide information that is comprehensive and 
proportional, mapping various social worlds—political, economic, and the like.  The 
U.S. news media’s purpose is to provide the public with the information needed to 
understand and participate in democracy, to make life decisions, and to place people 
within a larger human network.  Citizen’s ability to do this, to sift through facts and 
figures in an attempt to bring relevancy to their own situations, “satisfies a basic 
human impulse […] an intrinsic need—an instinct—to know what is occurring 
beyond [one’s] direct experience” (Kovach and Rosenstiel, 2001, p. 9). 
 
Journalism is not merely recording and ordering of facts—it is a large-scale and 
institutional expression of democracy.  The act of writing without the constraints of 
government censorship is a reification of the thing itself; the tool is the creation.  But 
what happens when the news media, in practicing their own First Amendment rights, 
cover the infringement of the press speech and press rights of others?  Do the U.S. 




The answer to this question provides insight into the world of journalism and other 
spheres of society the news media cover (such as politics, history, education, culture).  
As Zelizer (2004) describes it:  
If we are to take journalism seriously, then, we need to develop scholarly  
frameworks that can accommodate the more coherent dimensions of the  
journalistic world.  All of this supports a way of thinking about journalism and 
its study through a necessarily interdisciplinary lens. (p. 213)   
 
Of the five lenses she goes on to describe—sociology, history, language studies, 
political science, and culture analysis—political science is of greatest import to this 
discussion because “its considerations derive from long-standing expectations about 
the news media acting in democracies as government’s fourth estate” (p. 145).  In 
acting as a “fourth estate,” the media is tasked with observing and reporting on the 
government and its three branches.  By exploring how news media cover issues 
directly related to their own values and processes—such as the First Amendment 
rights of others—specific connections between practice and theory are made that 
better inform how the First Amendment is exercised and preserved in the United 
States. 
 
Because news media, including newspapers, are understood to set the tone and scope 
of discussion for many topics, this exploration of how news media cover the First 
Amendment rights of students uses the agenda-setting nature of the news media to 
understand how perceptions of students’ freedoms are established.  As one of the 
foremost thinkers on agenda setting, Maxwell McCombs calls the theory “a complex 
intellectual map still in the process of evolving” (McCombs, 2004, xiii).  Agenda 




important student First Amendment issues are.  Indeed, “the agenda-setting role of the 
mass media links journalism and its tradition of storytelling to the arena of public 
opinion, a relationship with considerable consequences for society” (McCombs, 2004, 
xiv).  
 
More simply put, scholar Bernard Cohen (1963) explained that “[t]he press may not 
be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly 
successful in telling its readers what to think about” (p. 13).  In his book on foreign 
policymaking, Cohen contends that the media’s power to influence perceptions lies in 
its relationship among sections of society—government, politics, public opinion, 
etc.—instead of within any one area (1963).  This omnipresence of sorts allows the 
news media to create links between news media content and public opinion on many 
topics. 
 
Extending this line of thinking, media scholars Sei-Hill Kim, Dietram A. Sheufele 
and James Shanahan (2002) concluded that not only do the types of stories covered 
by the news media direct consumers toward topics of thought and conversation, the 
type of coverage the news media give those issues also helps to frame the ways in 
which those topics are actually considered.  In other words, “the media, by 
emphasizing certain attributes of an issue, tell us ‘how to think about’ this issue as 
well as ‘what to think about’” (2002, p. 7).   Media scholar David H. Weaver (2005) 
more succinctly describes the function of agenda setting as priming, which focuses on 




priming suggests that how the news media covers something can make it easier for a 
person to access personal attitudes similar to those displayed in the media coverage 
(Weaver, 2005). 
 
This understanding of priming as an attribute of agenda setting makes a vital point: by 
emphasizing certain points, downplaying others, or entirely eliminating information, 
“media professionals in general are able to write or speak in authoritative ways about 
the world, making claims to know what other people feel or what is really happening 
which few others in society could get away with” (Matheson, 2005, p. 2).    
 
Media as a Watchdog and Protector of Minority Rights 
James Madison, the key figure in writing the First Amendment, once said in a speech 
to the Virginia Constitutional Convention in 1789 that the great danger of a Republic 
was that “the majority may not sufficiently respect the rights of the minority.”  Trying 
to avoid a major conflict between states concerned with the protection and 
interpretation of individual rights, Madison sought to explain the ideal balance of 
power.  He advocated a country whose government was structured as a representative 
republic but guided by the philosophical convictions of a democracy: equality, 
personal freedoms, privacy, the pursuit of happiness.  It was his hope that the press, 
facilitated by the First Amendment, would serve as watchdog of the new government.  
Should the government fail to create and maintain adequate protections for all 




alarm, informing citizens of the government’s indiscretions and, by doing so, helping 
to restore justice. 
 
This “watchdog” sentiment is echoed repeatedly in media theory and in private 
journalism scholarship.  For example, the Commission on the Freedom of the Press—
also known as the Hutchins Commission—issued a report in 1947 that enumerated 
the press’ social responsibility to “provide a full, truthful, comprehensive and 
intelligent account of the day’s events in a context which gives them meaning” (1947, 
p. 11).   The report argued the news media possess an obligation to the public that, if 
executed properly, would protect society from government and political 
manipulation.  Thus, the “watchdog” description endures. While the basic premise is 
sound, some scholars believe the “watchdog” notion “obscures, simplifies, and 
ultimately distorts” news media’s true purpose in a democratic society (Curran as 
cited in Overholser, 2005, p. 120).  More specifically, scholars such as Curran argue 
that the media enable and mobilize the people’s voice, helping them to speak for 
themselves, instead of being their only purveyor.  By viewing “tyranny as the only 
potential threat to the welfare of society” (Curran in Overholser, 2005, p. 129), the 
potential capacity for the news media in their truest watchdog role is shortchanged.  
Instead, tyranny against the government is just one of many concerns the news media 
must guard against—they must indeed be watchdogs that guard more than one house.   
 
To account for this misleading interpretation, news media scrutiny must extend 




democratic life: education, business, trade, etc.  In other words, to fulfill their 
watchdog function, news media must pay attention to most—if not all—facets of 
society, not just government.  Accordingly, Curran argues that education and the 
social upbringing of young adults through the institution of schools must make the 
list. 
 
Many adults have no immediate point of reference for the contemporary free 
expression struggles of high school and college students since they are no longer in 
the students’ position (although presumably most adults, as students, may have had 
access to student newspapers or participated in other forms of free expression such as 
music or art).  Still, adults can relate to these struggles by reading or hearing news 
accounts since news media coverage of any topic acts as a lens for those without first-
hand knowledge of the topic itself.  In this way, consumers who read the news are 
really citizens who “deal with a second-hand reality, a reality that is structured by 
journalists’ reports about these events and situations” (McCombs, 2004, p. 1).  Nor 
does the influence of the news media stop at the average citizen consumer.  In 
gleaning “specific bits of information from the press, the public and policy makers in 
government at all levels also receive subtle but powerful messages about what is 
really important in the vast realm of public affairs” (McCombs as cited in Overholser, 
2005, p. 156).   
 
This function of the news media justifies further discussion on how the educational 




Knowing the news media is capable of providing such “subtle but powerful 
messages” leads to a significant realization regarding the research presented here: the 
extent to and manner with which the news media cover student freedom of speech 
and press matters precisely because it intersects these divisions of power between 
policy and education.  What’s more, how the news media cover these issues in the 




Chapter 2: First Amendment Theory 
 
Passed in 1791, the First Amendment is only 45 words long: 
 Congress shall make no law regarding an establishment of religion, or  
prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech; or 
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble; and to petition 
the government for a redress of grievances. (U.S. Bill of Rights) 
 
Its very existence was at the heart of the debate surrounding passage of the 
U.S. Constitution (Levy, 1999) as Federalists and Anti-Federalists battled over who 
should be mostly responsible for citizens’ rights and protections: the federal 
government, or states and citizens themselves.  In the year of ratification, many of the 
freedoms that would later be guaranteed in the First Amendment already existed 
within state constitutions, such as those in Virginia or Maryland.  When James 
Madison finally introduced the text of the First Amendment, it was with some shame 
and a heart to appease (Levy, 1999).  And appease, it did.  With the passage of the 
Bill of Rights and the U.S. Constitution, the newly formed country of America finally 
had a governing document, and what’s more, a government.  Contrary to popular 
belief, the First Amendment was never intended to be first in the Bill of Rights.  
Though its current position is believed to be an indicator of its importance among our 
founding fathers, the First Amendment was actually written to be the Third 
Amendment.  When the first two amendments failed to be ratified, the five freedoms 
embodied in the First Amendment that are much extolled today took their place at the 





In the more than 200 years since its ratification, the First Amendment has never been 
altered, but the “spirit” of the amendment is continually being interpreted and applied 
in many different ways.  As such, the freedoms of the First Amendment have been 
applied differently to people in the United States depending on their discrete 
situations.  At times, this has created confusion about exactly when and how those 
five freedoms apply.   
 
Though the founding fathers recognized the vital role of a free press in society, today 
the value and scope of free expression such as press and speech—and how those 
freedoms are allowed or constrained by the First Amendment—is an ongoing debate.  
Taken generally, freedom of expression refers to the ways in which people use the 
five freedoms guaranteed in the First Amendment—religion, speech, press, assembly 
and petition—to communicate their opinions and values.  Freedom of expression is 
the notion that collectively, these five freedoms facilitate the rights of citizens to 
express themselves.  As this dissertation references “freedom of expression,” it 
connotes any combination of those five freedoms specified in the First Amendment, 
especially speech and press.   
 
Conceptualizing the importance of freedom of expression first requires exploring its 
theoretical underpinnings.  To do so, this chapter summarizes the main scholarship on 
the value and necessity of the First Amendment as interpreted through six theoretical 
justifications: the supremacy of the individual, the social value of speech, the absolute 




flawed marketplace.  Each of these perspectives on freedom of expression can be 
applied to different types of student expression, including freedom of speech and 
press.  Also, each of the case studies analyzed in this study stem from a student’s 
argument that he or she had a First Amendment right to some type of expression; the 
arguments these students used to justify their claims are rooted in the theories 
described below.  What’s more, the legal findings of the eight cases analyzed often 
reflect or reject, to greater and lesser extents, the philosophical approaches to the First 
Amendment justified by these scholars throughout history. 
The Supremacy of the Individual 
The work of John Stuart Mill relied on an individualistic notion of the First 
Amendment held by many anti-Federalists in the 1700s.  Mill premised his work on 
the idea that government- or society-given rights exist yet are acceptable only to the 
extent that they allow each person to find his or her own greatness.  According to this 
perspective, individuality and the right to self-growth or fulfillment are the priority 
for each person, no matter their social or economic status.  Mill argued that laws or 
obligations that do not facilitate these priorities are unlawful and doomed to fail.  This 
position would suggest that every person, regardless of age, possesses a certain right 
to expression that cannot be denied and is, in fact, a basic natural right.    Mill’s essay 
On Liberty (1869), for example, explicitly supports the concept of individual rights 
and self-fulfillment as the primary function of law and government.  Anything less, 
he argued, would be tyrannical. 
Society can and does execute its own mandates: and if it issues wrong 




not to meddle, it practises [sic] a social tyranny more formidable than many 
kinds of political oppression. (p. 5) 
 
In other words, according to Mill, the individual and his or her right to individual 
opinions, desires, and conduct must be protected at great costs, even if the supreme 
good of a society might conflict with such rights.  A government must never lose 
sight of the individual citizen as an independent actor within a populace.  In On 
Liverty, Mill invoked an individual’s right to dissent as paramount to society-
mandated expression: 
Protection, therefore, against the tyranny of the magistrate is not enough: there 
needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; 
against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, 
its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from 
them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any 
individuality not in harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to 
fashion themselves upon the model of its own. There is a limit to the 
legitimate interference of collective opinion with individual independence: 
and to find that limit, and maintain it against encroachment, is as 
indispensable to a good condition of human affairs, as protection against 
political despotism. (p. 5) 
 
Mill offered three justifications for allowing dissenting, false, or incendiary ideas 
within public discourse: truth needs to be tested by dissent; censored ideas may be 
true while majority opinion may be false; and most truth likely contains some amount 
of opinion.  Here, Mill echoed Milton’s polemic in Paradise Lost (1667) that truth 
always prevails in the fight against falsehood.  Both Mill and Milton suggested that if 
society were given the opportunity to observe and participate in a debate between 
good and evil—truth and falsehood—what is true would prevail because it had been 
tested in the minds of the public against all else.  This notion is evocative of the 




Oliver Wendell Holmes and is also reminiscent of the ancient philosophic debate 
traditions of Socrates and Plato.  Just as Socrates believed that inquisitive and 
directed examination of life leads to truth, so did Mill.  Still, it could be argued that 
Mill’s search leads to a far more individualistic concept of truth than does Socrates’. 
 
Examined practically, Mill’s concept of individual freedoms would likely demand 
extensive protections for student expression—or at the very least, protections equal to 
adult standards—especially as a means to further personal growth.  Because students, 
through the school environment, are exposed to myriad truths and falsities from other 
students, books and teachers, the ability to contribute to and engage in this 
marketplace is of utmost personal concern.  
 
The Social Value of Speech 
To understand why some expression is subject to censorship or restriction, we must 
examine the scholarly argument that some things are not worth saying—or 
conversely, that some things are more worth being said than others.  This argument is 
one commonly employed when censoring student expression, and it is one free 
speech expert Zechariah Chafee, Jr., explicated well in his 1941 book Free Speech in 
the United States.  Chafee’s central claim was that speech serves a social interest 
beyond that of the individual (Tedford, 1997).  While his position is not to be 
interpreted as a preference for social interests over individual rights, Chafee’s 
argument that the social order is preserved (or harmed) by free speech established a 




argued that political speech has a social value greater than other types of speech, 
particularly profane, indecent or defamatory speech (Chafee 1941, p. 150).  Chafee 
believed because political speech aims to advance society and provide feedback to 
those charged with keeping society intact, it is to be protected more fiercely than 
speech that serves only a personal need.  Chafee’s (1941) theory of the First 
Amendment proposed “maximum protection for ‘worthwhile’ speech that serves the 
social interest, while permitting constraints on speech that presents a clear and present 
danger to the community or to the nation” (p. 376).   
 
This clear and present danger theory, first articulated by Supreme Court Justice 
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., in the 1919 court case Schenck vs. United States, 249 
U.S. 47, established a model for categorizing speech that has often been applied in 
First Amendment adjudication.  It established what Tedford (1997) described as the 
two-level system of speech.  This system places speech into categories of worth, 
ranging from wholly worthwhile to utterly worthless.  Chafee’s theory was largely 
aimed at democratic maintenance since his ultimate goal was to preserve the right to 
political speech and dissent that he valued most: 
You make men love their government and their country by giving them the 
kind of government and the kind of country that inspire respect and love: a 
country that is free and unafraid, that lets the discontented talk in order to 
learn the causes of their discontent and end those causes, that refuses to impel 
men to spy on their neighbors, that protects its citizens vigorously from 
harmful acts while it leaves the remedies for objectionable ideas to 





Absolute Protection Clause 
If there are canonic authors on First Amendment theory, surely Alexander Meiklejohn 
is among them.  And if there are canonic texts, surely “The First Amendment is 
Absolute” (1961) and Free Speech and its Relation to Self-government (1948) would 
qualify.  These proclamations on the scope of First Amendment protection have been 
cited in many debates on Constitutional rights.  Those who believe in absolute 
protection read the first phrase of the First Amendment,  “Congress shall make no law 
abridging,” to mean just that: no law which abridges or reduces these freedoms is 
permissible or constitutional.   
 
However, Meiklejohn (1961) took issue with the semantics of the word “abridge” and 
did not agree that restrictions amount to abridgements.  While abridgments meant a 
categorical denial of freedom, restrictions established limitations on expression in 
certain circumstances.  Therefore, he did not advocate an “unlimited license to talk” 
(1961, p. 249) but instead distinguished between two types of expression similar to 
Chafee’s model.  Though Meiklejohn did not go so far as to call speech in the service 
of the individual as “worthless,” he did place a premium on freedom of speech that 
directly relates to self-government.  Meiklejohn (1948) then created two unequal 
categories through which speech rights are protected: public rights to liberty, and 
personal rights to life and property.  A Meiklejohnian model of First Amendment 
rights, for example, strictly argues against regulations relating to the personal right of 




related to property rights, such as taxes (1948), because such laws enable public 
rights to liberty. 
 
Where student freedoms fall among Meiklejohn’s spectrum is perhaps less clear.  
Because regulations against total student freedom of speech and press are often 
believed to maintain the order and safety necessary for successful public education—
a public liberty—perhaps he would tolerate such restrictions. 
 
Expression Versus Action Divide 
According to mid-1900s constitutional scholar Thomas Irwin Emerson, the First 
Amendment facilitates four tasks: individual self-fulfillment, advancement of 
knowledge and truth, stabilization of community, and promotion of democratic 
decision-making (1963).  Emerson explained that people conduct themselves through 
two outlets: expression and action.  Expression, he contended, “must be freely 
allowed and encouraged” (p. 17-18).  Action, on the other hand, can be controlled by 
laws that impose reasonable regulations but do not conflict with expression. Within 
these categories are examples of expression and examples of action, and it is this 
expression-action dichotomy for which Emerson is most noted (1970).   
 
Emerson turned to defamation as an example of his model; he believed all comments 
about public issues were protected as expression while private libels were ‘action’ 
and thus could be restricted (1970).  Because comments about public issues help to 




that such comments would be understood to be expression, not action; they 
contributed to the debate but were not cause for direct engagement.  But private libel, 
or attacking a private person’s reputation, directly engaged that person in a defensive 
position, and therefore would be categorized as an “action” instead of an expression.  
This exemplifies why Emerson found it reasonable to limit that which he would 
categorize as “action.”  Similarly, Emerson argued that socially obscene expression—
the legal test for obscenity was not established until 19733—as represented in books 
and art, should receive protection while live action, such as live sex shows, would 
receive no protection.  Emerson’s distinction between expression and action has been 
used to limit student’s First Amendment rights in school based on the idea of 
educational disruption, as discussed later in this chapter. 
 
Purpose Hierarchy 
In 1981, free speech philosopher Franklyn Haiman proposed a “communication 
context” theory of freedom of speech.  This theory divides speech into four contexts: 
speech about others, speech directed toward others, speech functioning within the 
marketplace of ideas, and government speech or participation in the marketplace.  For 
each of these contexts he provided examples, including defamation, fighting words, 
                                                
3 In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, established a 
three-prong test to determine whether an expression is obscene.  That test 
characterizes obscenity based on “(a) whether ‘the average person, applying 
contemporary community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole, 
appeals to the prurient interest ... (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a 
patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state 
law, and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, 
political, or scientific value. If a state obscenity law is thus limited, First Amendment 
values are adequately protected by ultimate independent appellate review of 




freedom of expression, and compelled speech, respectively (1981).  Then, for each 
context he illustrated a respective response: provide for more speech, not less; hold 
the individual responsible for his own response to the speaker unless deprived of 
choice; allow government promotion of communication diversity while permitting 
neutral restraints on time, place, and manner; and force the government to provide a 
compelling reason for the communication.   
 
In short, Haiman argued, the response to speech should depend upon the context of 
the speech (and perhaps its intended receiver) and may require modification or even 
government regulation of the speech.  Haiman’s context theory represents a prevalent 
attitude among First Amendment scholars—that no single expression or utterance can 
be good or bad except in how it is delivered.  However, administrators or teachers in 
the education field have not always located a place for student speech within 
Haiman’s four categories, and have therefore made a rationalized argument for 
censorship. 
 
A Flawed Marketplace 
Call him pessimistic, but C. Edwin Baker did not buy into the marketplace of ideas 
approach to the First Amendment.  His liberty theory (1989) outlined the perceived 
flaws of the marketplace and instead refocused freedom of speech on the notion of 
individual liberty.  Baker dismantled the basic tenets of the marketplace theory, which 
propose that truth is good and desirable, truth is discoverable, and humans are 




it desirable, especially in a true marketplace (2002).  Were traditional marketplace 
norms to be forced upon expression and the press without government regulation or 
oversight, Baker wrote, truth would rarely prevail when rumor-mongering pays 
dividends and competition stifles the weak and diverse (2002).   
 
Instead of the marketplace theory, he proposed a liberty theory that protects 
individual speech even if it has no greater collective good or social value—in other 
words, he argued for protection of goods that are neither profitable nor produced in a 
competitive market.  Baker’s approach mandated that speech that would never 
survive in a traditional marketplace receive government protection, allowing it to 
flourish or, at the very least, remain viable.  According to Baker, “[s]peech or other 
self-expressive conduct is protected not as a means to achieve a collective good but 
because of the value to the individual” (1989, p. 5).  So, whether student speech 
contributes to the collective good of the student body, school, or community is 
irrelevant; every student has a right to self-expressive conduct regardless of the 
“value” of that conduct. 
 
These six approaches to First Amendment theory—the supremacy of the individual, 
the social value of speech, the absolute protection clause, the expression versus action 
divide, the purpose hierarchy, and a flawed marketplace—are not all-encompassing, 
though they reflect the evolving scholarship since the 18th century.  They also 
establish a framework to better understand how extensions or restrictions of student 




freedom of speech and press in schools by building on the aforementioned theories 






Chapter 3: Scholastic Freedom of Speech and Press 
As with all questions of Constitutional law, federal courts have been shaping 
the meaning of the First Amendment since it was ratified in 1791.  Depending on the 
era and the makeup of the court, First Amendment protections have waxed and 
waned.  On the whole, however, the courts have established the standard that each 
individual has the freedom to express his or herself so long as it does not harm 
another person.  However, in cases relating to free speech in public schools, the 
courts have historically been divided on exactly what is “harm.”  The interpretation of 
this one word “harm” has accounted for almost all the disagreements among teachers, 
administrators, students, lawyers and First Amendment advocates about what is or is 
not appropriate expression in school.   
 
High school student journalists, perhaps more than any other group of students, have 
faced the reality of First Amendment restrictions in many ways.  Student newspapers 
are often prohibited from publishing articles that might cast the school in a bad light; 
for example, yearbooks are at times prohibited from printing photographs of students 
being too rowdy at home football games.  While these acts of censorship may or may 
not be legally defensible, most never make it into a courtroom for judges to decide.   
Moreover, these are not the only instances when freedom of expression is at stake. 
Many instances of student censorship are unaccounted for in the news media because 
students do not protest the infringement or simply because the students’ actions were 
not necessarily seen as free expression.  Such instances occur when a student is 




student wishes not to recite the pledge of allegiance, or even to stand and remain 
silent while her fellow students do so.  They occur when students’ political speech is 
silenced, and when students are punished in school for off-campus activity.  These 
and more are the types of cases this project is designed to explore, and a thorough 
review of the legal and pedagogical standards for free expression will accompany the 
individual case study findings. 
 
The courts have, at times, issued rulings that reflect a certain expectation and 
pedagogical justification for both extending and limiting First Amendment rights to 
students. 
 
In Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967)), Justice William J. Brennan, 
Jr., wrote that the First Amendment  
does not tolerate laws that cast a pall of orthodoxy over the classroom…the  
classroom is peculiarly the marketplace of ideas.  The nation’s future depends 
upon leaders trained through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas 
which discovers truth ‘out of a multitude of tongues, [rather] than through any 
kind of authoritative selection.’ (Id. at 603) 
  
Herein lies the distinction that must be made between schools and other social arenas: 
schools have a social responsibility to cultivate in their subjects an appreciation for 
civic participation and a sense of democracy as a revered American value.  Such is 
the backbone of our society (Dautrich, Yalof and Lopez, 2008).  So, education 
theorists Janet Price, Alan Levine and Eve Cary argue “[t]he First Amendment is not 
just to be grudgingly tolerated in school: it is fundamental to the American theory of 




Lawyer and First Amendment activist Alan Dershowitz (2002) suggests that 
educational institutions that attempt to stymie student expression are “failing in their 
responsibility to educate and prepare students for the real world.  Campus censorship 
is both bad politics and bad education” (p. 193).  Still, some argue that students, who 
possess varying ages and levels of maturity, do not possess the critical analysis skills 
necessary to execute Constitutional freedoms in safe and productive ways.  Scholastic 
journalism scholar Samuel N. Feldman (1968) would suggest otherwise:  
Academic freedom and freedom of the press can be understood by student 
minds.  They are not too young to learn that freedom is earned through 
responsibility.  If we simply pass it along from one student generation to the 
next, we lose it. (p. 50) 
 
Scholars such as Dershowitz and Feldman see the current status of student press 
rights as an indictment against a society that espouses First Amendment freedoms as 
hallmarks of a civil, democratic-minded society.  By restricting student freedoms so 
much that something as democratic as self expression is perceived as subversive or 
inappropriate, what can adults expect but that instead of a healthy respect for 
democracy, students will harbor frustration and apathy?  As Feldman (1968) 
explained: 
If the young are prohibited from learning how to govern themselves and from 
following their best instincts, including common sense, in high school, they do 
not receive appreciably more growing room in most colleges.  There they 
continue to be prepared for the basic feeling of powerlessness of American 
life…The empty, formal democracy of the campus is not only a frustrating 
experience; it becomes also a training ground for the acceptance of patterns of 
pseudodemocratic government. (p. 104-105) 
 
These First Amendment scholars are not the only ones who see the delicate balance 




to the greatest degree possible while also instilling in pupils the sense of 
responsibility necessary for using them.  Indeed, Supreme Court Justice William 
Brennan shared this sentiment in his famous Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier 484 U.S. 260 
(1988) dissent, wherein a student newspaper was prohibited from printing articles on 
teen pregnancy and divorce.  The Supreme Court upheld the censorship.  In his 
dissent, Brennan argued that instead of “teach[ing] children to respect the diversity of 
ideas that is fundamental to the American system” and “that our Constitution is a 
living reality, not parchment preserved under glass,” the court’s ruling “teach[es] 
youth to discount important principles of our government as mere platitudes” (484 
U.S. 260 at 290-291).  The job of educators, Brennan continued, is to prepare students 
to contribute to civilized society, not just to understand or observe it as outsiders.  
Brennan minced no words in his disappointment about the ruling: 
Such unthinking contempt for individual rights is intolerable from any state 
official. It is particularly insidious from one to whom the public entrusts the 
task of inculcating in its youth an appreciation for the cherished democratic 
liberties that our Constitution guarantees. (p. 290) 
 
 
In their 1988 book on the rights of students, Price et al. argued students’ rights should 
be boiled down to a single statement: “school officials can make and enforce only 
reasonable rules of behavior that are directly related to the students’ education.”  
What’s more, the authors contend, arbitrary decisions and actions are unlawful.  In 
fact, a 1943 Supreme Court ruling supported the inherent Constitutional rights of 
students.  In West Virginia v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 at 637 (1943), the Court ruled:  
“That [Boards of Education] are educating the young for citizenship is reason for 





Price et al. (1988) maintain that schools cannot on First Amendment grounds restrict 
a student’s behavior after school or off school property, nor can they require students 
with religious objections to participate in military training.  Schools also should not 
be able to require students to submit to blood or urine drug testing.  These standards 
all support a clear of view of students as autonomous figures, even within the 
constraints of a state-sponsored system.   
 
Having looked at the social, political, economic and historical context implicit in 
schooling, educational theorists Michael Haubrich and Vernon Apple (1975) 
concluded that while schools are encouraged to be a place a student could “get to 
know himself, to find a place for himself, to establish some kind of individuality,” 
they are not the best institutions for actually facilitating or supporting such changes.  
Because of this, a gap widens between what school administrators need to maintain 
order in school and those behaviors students need to experience to become 
individuals and adults.   
 
For instance, the Civil Rights movement, argued Haubrich and Apple, allowed 
students to better understand the legal system and their rights so that they became 
better protestors who were less apt to accept the status quo of what administrators 
offered.  This new understanding facilitated students’ capacity to question whether 
certain government powers—like institutionalized segregation—were legitimate 




become increasingly politicized for their ability to draw attention through rallies and 
demonstrations.  In the 1960s, students began to demand justification for the actions 
of school personnel and developed a distrust for authority figures’ ability to keep the 
best interests of the students at heart (Haubrich & Apple, 1975).  The authors also 
noted a key obstacle to codifying student rights: because principals and teachers are 
accountable to parents, school boards, and the state, “there exists no central 
‘authority’ on which to base ‘authoritarian’ policies” (1975).  A solution, they 
suggested, would be a student’s bill of rights. 
 
Much debate also exists regarding a child’s or young adult’s ability to make sound 
judgments and to comprehend the responsibilities and consequences that accompany 
certain actions.  Elementary and middle school students have not been seen by 
educators and psychologists as having the same cognitive functions, maturity or 
judgment as high school students, generally as a function of their age.  Whereas high 
school students are presumed to have the ability to make rational, consequence-
oriented decisions, the same is not argued for younger students.  Yet there is no single 
age at which courts have universally drawn the line mandating that a child or teenager 
be treated as an adult even if he or she has not yet reached the legal adult age of 18.  
This confusion is evident in criminal cases when teenagers and even younger children 
are on trial for committing heinous acts of violence.  For instance, in California and 
Ohio (among other states), a child as young as 14 can be tried as an adult for certain 





With this in mind, Haubrich and Apple (1975) take a social-psychological approach 
to granting rights to children by first discrediting maturity markers, which are vague 
at best.  Traditional rights “conferred on the basis of age, sex, and other qualifying 
conditions” (1975) are what the authors describe as “welfare rights” and include 
goods and services a person feels society ought to provide.  These rights, unlike 
“human rights” derived from the Constitution, change over time.  Because of Tinker 
v. Des Moines (393 U.S. 503, 1969), when the Supreme Court ruled the First 
Amendment applies to students, the authors contend a child “has only to show that he 
is a member of the class ‘persons’ to qualify for these rights” (1975).  
 
In reality, proving students have a legitimate claim to certain rights is not always that 
easy. Regardless of philosophical reasons to grant or restrict First Amendment 
freedoms, the legal limits of speech and press have been interpreted and mandated 
through the courts. 
Legal Constraints on High School and College Students 
Only a handful of student freedom of speech and press cases have crossed the 
Supreme Court’s threshold, although many others have risen to the federal appellate 
level.  The rulings in all these cases tend to support the rights of the educational 
system by arguing for different First Amendment applications on school grounds.  
This section summarizes the most significant cases relating to free speech and press 
for high school and college students by focusing on Supreme Court cases and those 
district and appellate cases that have caused a marked shift in attitude toward student 




into two groups: cases pertaining to public secondary schools and those pertaining to 
public colleges and universities.  
 
Not all cases summarized in this section were analyzed in this study, but a selection 
of eight cases was chosen to represent both speech and press issues for both college 
and high school students.  Those cases are marked with asterisks, and further 
information on case selection can be found in the methodology section.  Since each 
case represents a distinct question to the court (i.e. Is nonviolent protest protected? 
Can a student use sexually suggestive speech in a school assembly?), examining a 
range of cases helps establish the courts’ tests for acceptability of student expression.  
As a whole, these cases demonstrate the current legal precedents regarding student 
speech and press rights, and they are the standard against which future cases will be 
considered. 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) 
Of all student First Amendment cases, Tinker v. Des Moines, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) is 
undoubtedly the most-referenced.  In 1965, a principal at a Des Moines high school 
suspended a handful of students for wearing black armbands to their public high 
school to protest the Vietnam War.  Of those students, siblings Mary Beth and John 
Tinker and fellow pupil Christopher Eckhardt took their case to court, arguing their 
Constitutional rights to freedom of expression were unduly violated.  The district 
court dismissed their case, and the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district 
court opinion.   The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1968 and ruled against the 




‘pure speech’” (393 U.S. 503 at 506) and therefore, protected.  The “pure speech” the 
court was referencing was political speech, which historically receives the highest 
level of First Amendment protections.  The majority opinion in this case ruled that “it 
can hardly be argued that students and teachers shed their Constitutional rights to 
freedom of expression at the schoolhouse gate” (393 U.S. 503 at 506 (1969)).  Instead 
of relegating students to second-class citizens, the Court found that speech that does 
not materially and substantially disrupt the educational process must be tolerated, no 
matter what the topic. 
In order for the State in the person of school officials to justify prohibition of 
a particular expression of opinion, it must be able to show that its action was 
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and 
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint…In our 
system, state-operated schools may not be enclaves of 
totalitarianism…Students in school as well as out of school are ‘persons’ 
under our Constitution. (Id. at 509-512) 
 
 
Since 1969, the Tinker standard, or the “materially and substantially disruptive” 
standard, has held a place in protecting school publications, and seven states have 
adopted the standard as the legal authority in student free expression rights.  
However, arguments in Justice Hugo Black’s dissent would be echoed in other 
student First Amendment battles decades later.  Black did not agree with the majority 
opinion that students preserve their Constitutional rights while on school grounds: 
The original idea of schools, which I do not believe is yet abandoned as 
worthless or out of date, was that children had not yet reached the point of 
experience and wisdom which enabled them to teach all of their elders.  It 
may be that the Nation has outworn the old-fashioned slogan that ‘children are 
to be seen and not heard,’ but one may, I hope, be permitted to harbor the 
thought that taxpayers send children to school on the premise that at their age 






Bethel v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) 
Almost 20 years later, a case tested students’ First Amendment rights in a very 
different way.  This case, Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser (478 U.S. 675 
(1986)) is remarkable for its finding that “the constitutional rights of students in 
public school are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other 
settings” (Id. at 682).  The case arose when a student, giving a stump speech for a 
student government candidate at a school assembly, used what school officials 
deemed vulgar and sexually obscene metaphors to describe the candidate and his 
platform. Matthew Fraser was a student at Bethel High School and gave his speech to 
approximately 600 students, some of whom were 14-year-olds.   
 
The court ruled that “the undoubted freedom to advocate unpopular and controversial 
views in schools and classrooms must be balanced against the society's countervailing 
interest in teaching students the boundaries of socially appropriate behavior” (478 
U.S. 675 at 681 (1986)).  What’s more, the Supreme Court also ruled that “the First 
Amendment does not prevent the school officials from determining that to permit a 
vulgar and lewd speech such as respondent's would undermine the school's basic 
educational mission” (Id. at 685).   
 
Justice John Paul Stevens, in his dissent, pointed to the difference in acceptable 
speech between age groups, noting that it was a stretch to assume a Court with 
members two generations away from Fraser could be in a position to rule on the 




were worn, Bethel represented to the Supreme Court majority an obvious exception to 
the Tinker standard granting students the same Constitutional rights as any other 
citizen. 
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) 
The first case strictly revolving around prior review of high school publications 
reached the Supreme Court in October of 1987 and was decided in January of 1988.  
The principal at Hazelwood East High School in Missouri censored articles in the 
student newspaper that discussed teenage pregnancy and the effects of divorce on 
students.  When the principal removed the offending articles and sent the altered 
newspaper to press, newspaper editor Kathy Kuhlmeier and two of her colleagues on 
the newspaper staff sued, contending their First Amendment rights were violated.  
The district court dismissed the case on appeal.  The 8th Circuit Court of Appeals 
reversed the decision and held the newspaper was a public forum and thus “intended 
to be and operated as a conduit for student viewpoint” (795 F.2d 1368 at 1372 
(1986)).  Based on the Tinker standard, the appeals court could find no reason to 
believe the school principal foresaw a material and substantial disruption would occur 
if the articles were printed, invalidating his decision to remove the content.  The 
school district then appealed to the Supreme Court, which agreed to hear the case. 
 
Though the high court began its review of the Hazelwood case with a reference to 
Tinker, it deviated from the Tinker ruling by turning to the question of whether the 
newspaper was a public forum.  Traditionally, a public forum receives greater First 




Instead, the Supreme Court ruled that the newspaper was part of the educational 
curriculum and therefore not a public forum (484 U.S. 260 (1988)).  Furthermore, the 
newspaper had established a policy of submitting content to the principal for review 
prior to publication, also limiting its forum argument.   
 
The Court maintained it was answering a different question than the one addressed in 
Tinker; instead of deciding whether a school must tolerate particular student speech, 
the Court was addressing whether the First Amendment requires school promotion of 
speech such as what appeared in the curricular newspaper.  Finally, the Court 
established a different standard for evaluating free press claims: “we hold that 
educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the 
style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long 
as their action is reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns” (484 U.S. 
260, 273). 
 
“Legitimate pedagogical concern” along with “school-sponsored” became the 
Hazelwood standards, both seemingly irreconcilable with the Tinker ruling.  The 
result was the establishment of potentially dueling precedents for high school 
students.  In states wherein Tinker is not adopted as the supreme law via state 
legislation, the Hazelwood standard allows for more sweeping claims to censorship 
rights.  This fear was made evident in Justice Brennan’s dissent: “The young men and 
women of Hazelwood East expected a civics lesson, but not the one the Court teaches 





Dean v. Utica Community Schools, 345 F.Supp.2d 799 (E.D. Mich. 2004) 
In 2002, Michigan high school student Katy Dean, a junior staffer on her school’s 
newspaper, wrote a story regarding a lawsuit Utica residents had filed against the 
school district, alleging that bus exhaust fumes contributed to one man’s cancer and 
other illnesses.  The couple, who lived next to a school bus garage, alleged that diesel 
fumes infiltrated their house and neighborhood, making them sick.  Dean’s story 
relied on an interview with the couple and scientific studies on the health effects of 
exposure to diesel fumes.  Dean’s story noted that the school district refused to 
comment for the story.  
 
Before the story could be published, Utica High School principal Richard Machesky 
ordered the article and related coverage pulled from the newspaper, arguing the story 
was inaccurate and based on unreliable sources.  Dean sued in federal district court in 
2003, and Arthur Tarnow, federal judge for the Eastern District of Michigan, ruled in 
favor of the student, arguing the censorship was essentially indefensible and finding 
nothing in favor of the school.  Judge Tarnow also found that the Arrow was a limited 
public forum with no history or policy of prior review, so it was subject to the greater 
protections of the Tinker standard even though Michigan falls under Hazelwood 
legislation.  As a federal judge, Tarnow’s ruling sets precedent in a state with no 
enshrined Tinker protections, paving the way for other limited or public forum school 




Morse v. Frederick, No. 06-278 slip op. 
The last case to review regarding First Amendment rights for public high school 
students is also the most recent, receiving Supreme Court review in 2007.  High 
school student Joseph Frederick was suspended at an Olympic torch rally held off 
school grounds in Juneau, Alaska, because he unfurled a banner reading “BONG 
HiTS 4 JESUS.”  The principal, Deborah Morse, was attending the event with most 
of the student body and considered the banner a promotion of illegal drug use—a 
violation of school policy.  Though the event was school-sanctioned, students were 
not required to attend, nor were permission slips issued.  When Frederick refused to 
lower the banner, Morse suspended him.  Frederick sued Morse and the school 
district but lost in district court.  The 9th Circuit Court of Appeals applied the Tinker 
standard and reversed the ruling because the school failed to demonstrate the speech 
created a substantial disruption. 
 
The Supreme Court ruled against Frederick and upheld Morse’s right to restrict 
student speech at a school event; “[t]he concern here is not that Frederick’s speech 
was offensive, but that it was reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use” (slip 
op. at 14).  In his concurring opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas justified Morse’s 
action by invoking the doctrine of in loco parentis, wherein schools have the right to 
discipline students in their parents’ stead.  He also noted that the ruling in Morse is a 
move to “distance ourselves from Tinker, but we neither overrule it nor offer an 
explanation of when it operates and when it does not” (Justice Thomas, concurring at 




it but to offer an ad hoc solution.  In this case, as in the others, the Justices addressed 
only the specific context in which the contentious speech or press occurred; the larger 
question of the scope of student rights went unanswered. 
 
In a partial dissent, Justice Stephen Breyer moved for the Court to leave the First 
Amendment question unresolved—to do otherwise would be “unwise”—and instead 
asked his colleagues to answer the question of Morse’s immunity from damages.  
Breyer was concerned the case would create a slippery slope and “authorize further 
viewpoint-based restrictions” (Justice Breyer, partially dissenting at 2) on student 
speech.  In his unqualified dissent, Justice John Paul Stevens went even further: “it is 
a gross non sequitur to draw…the remarkable conclusion that the school may 
suppress student speech that was never meant to persuade anyone to do anything” 
(Justice Stevens, dissenting at 2).  He applied a test from Brandenburg v. Ohio (395 
U.S. 444 (1969)) in arguing that punishment for speech advocating illegal activity is 
only permissible when the advocacy provokes imminent harm.  In Brandenburg, the 
Supreme Court ruled it illegal “to punish mere advocacy and to forbid, on pain of 
criminal punishment, assembly with others merely to advocate” (Id. at 444). 
 
First Amendment advocates see Morse as a further erosion of student free speech 
principles granted exclusively and unhesitatingly in Tinker but diminished by the 
Hazelwood ruling.  Others see it as so narrowly tailored to speech advocating illicit 




which of these standards, if any, apply to the press in public colleges?  To this 
question the courts have responded in equally conflicting terms. 
 
Freedom of speech and press for high school students is generally more restrictive 
than its college counterpart.  As a whole, college students have enjoyed more 
expansive free speech and press rights than younger students.  This difference can be 
attributed both to maturity and age levels and to perceived differences in the purposes 
of secondary and post-secondary educational systems: one to impart necessary 
intellectual and societal knowledge in preparation for adult life, the other to challenge 
and expand upon those norms while establishing skills for a professional niche.  
However, more recently, courts have narrowed college students’ rights in similar 
ways as they have done for high school students.  Examination of a handful of the 
most significant court cases reveals conflicting assumptions about the role of speech 
and press on college and university campuses. 
Trujillo v. Love, 322 F.Supp. 1266 (D. Colo. 1971) 
Three court decisions set the stage for later conflicts regarding the free press rights of 
college students and are briefly explored here.  In Trujillo v. Love, 322 F.Supp. 1266 
(D. Colo. 1971), an editor at a college newspaper sued for violation of her First 
Amendment rights when the newspaper was required to submit controversial content 
to a faculty adviser.  When Dorothy Trujillo, the editor of The Arrow at Southern 
Colorado State University, refused to submit the newspaper to prior review, she was 




critical of the administration as well as an editorial chastising a local Colorado judge, 
but she met with opposition from the faculty advisor and university president.   
 
The U.S. District Court for the District of Colorado ordered Trujillo to be reinstated 
to her managing editor position and found that  
The state is not necessarily the unfettered master of all it creates. Having 
established a particular forum for expression, officials may not then place 
limitations upon the use of that forum which interfere with protected speech 
and are not unjustified [sic] by an overriding state interest. (322 F. Supp. 1266 
at 1270)   
 
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972) 
In Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972), the Supreme Court found that a state college 
“could not restrict speech or association simply because it found the views expressed 
by the group to be abhorrent” (Inglehart, 1985, p. 53).  The Court ruled that Central 
Connecticut State University could not restrict the Students for Democratic Society 
group—a left-wing club with a violent reputation on some campuses—from being 
recognized as an official campus organization.  Failure to achieve official status on 
the campus meant the group couldn’t distribute literature, advertise in the college 
paper or use campus facilities.  The court found that simply because the school 
disagreed with the group’s mission or feared its philosophies did not mean the school 
could deny the group official recognition.  The court noted that such denial would 
only be justified if the group failed to observe a campus rule or regulation; in other 
words, the act to deny the group recognition must be content-neutral, or separate from 




“state colleges and universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First 
Amendment” (408 U.S. 169 at 180 (1972)).   
Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) 
Similarly, in Papish v. Board, 410 U.S. 667 (1973), the editor of an underground 
newspaper was expelled for distributing an issue with the word “motherfucker” and a 
sexually explicit cartoon was reinstated when the court found that “[t]he mere 
dissemination of ideas—no matter how offensive to good taste—on a state university 
campus may not be shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of decency’” (410 U.S. 
667, 667 (1973)).  Barbara Papish, a graduate student at the time and editor of the 
Free Press Underground newspaper, contended that her First Amendment rights were 
violated when she was expelled for content in her newspaper.  Aside from the 
expletive, the newspaper contained a graphic political cartoon of policemen raping 
the Statue of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice, with the words “with liberty and 
justice for all” surrounding the image.   
 
The school’s conduct code required students "to observe generally accepted standards 
of conduct" (Id. at 668), and the Student Conduct Committee determined Papish to be 
in violation of this code.  Though the school made a case for her continued poor 
performance and questionable behavior on campus during her five and one-half year 
tenure as a graduate student, the Supreme Court found “disenchantment with Miss 
Papish's performance, understandable as it may have been, is no justification for 





The resolution of the Papish case marked the beginning of almost three relatively 
quiet decades for college speech and press litigation.  Instead, courts, students and 
professors turned their attention to notions of academic freedom, an important legal 
struggle that merits more attention than what can be given here. 
Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001)(en banc)  
Almost 20 years after Papish, a state university confiscated the school’s 1993-1994 
yearbook because it took issue with the publications’ supposed poor quality.  The 
school argued that the yearbook was the wrong color and poorly written, and it did an 
inadequate job of capturing student life—the purpose of a yearbook.  Charles 
Kincaid, a student, and Capri Coffer, editor of the yearbook, sued the school.  The 
students claimed that not only did the school violate their First Amendment rights, but 
also that the school did so in retaliation for content in the school newspaper and 
yearbook, both of which had been advised by the same faculty member who was 
subsequently removed from her post.  The students lost their First Amendment suit in 
district court, but the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, deciding that 
Hazelwood does not apply to college publications and that the school’s conduct 
violated the students’ First Amendment rights.   
 
Ruling en banc, the court found that “[t]he university is a special place for purposes 
of First Amendment jurisprudence. The danger of ‘chilling…individual thought and 
expression…is especially real in the University setting, where the State acts against a 
background and tradition of thought and experiment that is at the center of our 




2001)(en banc)).  The 6th Circuit reversed the lower court’s findings and ordered the 
yearbooks be distributed on campus, in addition to requiring the school to pay the 
students’ attorneys’ fees and $5,000 each to Kincaid and Coffer. 
Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005)(en banc) cert. denied 
The 7th Circuit Court of Appeals made an about-face in 2005 when it ruled the 
Hazelwood standard could, indeed, be applied to college press not designated as a 
public forum (Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005)(en banc), cert. denied.  
The Supreme Court declined to review the Hosty case about public university 
journalists who sued their school when it enacted a policy of prior review for the 
student newspaper.  Therefore, the 7th Circuit’s ruling stands, which allows three 
states—Illinois, Indiana, and Wisconsin—to apply the more restrictive Hazelwood 
standard to college publications.  Arguably, the Supreme Court’s refusal to hear the 
case could also be interpreted as approval of the 7th Circuit’s ruling; when the 
Supreme Court declines to grant certiorari, its declination is often cited as support for 
a lower court’s ruling in legal arguments. 
 
The Innovator at Governors State University in Illinois had published stories critical 
of the campus’s administration, and despite a university policy giving the staff sole 
discretion over the newspaper’s content, the appeals court ruled in favor of the 
university’s actions.  The federal district court in Illinois had previously ruled in 
support of the students; the appeals court ruling vacated that judgment. Central to the 
appeals court’s judgment was the question of whether the newspaper was a 




newspaper the University may have created a venue that goes by the name 
‘designated public forum’ or ‘limited purpose public forum’” (412 F.3d 731, 737).  
Thus, the Innovator, subsidized by school funds, was not an open forum.  The ruling 
maintains that school publications designated as a public forum by policy or practice 
are still eligible for protection under the less restrictive Tinker standard. 
 
State Freedom of Expression Laws 
In light of some of these court rulings, a handful of states across the country have 
passed their own freedom of expression laws for high school and college students.  
When states seek to override court decisions that run contrary to the states’ 
educational goals for students, state freedom of expression laws can better specify the 
extent of student freedoms.  Such state laws generally have granted students more 
extensive rights, ones that mirror the standards set forth in Tinker.  Fewer than a 
dozen states have passed such laws.   
 
According to the Student Press Law Center, seven states have passed freedom of 
expression statutes that extend Tinker protections to high school students: California, 
Colorado, Iowa, Massachusetts, Arkansas, Iowa, and Kansas.  Oregon has passed 
student free expression laws for both public secondary schools and public colleges 
and universities.  In Illinois, a state law protects college campus press.  Since the 
Hazelwood ruling in 1988, many other state legislatures have unsuccessfully 





Because of conflicting established case law, how the First Amendment applies to 
public high school and college students is murky.  Seemingly conflicting rulings put 
both students and administrators in positions where the legal mandate is not always 
apparent.  This dilemma is evidenced by a quote from Justice Thomas’s concurring 
opinion in Morse v. Frederick, “I am afraid that our jurisprudence now says that 
students have a right to speak in schools except when they don’t” (No. 06-278 slip op. 
(2007) Justice Thomas, concurring).   As a general rule, legal scholar John Hogan 
noted in 1985 that the courts have concluded “once a personal liberty is shown to be 
affected by a school rule, the burden of justifying that rule — in ‘the absence of an 
inherent, self-evident justification on the face of the rule’ — is on the school 
authorities” (Hogan, 1985).   Ultimately, how the news media cover student First 




Chapter 4: Methods 
 
This study looks at news coverage of eight legal cases over the span of 39 
years, from 1969-2008.  This study uses news stories, commentaries and editorials 
from local, state, and national newspapers to answer its central research question: 
How do U.S. newspapers frame high school and college students’ right to freedom of 
speech and press?  A textual analysis of the articles identified frames that emerged 
throughout the newspaper coverage. 
 
High school and college students, as tomorrow’s leaders, often face a delicate balance 
of educational imperatives and attempts at expression related to personal growth.   
Yet, journalism and media scholars have given too little attention to news coverage of 
students’ rights, an area of First Amendment scholarship that can generate significant 
legal questions.  Many scholars (see Yalof & Dautrich, 2008) recognize the need for 
extensive research of the First Amendment and how it is used and appreciated in 
America.  However, none—to this researcher’s knowledge— have considered how 
news media coverage provides the public with specific frames of reference in this 
matter, or what those frames look like.  
 
This study is designed to fill this gap by providing a foundation for more research. 
Characterizing and describing the way news media frame freedom of speech and 
press for high school and college students establishes a much-needed context for 




which the news media cover certain legal cases involving student freedom of 
expression—namely speech and press— is the main concern, but this research also 
provides a gateway to more extensive research regarding the relationships among 
education, the First Amendment, civics, and democratic practices in this country.  In 
short, this study is a textual analysis of the frames that emerge in coverage of freedom 
of expression lawsuits involving high school and college students.  The textual 
analysis approach is explained in the proceeding section on central data collection and 
grounded theory. 
 
This study’s introduction and literature review explored scholarship relevant to high 
school and college students and focused on freedom of expression from social, legal 
and pedagogical standpoints.  Many, if not most, legal cases arise from questions 
regarding what student media can and cannot print.  However, in this study, student 
media are considered within the larger populations of all high school and college 
students.  To focus solely on student media would require different case selections 
altogether, and while student media may be the springboard from which many legal 
disputes arise, high school and college student challenges to the First Amendment 
occur under many different circumstances.  So, whether or not a legal case originated 
from within the confines of a student media activity—such as a yearbook or 
newspaper—is not a consideration in this study.  This is a necessary qualification to 
maintain a broad stroke approach to the research question.  In addition, as made 




student media activities are often discussed by the courts as peripheral to a central 
question of general student autonomy. 
Extended Definition of Terms 
Important terms, while briefly defined at the beginning of this study, are more fully 
developed here. 
 
News Media:  Local and national U.S. newspapers.   This construct denotes Zelizer’s 
(2004) reference to “mediating agencies” used to transmit information and relies on 
U.S. newspapers as those mediating agencies.  This construct also eliminates any and 
all broadcast media for the purpose of limiting this study to newspaper coverage only.  
Local, state and a selection of national newspapers were all used for database and 
online archival searches.  These national newspapers included three newspapers 
within the top five largest national newspapers (based on circulation): The 
Washington Post, The New York Times, and USA Today.  These three were selected 
because of their large circulation sizes and prominence in the U.S. news media based 
on World Association of Newspaper rankings.  The Christian Science Monitor was 
added as a fourth newspaper because of its mix of international and national focus, 
providing a litmus test of sorts as to whether a case was deemed newsworthy for an 
international audience.  Using these specific national newspapers as well as state and 
local newspapers  (i.e. local to the city/state where the case originated) allowed for a 





Democracy: the philosophical construct, not the government structure.  The U.S. 
government is structured as a Republic but assumes the cultural and institutional 
principles associated with a democracy: providing citizens the right to vote; freedom 
from government mandated political and religious ideology; the pursuit of individual 
ideals and lifestyles; active participation in civic life; and vibrant, public debate over 
government policies and actions. 
 
Freedom of Expression: Any combination of the five freedoms outlined in the First 
Amendment (religion, speech, press, assembly and petition), but especially the 
combination of speech and press.  This definition looks at legal issues pursued in 
court as a violation of the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and/or press.   
The term “speech” refers to both literal speech and symbolic speech—which the 
courts have ruled (Tinker v. Des Moines, 1969) is akin to pure speech.  This study 
does not investigate media coverage of other First Amendment cases in which 
students have pursued freedom of religion, assembly and petition through the courts 
 
Data 
This study analyzed data comprising newspaper articles and editorials on specific 
legal cases involving freedom of speech and press for both high school and college 
students.  The data reflected a two-cell approach: the researcher selected two cases for 





The eight cases reflect instances in which high school or college students exercising 
freedom of speech or press were reprimanded or restricted, and legal action was 
pursued.  The cases were chosen for their status as legal precedents, their prominence 
in subsequent legal literature, and their continued and detailed explication in 
scholastic media law books.  Legal action occurs when a student files a complaint in 
court against the school or administrator.    
 
For each of the eight cases, the data consisted of local, national and editorial 
coverage.  However, for some cases, only local or national coverage existed in the 
data set, not both.  And in some cases, no editorial coverage was present in the data 
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This study analyzes how news media covered these eight specific cases.  The data set 
included case coverage originating from the initial First Amendment issue, meaning 
news media coverage prior to suit being filed was not analyzed.  News media 
coverage prior to the suit being filed was eliminated from the central data set because 
while a student complaint against administration for disciplinary action is relatively 
common, a student’s filing suit against an administrator or school is not.  Therefore, 
the unique circumstance of a student filing suit against a school would likely 
predispose the story to some degree of news media coverage.  This limitation to the 
data set helped to eliminate those initial stories that, because no proper legal claim 
was staked, would likely have focused not on the First Amendment issue but the 
disciplinary action instead.   
 
This study also analyzed follow-up coverage relating directly to the case as it 
progressed through the legal system and was resolved, and anniversary coverage if 
available, including but not limited to special coverage on the case or in-depth articles 
relating to the case. 
 
Database searches using keywords relating to each case located relevant articles.  
LexisNexis was the primary database and starting point for the keyword searches.  In 
addition to searching LexisNexis, online archival searches of local (city) newspapers 
in which the case originated, online archival searches of major state newspapers (as 




archival searches of four national newspapers, The New York Times, The Washington 
Post, USA Today, and the Christian Science Monitor located the remainder of the 
coverage.  When articles were unavailable electronically, the researcher sent emails to 
newspapers requesting hard copies of articles relating to the case.  A full list of 
newspapers used and dates of located articles can be found in the appendix for each 
case.   
 
Keywords entered into both LexisNexis and individual newspaper archives included: 
• the case name (ie Tinker v. Des Moines)  
• the full names of individuals filing or defending the suit 
• names of the school and school district involved 
• names of the student newspaper (if a press case) 
• year of the final case decision paired with “student freedom of 
speech/press” 
• year of the final case decision paired with “freedom of expression” 
 
Keywords and date-specific searches located a total of 178 articles.  This study 
eliminated coverage in which the story itself was substantially devoted to something 
other than the specific legal case (i.e. the story was about the student’s subsequent trip 
to China, and not the lawsuit he filed) or if the keyword search generated articles not 
actually related to the case or articles outside the limits of the study (i.e. international 




analyzed 98 articles across seven cases.  One case search, Healy v. James, generated 
no significant coverage.  This case will be discussed further in Chapter Five. 
 
Data Analysis and Grounded Theory 
A textual analysis of the news media coverage revealed frames and themes reporters 
used to cover and characterize the cases, including themes related directly to the 
student, the Constitutional significance of the case, and the educational significance 
of the case.  The researcher allowed themes to emerge from the coverage instead of 
creating a set of expected themes prior to analysis.  
 
The principles of grounded theory as explored by researchers A.L. Strauss and J. 
Corbin (1990; also Glaser and Strauss, 1967) guided this textual analysis.  These 
scholars describe their approach to this methodology as “a way of thinking about and 
studying social reality” (1990, p. 4).  The grounded theory approach demands 
flexibility and creativity, as well as sensitivity to nuance and detail (1990).  
Accordingly, the researcher paid significant attention to semantics, descriptions, word 
choice, rhetoric, repetition, and characterizations in the news media coverage.  
Grounded theory is a largely comparative method, and as such, this approach to 
analyzing the data required constant comparison between themes and across data 
samples.  This method is consistent with “interpretation based on systematically 
carried out inquiry” (p. 8).  As a nonmathematical process, this research is “carried 
out for the purpose of discerning concepts and relationships in raw data and then 





In other words, the articles used as data were interpreted according to the themes that 
arose, generating an explanatory scheme that described ways the news media frame 
issues of freedom of speech and press for high school and college students.  The 
researcher read the coverage of each case to establish an understanding of the tone, 
sentence structure, theme, voice, word choice, sourcing, fact inclusion and omission, 
and story structure each article used.  As the researcher progressed through the data 
set, these elements were compared within and across court cases for any similarities 
and differences.  This process exemplifies a basic tenet of grounded theory: that the 
researcher may make assumptions from findings based on significant interaction with 
the subject of inquiry—in this case, the news media coverage.  Grounded theory 
premises this approach on the “belief that persons are actors who take an active role 
in responding to problematic situations…[and] the understanding that meaning is 
defined and redefined through interaction” (Strauss and Corbin, 1990, p. 9-10).  
Ultimately, these characteristics of grounded theory research lead to “an awareness of 
the interrelationships among conditions (structure), action (process), and 
consequences” (p. 10).  It is these relationships, actions and consequences derived 
from the news media coverage that are discussed in the results sections.   
 
While traditional grounded theory methods suggest an emergent approach to data 
sampling, that is, allowing one piece of selected data to lead to another based on 
interpretation of the first, this research demanded a slightly more systematic 




end product and time needed for completion, it was necessary to further refine the 
data to specific cases on student freedom of speech and press issues. 
 
Many researchers have used the tenets of grounded theory to explore media-related 
relationships and to develop foundations for interpreting media.  The theory itself is a 
staple in communications research textbooks.  Because of its constant comparison, 
interaction with the data, and focus on interrelationships among subjects of inquiry, 
this method represents a high level of fit for this study.   
 
Framing and Procedures 
Many media scholars have worked to deconstruct, interpret, and understand the 
rhetorical strategies news media use to relay information to the public.  Media 
theorists Yoonhyeung Choi and Ying-Hsuan Lin (2008) analyzed news coverage of 
three major hurricanes and concluded that, “as the primary means of communication 
between government agencies and the general public, the media play an important 
role in shaping [public perception]” (p. 294).  With grounded theory as its foundation, 
this study used framing methodology as its primary tool to determine, as did Choi and 
Lin, the many nuances in news media coverage that actively shape public perception.   
In addition, this study relied on methods related to discourse analysis and grounded 
theory to answer the central research question. The researcher used framing and 
discourse analysis procedures to identify and analyze the frames present in each 




Based on the frames identified in the news coverage, this study makes conclusions 
about the way news media treat issues of student freedom of speech and press.   
 
As media scholar Todd Gitlin (1980) argued, framing reflects “the principles of 
selection, emphasis and presentation composed of little tacit theories about what 
exists, what happens, and what matters” (p. 6).   A grounded theory approach to 
Gitlin’s framing could lead to identifying concepts, categories and hypotheses as 
discussed by grounded theorists J. Corbin and A. Strauss (1990; see also Glaser & 
Strauss, 1967).  So, identifying and grouping frames and themes from news media 
coverage that reflect similar or distinct selection, emphasis, or presentation into larger 
categories of understanding generates a guide, a key of sorts, for understanding the 
coverage.  
 
Media framing theorists Sei Hill Kim, Dietram A. Sheufele and James Shanahan 
(2002) have provided a useful approach to news media’s use of frames, and their 
concepts are invoked in this study.  These scholars argue that the news media create 
“interpretive packages” to make news easier to understand.  In doing so,  
[T]hese frames also serve as interpretive shortcuts for audience members, 
leading them to make attributions of responsibility or other judgments, based 
on different frames or interpretations offered by mass media for the same 
factual content. (p. 8) 
   
This approach to framing “assumes that it is ‘terminological or semantic differences’ 
in how an issue is described rather than the salience of an issue itself that evoke 
audience responses. In other words, different descriptions of the ‘same’ issue will be 





While grounded theory requires the researcher to withhold from solidifying thematic 
categories until all data has been interpreted and compared, Choi and Lin give 
suggestions for frames commonly used in the media, such as logical vs. emotional, 
and image-evoking vs. non-image-evoking.  Likewise, W.L.W. Siu (2008), in 
analyzing news discourse of teacher suicide, uses critical discourse analysis to 
“analyze the way power and news ideology are negotiated in the news discourse” (p. 
249).  This analysis gives way to exploration of social and political relationships as 
played out in the news media sphere.  These techniques are especially appropriate 
considering the potential for the revelation of ideology inherent in the way the news 
media cover student freedom issues. 
 
In order to determine the specific themes and frames the news media used in their 
coverage of scholastic speech and press rights, one must first acknowledge that “the 
semantic superstructure, the theme is important because it is important to the 
understanding of a text” (Sui, 2008, p. 249).  Analysis and examination of the news 
media coverage showed that words, phrases, sources, use of quotations, inclusion or 
omission of facts and the inherent themes present within the coverage all directly 
contributed to the construction of these themes.  In turn, the themes that emerged 
represented a reliable interpretation of the perceived meaning of the news text 
because “[w]hereas people may not recall specific details of news text, the semantic 
superstructure, the theme usually can be recognized as time goes by” (Sui, 2008, p. 




negotiated and constructed” (p. 250)—the reality of the importance of student press 
and speech issues portrayed in the text themselves.  As these emerging themes 
repeated themselves throughout the news media coverage in all court cases, and as 
certain themes proved to be stronger or weaker throughout time, they were 
consolidated into frames through which the news media presented information on the 
cases.  The frames reflected the ways in which the news media presented the students 
involved, the schools, the case itself, the students’ actions, the particular freedom in 
question, and the larger philosophical questions involved.  The specific frames that 
were uncovered are discussed fully in Chapter Six. 
 
Professor Robert M. Entman (1993), a leading scholar of media theory and framing 
expert, distinguishes framing as the purposeful selection or omission of information 
that creates a final news text, one in which the audience’s understanding is shaped in 
part by the inclusive or exclusive decisions of the author.  Because the reader had no 
part in the creation of the text, he is left only with the frame of reference or 
understanding the author created, ignorant to any alternative understanding.  In 
Entman’s words, “[t]o frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make 
them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular 
problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment 
recommendation for the item described” (p. 50).  By identifying frames used in a text, 
readers can identify “content and meaning reflecting a message consistent with the 
beliefs of the writer” (Sui, 2008, p. 250).  So, what reporters choose to disclose or 




or may not be the reality the reader would gather if writing or researching the story 
herself.    
 
In Framing Analysis: An Approach to News Discourse, authors Z. Pan and G.M. 
Kosicki found that strategies used to frame stories may reflect a hierarchy of 
importance the author constructs within the text, and may also facilitate the 
marginalization of perspectives by “attributing them to a social deviant” (Pan and 
Kosicki, 1993, p. 284).   Pan and Kosicki’s findings are relevant to this study because 
the frames that emerged from the news media coverage, at times, exposed this 
hierarchy of importance journalists created through their articles and editorials.  More 
specifically, journalists in this study used the following strategies to construct and 
present meaning in their texts: source selection, source identification, direct and 
indirect quotations, source placement within the story, rhetorical choices, extent of 
source coverage, and factual and source hierarchies.  This final strategy, the hierarchy 
of facts and sources as presented in the story, is used to guide the reader towards the 
most important information.  As Pan and Kosicki  (1993) demonstrated, the thematic 
structure of the media text generally lies in the lead, or the first few paragraphs, and is 
confirmed and supported in the remaining text.    
 
While a comprehensive examination of news media coverage of student press and 
speech rights would be an almost insurmountable task, by examining the news media 
strategies used to cover the eight cases analyzed here, this study aims to lay a 




differing nature of the legal cases, as well as the different locales from which they 
emerged, and the differing types of news media coverage explored, provided a 
broadstroke approach to an issue that has received no notable attention from media or 
legal scholars.   
 
Limitations 
A Note on Sample Size 
As with any study confined in scope by time and resources, this study has its 
limitations.  Such limitations are both practical and personal.  In this study, there was 
not a consistent level of coverage across cases.  Some court cases received 
considerable attention while others received next to none.  This type of limitation can 
neither be predicted nor remedied, but a thorough review of available databases and 
online records ensured no significant coverage was overlooked.  Because this study 
used online newspaper archives and educational and media databases to locate 
potential articles, those newspapers with no electronic records were eliminated from 
the search.  Due to the span in years covered by the court cases, older stories were 
less likely to be digitally archived, and researcher requests to newspapers for access 
to decades-old archives were at times ignored or rejected. 
 
There is no doubt the sample size of newspaper articles analyzed here is humble, with 
individual court case coverage ranging from zero articles to more than 40.  This span, 
and the disparate number of articles available for analysis in each court case, 




these scant or generous, unpredictable and at times incongruous levels of newspaper 
coverage are exactly what this study is designed to highlight.   Each time the courts in 
the U.S. lay down their gavels, law is made or altered.  In theory, these laws and 
alterations to existing law reflect legal interpretations of contemporary, community 
issues.  In effect, courts make history every day, and whether the U.S. news media 
bother to write about it—and in what way—is worth studying.     
 
Additionally, because the number of student First Amendment cases, as compared to 
other types of litigation, is relatively small, it is not surprising that newspaper 
coverage would also be somewhat limited.   Therefore, the coverage is relatively 
proportional to the occurrence of student First Amendment court cases (although, as 
discussed in the final chapter, proportionate does not necessarily mean adequate).  
And while the sample of articles for each individual court case studied here may 
fluctuate, the overall number of articles sampled across cases—98 stories, editorials 
and commentaries—represents a strong sample size.  In an online journal The 
Qualitative Report, researcher Margaret Myers (2000) noted that “small qualitative 
studies are not generalizable in the traditional sense, yet have redeeming qualities that 
set them above that requirement” (n.p).  These qualities include proliferation of 
knowledge through situational observations instead of truth a priori.  Knowledge and 
understanding happen incrementally, and this study is premised on the belief that any 
significant dip into knowledge making begins with an initial testing of the waters.  
And, as demonstrated in the final chapter, these waters run deep with potential for 





A Note on Grounded Theory Approach 
Using textual analysis to deconstruct media coverage implies some level of researcher 
bias.  By selecting the cases to be covered, the researcher implies a certain level of 
innate significance to some cases that others may not recognize.  To be sure articles 
used were representative of the news media’s coverage, the researcher selected cases 
that reached a level of legal significance, meaning they were tried or settled at least at 
the federal circuit level.  Cases decided at this level or beyond set precedent for First 
Amendment theory by either reversing or reinforcing prevailing court doctrine.  
 
This study cannot be representative of any and all news media coverage relating to 
student’s First Amendment rights; it is a limited selection of newspaper coverage on a 
limited number of legal cases.  Semantic and rhetorical limitations arise with the use 
of terms like “news media, citizenship, self-fulfillment, etc.”  Legal and scholarly 
understandings of these terms were provided to avoid confusion or misrepresentation.  
All of these limitations were the result of the researcher’s choices, and they were 






Chapter 5: Findings 
 
This chapter documents the findings of cases regarding high school and college 
students’ freedom of speech and press.  It reports on four high school cases and four 
college cases.  The cases are presented chronologically.  Each case section opens with 
a brief historical discussion of the time in which the case was filed as well as a 
discussion of relevant media and world events that could have impacted the scope and 
nature of coverage.  Then, each section outlines the main frames found within the 
articles and provides excerpts, analysis and extended discussion of these frames.  
Because each case generated articles with specific focuses, constructions, and themes, 
the categories across cases are similar but not identical.   
 
For each excerpt, a citation including the last name of the journalist and full name of 
the newspaper is provided to give background information on the excerpt’s source.  
Full newspaper source citations can be found in the appendix for each case.  While 
the effects of news media ownership and a reporter’s personal and political ideology 
on news media coverage are beyond the scope of this paper, this source information 
provided can be used as a tool in further understanding the different types of 







Tinker v. Des Moines 
Case filed: 1965 
Supreme Court ruled: 1969 
 
Make Peace, Not War: A Historical Perspective 
It was a decade of violence.  A decade of protest, a decade of love, and a decade of 
“Help” when the Beatles emerged on the music scene in full force.  When middle 
school student Mary Beth Tinker and her high school-aged brother John, as well as a 
handful of friends, decided to wear black armbands to school in 1965 to protest the 
Vietnam War, their actions reflected a growing nationwide concern.  Anti-war 
protests drew thousands in cities across the world, and personal demonstrations of 
protests ranged from commonplace picketing to rare violence, as evident when a man 
set himself on fire in front of the United Nations Building that year. 
 
Findings 
In hindsight, it is surprising that one of the most famed First Amendment cases 
received such little coverage while later cases generated more significant attention.  
This section summarizes the findings of the only two articles located which covered 
the court case Tinker vs. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 
U.S. 503 (1969).  This study looked at one article and one commentary, both in The 
New York Times.  The coverage spanned from February to March of 1969.    
 
Previous scholarly research into the Tinker case has discussed local coverage of the 




Student Rights: Tinker v. Des Moines and the 1960s, Johnson (1997) discusses the 
tenor of editorial coverage from the now-defunct Des Moines Tribune and its sister 
paper, the Des Moines Register.  His discussion suggests the local newspapers’ 
editorials hedged, offering pleas that the issue might be resolved in a timely and 
pleasant manner.  According to Johnson, one editorial snidely critiqued the school 
board’s dodging of the issue until the board realized the case wasn’t going away 
(Johnson, 1997).  Unfortunately this study was unable to discover that coverage.  
Archival and database searches found no such editorials, and a written request for 
direct copies from the Des Moines Register went unanswered.  A search of the Des 
Moines Register index for terms “Tinker” and “Tinker v. Des Moines” yielded no 
results.  
 
In light of this, the findings here are based solely on the two New York Times pieces.  
Appendix A provides a complete list of newspaper sources.  The article and 
commentary were both analyzed according to the central research question: 
RQ1: How do U.S. newspapers frame high school and college students’ right to 
freedom of speech and press? 
 
Analysis of the article and commentary focused on how the reporter: 
1. Provided legal context and case background  
2. Relayed court rulings and judges’ opinions  
3. Opined potential reactions from students 
4. Iterated legal limits of the ruling; and 
5. Characterized the court’s dissent 
 
In the Tinker case, the editorial voice was as significant as the straight news coverage, 




case.  Instead, the opinion column was an equally dominant vehicle for information 
regarding the case and the legal ruling.  Sections from the opinion column are 
grouped with similar excerpts from the straight news piece to show similarities and 
differences in the media coverage.  It is important to note that the same reporter wrote 
both the opinion column and the straight news article.  Traditionally, this would 
represent a conflict of interest and signal a level of bias in the reporter, since 
journalists do not usually write opinions on the same stories they cover. 
 
1. Providing Legal Context and Case Background 
Because Tinker marked the first significant case to rule on students’ First Amendment 
rights in schools, there was little legal context to which newspapers could refer.   As a 
result, both the opinion column and the straight news story referenced a 1943 
Supreme Court ruling that protects students from being forced to salute the American 
flag.  The opinion column gave no significant background on what happened in the 
Tinker case, but the straight news story devoted five paragraphs to case history.  
Interestingly, the paragraphs on case history first stated the claim that “school 
officials in Des Moines, Iowa, had violated the First Amendment rights of three 
children” (Graham, The New York Times, Feb. 25, 1969, italics added).  However, the 
article continued by providing the age range of those students involved, all of whom 
were ages 13-16, a range most would characterize as teenagers, not children. 
 
2. Relaying Court Ruling and Judges’ Opinions 
In describing what the court ruled and what the judges said, the straight news article 




she said” approach to this by allowing quotes from judges and the rulings to speak for 
themselves.  The author balanced the quotes from the judges’ favorable ruling for the 
students with a quote from dissenting Justice Hugo Black: 
“ ‘In our system, students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that which 
the state chooses to communicate’” (Graham, The New York Times, Feb. 25, 1969). 
 
“ ‘This is the more unfortunate for the schools,’ he [Black] said, ‘since groups of students all 
over the land are already running loose, conducting break-ins, sit-ins, lie-ins and smash-ins’” 
(Graham, The New York Times, March 2, 1969). 
 
The opinion column, however, was more descriptive and critical of the ruling, and 
went beyond merely reprinting the text of the decision: 
“The only real alternative to the decision was to say that students have no free speech rights, 
and the law had almost developed too far to take that position now” (Graham, The New York 
Times, March 2, 1969). 
 
“There is less than meets the eye to the Supreme Court’s new ruling that public school 
students have a constitutional right to be heard as well as seen” (Graham, The New York 
Times, March 2, 1969). 
 
“On the face of it, the Court seemed to be doing a groovy new thing” (Graham, The New York 
Times, March 2, 1969). 
 
3. Opining Potential Student Reactions 
The personal opinion column by Graham suggested students might have seen the 
ruling as a get-out-of-jail free card, protecting any and all bad behavior: 
“…some youngsters may have believed that they had scored in a big way” (Graham, The New 
York Times, March 2, 1969). 
However, Graham’s column later rejected this fear by noting the limitations of the 
ruling. 
“So before the school children of the country decide to begin swinging with their new 
constitutional rights, they would do well to read some of the fine print in the decision and 





In these excerpts, Graham assumed he knew how students would react to the ruling 
without actually providing first-hand responses from students.  This level of 
assumption is pretentious and contrary to common journalism ethics that advise 
journalists never to assume; Graham and the story would have been better served had 
he actually provided a student’s perspective on the case.   
 
The “fine print” Graham referred to was examined more thoroughly in both the 
straight news article and the opinion column as they iterated the legal limits of the 
ruling. 
 
4. Iterating Legal Limits of the Ruling 
The opinion column expressed concern about the restrictive standard of the ruling, 
but both the straight news article and the column cited similar circumstances that 
demonstrated the ruling’s limitations.  Note the similarities in these examples: 
“their rights included only political expression, and that the Federal courts would not become 
involved in disputes over the permissible length of students’ hair or skirts” (Graham, The New 
York Times, Feb. 25, 1969). 
 
“Finally, the student’s new right of expression does not help those who choose miniskirts and 
hippie hair styles as a way of expressing their individualism” (Graham, The New York Times, 
March 2, 1969). 
 
In his opinion column, Graham indicated he believed the ruling might still be overly 
restrictive, yet in his news article, he chose to emphasize the ruling’s narrow 
parameters: 
“the free speech right extended by the Supreme Court to students…a restrictive standard that 
will give school personnel power to limit students’ speech under many, and perhaps most, 
circumstances” (Graham, The New York Times, March 2, 1969). 
 
“Justice Abe Fortas emphasized in the Court’s opinion that school children’s free speech 
rights are limited to conduct that does not disrupt discipline or interfere with the rights of 





Even the headline in Graham’s column told of his uneasiness over the decision, and 
his column revealed his ambivalence toward the ruling: 
 “Freedom of Speech, But Not License” (Graham, The New York Times, March 2, 1969). 
 
“The Justices…realized when they extended the First Amendment’s free speech right to 
children that it would have to be a child-sized First Amendment—and so they trimmed it 
down to fit the occasion” (Graham, The New York Times, March 2, 1969). 
 
“Furthermore, free ‘speech’ to students means only non-disruptive talk, plus a narrow class of 
conduct called ‘symbolic speech,’ such as armbands, placards, and banners.  Last week’s 
decision specifically said that sit-ins, picketing and demonstrations are not protected” 
(Graham, The New York Times, March 2, 1969). 
 
“The Court had never before said that students of public schools—or colleges for that 
matter—have free speech rights that the courts will enforce against their elders” (Graham, The 
New York Times, March 2, 1969). 
 
This accurate characterization of the ruling’s precedence was downplayed in the 
straight news article: 
“today’s ruling marked the Supreme Court’s first ruling on the question of free speech rights” 
(Graham, The New York Times, Feb. 25, 1969). 
 
In discussing how the ruling might affect schools, Graham once again used the same 
examples in both his personal column and his news article: 
“Despite efforts by Justice Fortas to confine the ruling to narrow limits, it may make it more 
difficult for public schools to censor student publications or to purge school libraries or 
curriculums of ‘objectionable’ material” (Graham, The New York Times, Feb. 25, 1969). 
 
“The Supreme Court’s new decision will reinforce these actions and will probably pave the 
way for a few embellishments.  Students may get by with more criticism of teachers and 
school officials, and parents’ efforts to purge material they don’t like from the reading lists 
will probably be barred” (Graham, The New York Times, March 2, 1969). 
 
These similarities between the column and article serve to confound Graham’s 
position, making his opinion and reporting indistinguishable and, in part, chipping 
away at his credibility as a reporter.  Subsequently, it became entirely too difficult to 
judge whether his news analysis in the article was accurate or merely a toned-down 




appreciation for the ruling could help set the bar for public perception in those who 
read his stories, it also glossed over important details. 
 
5. Characterizing the Court’s Dissent 
Graham, in his news article, spent seven paragraphs discussing the court’s dissent 
from the perspectives of Justices Hugo Black and John M. Harlan as compared to two 
paragraphs on the dissent found in his opinion column.  Those seven paragraphs 
included a detailed description judge Black. 
“He objected that young persons are currently too prone to try to teach their elders rather than 
to learn from them, and that today’s ruling would make the situation worse” (Graham, The 
New York Times, Feb. 25, 1969). 
 
“Justice Black, whose dissents have tended to become longer and more acid in recent years, 
spoke extemporaneously for about 20 minutes this morning.  At one point he used mocking 
tones to quote from an old opinion with which he disagreed, and he finished by stating that ‘I 
want it thoroughly known that I disclaim any sentence, any word, any part of what the Court 
does today’” (Graham, The New York Times, Feb. 25, 1969). 
 
Graham ended his description of Black’s dissent with a single sentence that could be 
loaded with multiple implications: 
“Justice Black will observe his 83d [sic] birthday next Thursday” (Graham, The New York 
Times, Feb. 25, 1969). 
 
This factual statement is unusual and almost seems to imply more than the 
information given because Graham did not list the age of any other Supreme Court 
justice who ruled on the case.   The reader is left to conclude that this tidbit of 
information is significant and relevant to the court decision, and while that may very 
well be the case, Graham does not further develop his thought process, leaving the 





Justice Black’s dissent provided insight into one member of the Court’s perspective 
on students: disobedient rabble-rousers.  His wariness of students, and of student 
freedoms, demonstrated a skepticism found in many later rulings.  In fact, at one 
point Justice Black even appears to condemn the idea that free student expression can 
be a part of the educational experience: 
The original idea of schools, which I do not believe is yet abandoned as 
worthless or out of date, was that children had not yet reached the point of 
experience and wisdom which enabled them to teach all of their elders. It may 
be that the Nation has outworn the old-fashioned slogan that "children are to 
be seen not heard," but one may, I hope, be permitted to harbor the thought 
that taxpayers send children to school on the premise that at their age they 
need to learn, not teach. (Tinker vs. Des Moines Independent Community 
School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969), Justice Black, dissenting) 
 
Justice Black’s dissent was deserving of news media attention and public debate for 
the simple fact that Black, nominated by the president and appointed for life to the 
nation’s highest court, was expressing his belief that because schools accepted 
taxpayer dollars (taxes paid by adults, no less), that adult mandates for student 
behavior were the only acceptable educational approach.  Justice Black, while serving 
the public through government appointment, did not necessarily speak for all tax-
paying citizens, and therefore, the public had the right to a level of accountability for 
and discussion of the beliefs of those who hold public office. 
 
Perhaps more than any other case, the juxtaposition in Tinker coverage of a single 
news article and a single opinion column written by the same person represented an 
intrinsic dilemma journalists face in covering issues of student freedom of expression.  




esteemed front-page location, while Graham’s column was located inside the 
newspaper—whether Graham’s opinion column actually appeared in the opinion or 
op-ed section of the newspaper is unclear.  In separating the two articles, The New 
York Times did, on some level, distinguish between the significance of the case versus 
the importance of the writer’s opinion.  However, the fact that Graham wrote from 
both sides of the story is still an ethical problem.  Most journalists hold the concepts 
of freedom of speech and press in high esteem, so one would expect Graham to take 
this side in his opinion.  But as an adult, he might not agree that all ages share the 
same First Amendment rights.  Graham’s dual approach as reporter and columnist, 
journalist and adult, complicate the presentation of both pieces, leaving the reader 





Healy v. James 
Case filed: 1969 
Supreme Court ruled: 1972 
 
More than any other case analyzed in this study, Healy v. James is an enigma.  It is 
one of the most significant legal cases for student freedoms, and one that is oft-cited 
in legal and media textbooks.  However, archival searches turned up no coverage of 
the Supreme Court’s ruling on June 26, 1972, beyond several newspapers simply 
listing the case in their summaries of the Court’s business.  Instead of eliminating this 
case from the study and choosing another student First Amendment case, Healy v. 
James was retained as an extreme example of how these cases are eclipsed by other 
stories and to provide an opening to a broader discussion of why student First 
Amendment cases so often run hot or cold in the news media. 
Buried News 
Perhaps related to the lack of coverage, Healy v. James was decided and announced 
amid a slew of other rulings the Supreme Court released at the end of the its 1971-
1972 session.  Though the Court officially recessed on June 30, it released its final set 
of rulings on June 26, 1972.  That same day, the Court announced its decision to 
delay rulings on two politically heated cases, both challenging the constitutionality of 
anti-abortion legislation.  
 
Two other momentous political stories occurring at the same time might have 




Vietnam and the daily breaking news on peace talks and incursions into Cambodia 
were likely enough to steal the media spotlight.  But perhaps even more critical was 
the state-side news of the Watergate scandal, breaking in early June, 1972.  Three 
days before the Supreme Court released the Healy decision, details related to the 
Watergate reached a new level with presidential implications: President Nixon was 
taped when talking with chief of staff H.R. Haldeman about using the CIA to interfere 
with the FBI investigation of the break-in (“Richard M. Nixon: The Watergate 
Tapes”).  All eyes were on the government, and few stories beyond the Watergate 
agenda made it to the presses. 
 
Aside from Watergate, news media focus in June of 1972 was also on catastrophes, as 
a string of important events overseas and at home captured the media’s attention. 
Between a plane crash in England, trains colliding in France, a hurricane slamming 
the East Coast and floods in South Dakota, man-made and natural disasters were 
responsible for the deaths of hundreds.  Internationally, a grand political gesture was 
made on June 17 with the return of Okinawa to Japan, and on the same day, Chile 
announced a new form of government.  Just days after the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Healy v. James, major shifts in U.S. policy were still occurring; Nixon’s 
announcement that no new draftees would be sent to Vietnam marked a shift in 
military strategy for the conflict.  Finally, a dramatic ruling by the Supreme Court 
making the death penalty unconstitutional was released on June 29, 1972, just three 





In the media world, technology was at the forefront with the first public 
demonstration of ARPANET at the International Conference of Computer 
Communications in Washington, D.C. (Sheddon, 2009).  Newsrooms across the 
country also began slowly integrating computer interfaces into their newsrooms 
(Sheddon, 2009). 
 
The fact that no significant coverage of this case was found could be indicative of the 
low priority the news media place on stories relating to student freedom of 
expression.  While it is understandable to note that other, perhaps even more 
significant, events were taking place around the same time period, the fact that a case 
of this scope went essentially unnoticed at the time hints at the news media’s regard 
for student issues. 
 
Had media been paying attention, they could have written about Justice William O. 
Douglas’ separate concurring opinion that highlighted other pressing issues in 
academia at the time.  His opinion expressed his concern that universities were not 
keeping up with the changing tides: 
Many, inside and out of faculty circles, realize that one of the main problems 
of faculty members is their own re-education or re-orientation. Some have 
narrow specialties that are hardly relevant to modern times. History has passed 
others by, leaving them interesting relics of a bygone day. More often than not 
they represent those who withered under the pressures of McCarthyism or 
other forces of conformity and represent [408 U.S. 169, 197] but a timid 
replica of those who once brought distinction to the ideal of academic 
freedom. (Justice Douglas, concurring) 
 
The opinion suggested that, given the struggles of the 1960s and 70s, the case was 




implication of this case reaching the Supreme Court was that it reflected a rather ill 
academy: 
Students - who, by reason of the Twenty-sixth Amendment, become eligible 
to vote when 18 years of age - are adults who are members of the college or 
university community. Their interests and concerns are often quite different 
from those of the faculty. They often have values, views, and ideologies that 
are at war with the ones which the college has traditionally espoused or 
indoctrinated. When they ask for change, they, the students, speak in the 
tradition of Jefferson and Madison and the First Amendment. 
The First Amendment does not authorize violence. But it does authorize 
advocacy, group activities, and espousal of change. 
The present case is minuscule in the events of the 60's and 70's. But the fact 
that it has to come here for ultimate resolution indicates the sickness of our 
academic world, measured by First Amendment standards. Students as well as 
faculty are entitled to credentials in their search for truth. If we are to become 
an integrated, adult society, rather than a stubborn status quo opposed to 
change, students and faculties should have communal interests in which each 
age learns from the other. Without ferment of one kind or another, a college or 
university (like a federal agency or other human institution) becomes a useless 
appendage to a society which traditionally has reflected the spirit of rebellion. 
(Justice Douglas, concurring) 
 
Essentially, the entirety of Douglas’ concurring opinion is a treatise on the state of 
education—primary, secondary and higher—in the early 1970s.  Given that no other 
justices joined his separate yet concurring opinion in the case, it can be assumed that 
Douglas’ thoughts were not shared by the rest of the majority.  This, then, was a news 
story that the media could have profitably written about. Douglas’ opinion noted a 
change in American ideals; and his authoring of an individual opinion suggested that 
there might be a shifting taking place in the balance and mentality of the court—both 






It is likely inaccurate to assume Healy v. James did not receive any news media 
coverage.  That no coverage could be found in the databases this study utilized, and 
through targeted searches of local and state newspaper archives, is potentially a result 
of the era of the coverage and the relatively slow nature in which decades-old 
newspaper articles become publicly archived.  Still, that no major national news 
media voices, such as The New York Times or The Washington Post, gave the story 
substantial coverage is a gross oversight.   
 
There are perhaps many reasons why student First Amendment issues, as a whole and 
as demonstrated in the rest of this chapter and Chapter Six, receive such little 
attention.  While this study was not designed to address this “why” question, the news 
media response to Healy v. James provided an opportunity to address possible 
reasons.  This section introduced some immediate reasons why the case received such 
little attention; the conclusions chapter contains a more thorough discussion of news 






Papish v. Board of Curators 
Case filed: 1969 
Supreme Court ruled: 1973 
 
Testing the Limits of Personal Freedom: A Historical Perspective 
When Papish v. Board of Curators hit the Supreme Court in March of 1973, the 
Court had a docket full of personal freedom-testing cases.  Roe v. Wade was decided 
in January the same year, and Papish was closely followed in June by the infamous 
Miller v. California case, which tested (and consequently reestablished) the limits of 
Constitutionally protected obscenity.  On some levels, the Miller case was the legal 
embodiment of the cultural hoopla observed after a Pacifica station aired the 
uncensored version of George Carlin’s skit containing his list of “Seven Words You 
Can Never Say on Television.”  The broadcast of that skit would later go to the 
Supreme Court in 1978 after the FCC put Pacifica’s station WBAI on notice for the 
broadcast, and the nation’s first formal indecency laws were established for the 
airwaves. 
Despite efforts to tame media content, the political landscape engendered a 
significant amount of dissent in 1973, and news media coverage followed.  Protestors 
demonstrated against the inauguration of U.S. President Richard Nixon, and secret 
peace talks between the U.S. and North Vietnam were underway.  A peace agreement 
was eventually signed, but antiwar protesters continued as pressure mounted on 
Congress to pass the War Powers Act, which essentially limited the ability of future 




Powers Act Works,” New York Times, 1984).  Meanwhile, the first of the Watergate 
burglars pleaded guilty in federal court. 
Findings 
This chapter summarizes the findings of a sample of 10 articles covering the court 
case Papish v. Board of Curators of the University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973).  
This study looked at nine articles from local newspapers and one article from a 
national newspaper.  Of the 10 articles analyzed, there was one local editorial.  The 
coverage spanned from Sept. 20, 1972 to April 14, 1973.  Appendix B provides a 
complete list of newspaper sources.  The articles were analyzed according to the 
central research question: 
RQ1: How do U.S. newspapers frame high school and college students’ right to 
freedom of speech and press? 
 
Analysis of the articles, editorials and commentaries focused on how the reporters: 
1. Established case background  
2. Provided legal context 
3. Relayed court rulings and judges’ opinions  
4. Described the student’s position  
5. Described the school’s position; and 
6. Characterized and editorialized the lawsuit 
 
 
Unlike some cases, news media coverage of the Papish case did not include 
significant use of expert testimony.  There was also little discussion regarding 
potential effects of the ruling on greater issues of student press and student rights.  A 
single editorial provided perspective on how professional journalists viewed the case 








1. Establishing Case Background 
While news media coverage of other cases involving prior review or censorship often 
substituted a euphemism for the word “censorship,” this was not true for Papish.  
Because censorship itself is a proactive measure—prohibiting the publication or 
expression of something—and the actions in Papish were reactive, the focus shifted 
to terms used to describe her being removed from the university.   Descriptions of 
what happened to Barbara Papish after she published her underground newspaper 
were almost evenly split between two words: “expelled” and “dismissed.”  Three 
articles and one editorial used the term “dismissed,” while five articles used the term 
“expelled.”  One article used both terms interchangeably.   
 
As with the use of the word “censorship” in coverage of other cases, euphemistic 
substitutions in the Papish coverage could imply entirely different meanings for any 
given reader.  The seemingly slight difference in word choice between “expelled” and 
“dismissed” actually represents two entirely separate implications about what 
happened to Barbara Papish.  The word “dismissed” is much less forceful and can 
even imply a level of compliance or acceptance on Papish’s part, while the word 
“expelled” clearly indicates a retaliatory act of punishment. 
 
Interestingly, only one article provided background information on Papish’s academic 




“When dismissed, Ms. Papish was on both academic and disciplinary probation at the 
university.  The university had claimed in its case against Ms. Papish that the question of her 
removal for distributing “indecent” literature was moot because she had failed also to fulfill 
scholastic requirements while on academic probation.  The failure to fill these requirements 
also would keep her from returning to UMC, university attorneys had claimed” (Noblin, 
Columbia (MO) Daily Tribune, March 19, 1973). 
 
Why only one article included this information is unknown.  To include this 
information could suggest the court case is about something other than Papish’s right 
to distribute an underground newspaper; it minimizes her agency as a person entitled 
to First Amendment protections according to the law and essentially makes the case 
an issue of behavior.  In doing so, this contextual addition could also perpetuate the 
notion that the First Amendment only applies to thought and speech that is publically 
acceptable.  On the contrary, the Supreme Court’s ruling confined itself to the 
question of whether Papish’s expulsion was legitimate by noting only in passing that 
“disenchantment with Miss Papish's performance, understandable as it may have 
been, is no justification for denial of constitutional rights” (Papish v. Board of 
Curators of the University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973), footnote 1). 
 
2. Providing Legal Context 
Only two articles and one editorial provided any amount of legal context by 
referencing contemporary legal constraints on students.  One article referenced Healy 
as the reigning legal standard (the case was referenced multiple times in the Court’s 
opinion), while another referenced a general order from Missouri that was discussed 
during the court case.  The editorial referenced neither but instead provided a single, 
general paragraph describing student freedom of expression law. 
“…the case he was referring to involved the recognition of the Students for Democratic 
Society (SDS) at a Connecticut university.  That university had refused recognition, but 
recognition was mandated by the Supreme Court.  Wulff said that case was the landmark 




merely affirmed the court’s previous decision” (Noblin, Columbia Daily Tribune, March 19, 
1973). 
 
“However, the District Court for the Western District of Missouri, in a 1971 decision, issued a 
‘General Order’ which provides that universities and colleges may ‘…require scholastic 
attainments higher than the average of the population and may require superior ethical and 
moral behavior.  In establishing standards of behavior, the institution is not limited to the 
standards or the forms of criminal law’” (Vandiver, Columbia Daily Tribune, Dec. 2, 1972). 
 
“There has developed quite a body of law which says that schools and universities can make 
rules for student conduct to preserve the educational function.  These rules do not always have 
to follow precisely the same guidelines that would apply to individual citizens off the campus.  
Due process must be exercised in imposing penalties under university rules, but once this has 
been established the courts have been relatively lenient in permitting regulations of strict 
substance” (Staff, Columbia Daily Tribune, March 20, 1973). 
 
 
3. Relaying Court Ruling and Judges’ Opinions 
Descriptions of what the court ruled ranged from sweeping interpretations that served 
to place the ruling in a greater context of student First Amendment rights, to more 
narrow descriptions that confined the scope of the ruling to the university: 
“The court ruling yesterday said universities cannot impose free speech regulations on 
students if those regulations are stricter than the First Amendment” (Noblin, Columbia Daily 
Tribune, March 20, 1973). 
 
“The high court ruled today that universities cannot impose free speech regulations on 
students if those regulations are stricter than the First Amendment” (Noblin, Columbia Daily 
Tribune, March 19, 1973). 
 
“State university officials cannot shut off the dissemination of offensive ideas by expelling a 
student who circulates them in print, the Supreme Court ruled today” (Weaver, The New York 
Times, March 20, 1973). 
 
“The court ruled recently that the university was wrong in expelling Ms. Papish in 1969 for 
distributing on the Columbia campus an underground newspaper which the university deemed 
to be indecent and obscene” (Staff, Columbia Daily Tribune, April 14, 1973). 
 
“The court’s recent ruling held that the university could not expel Ms. Papish for distributing 
an underground newspaper which the university deemed ‘indecent’ on the Columbia campus” 
(Noblin, Columbia Daily Tribune, April 6, 1973). 
 
Use of direct quotations from the ruling was sparse, and only one article devoted 
significant space to the court’s dissenters.  In that article, the dissent received 
approximately four paragraphs out of an approximately 11-paragraph story.  




used in court.  This pattern provided little discussion and context as to how the court 
reached its decision and what the ramifications of that decision were. 
 
As in Healy, the two separate dissenting opinions provided significant insight into the 
Court’s approach to the case.  In his dissent, Justice Warren Burger submitted that  
A university is not merely an arena for the discussion of ideas by students and 
faculty; it is also an institution where individuals learn to express themselves 
in acceptable, civil terms. We provide that environment to the end that 
students may learn the self-restraint necessary to the functioning of a civilized 
society and understand the need for those external restraints to which we must 
all submit if group existence is to be tolerable” (Papish v. Board of Curators 
of the University of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973), Burger, dissenting). 
 
Also dissenting were Justices William Rehnquist and Harry Blackmun, who took 
their argument a step further by arguing that, were the Court to continue to support 
such actions at public universities, tax-payers might also become “disenchanted” with 
higher education’s role in civil society.  These separate but similar dissents 
demonstrated a significant departure from the Healy ruling and in some ways 
anticipated rulings in future cases such as Hazelwood by reinforcing the argument for 
society-enforced civility as a function of public education. 
 
4. Describing the Student’s Position 
To describe the situation, two articles—one from 1972 and one from 1973—quoted 
Papish directly, using her opinions to shore up the articles’ account of her First 
Amendment claims and antagonized position.  However, out of 10 articles, only two 
reporters used Papish as a primary source.  Instead, most articles simply quoted from 




Many articles offered no content procured either directly or indirectly that conveyed 
the student’s position, instead confining the stories to an account of the legal 
proceedings.  Still, that any article quoted Papish is a step beyond other newspapers’ 
coverage of student First Amendment cases.  It must be noted, however, that the 
quotations that were obtained from Papish did little to flesh out the discussion about 
the extent of students’ First Amendment rights.  Instead, they were rather superficial 
and, in the case of the second quotation, were not entirely flattering: 
“ ‘I hope I win.’ She added if the case were decided in her favor, ‘It would give me great 
pleasure to return to Missouri next fall’” (Staff, Columbia Daily Tribune, Sept, 20, 1972). 
 
“ ‘I am very happy and very surprised,’ she said. ‘With the Nixon government, you never 
know what to expect. But there never should have been a trial at all,’ she concluded. ‘The 
university should have realized in the first place that there is a Bill of Rights’” (Noblin, 
Columbia Daily Tribune, March 19, 1973). 
 
5. Describing the School’s Position 
Comments from the university were more common amid the articles than were 
comments from Papish, and three of the articles were directly written from the angle 
of the university’s position and/or disagreement with the ruling.  One article was 
written with the headline “MU dean upset by decision” (Noblin, Columbia Daily 
Tribune, March 20, 1973).  In total, the university’s position received considerably 
more coverage than did Papish’s position.  One article framed the school’s position 
against Papish as an issue of decency versus offensiveness and suggested a hierarchy 
of protected speech: 
“ ‘I grew up in Sedalia and by the time I was six I could match any of the language of the 
railroaders,’ Thelen [school dean] said. ‘When I came to the university, I tried to improve my 
language. I hope I’ve learned to express myself in a decent manner.  There’s no place for that 
kind of language here’” (Noblin, Columbia Daily Tribune, March 20, 1973-brackets added). 
 
“ ‘This business of four-letter words is immature,’ he [university board member] said. ‘Those 




because in this case they came off a typewriter, that dignifies them any’” (Noblin, Columbia 
Daily Tribune, March 20, 1973-brackets added). 
 
There were no direct quotations from Papish in these articles to respond to the 
perspectives of the dean and school board member. 
 
6. Characterizing and Editorializing the Lawsuit 
The articles as a whole were largely devoid of modifiers that could be construed to 
characterize the lawsuit in a positive or negative light.  Only one article called the 
lawsuit a “battle,” using a loaded noun to illuminate the difference between stories 
written decades ago and today’s coverage of similar court cases (see Utica and Morse 
for more discussion).  This lack of characterization could represent more strict 
journalism standards against such embellishments, or it could signify an uninterested 
press that deemed the case relatively unimportant and therefore did not write to the 
scope of the case.  However, a single editorial voice (Staff, Columbia (MO) Daily 
Tribune, March 20, 1973) backed Papish (although it hedged its bet not on Papish’s 
right to voice vulgar and obscene opinions but on the school’s authoritarian stance) 
and characterized the school’s administration as Machiavellian despots: 
 “A First Amendment victory” (headline). 
 
 “This is a good decision.” 
 
“Not because there was anything of particular value in the message Ms. Papish was trying to 
distribute.  As a matter of fact, the underground newspaper was not an important organ of 
communication and would not have received much notoriety at all except for that which the 
traumatized university officials gave it” (emphasis added). 
 
“The court decision was good because it said that those officials should not have taken it upon 
themselves to judge the quality or propriety of the communication – this should be left to 
individuals who had the options of either refraining from reading the paper, rejecting the 
message after reading it or accepting it.” 
 
“The First Amendment says that the people should be allowed to make these choices for 
themselves.  Let all kinds of information flow and let the people use their individual powers 






“The primary tool of the despot is the ‘judging’ of information for the ‘benefit’ of the people 
he would control.” 
 
 “Trust the folks, you high muckedy-mucks. It’s their system, not yours.” 
 
This editorial position coincided with a “marketplace of ideas” approach to the First 
Amendment.  By supporting all kinds of speech in the marketplace, it argued that 
individuals must be allowed to choose for themselves that speech which they believe 
is most true and which most resonates with their own personal values. 
 
On the whole, analysis of the Papish coverage shed light on some of the secondary 
research questions by showing that newspapers focused mostly on the student, the 
court ruling and the school’s position.  The analysis invoked these secondary research 
questions: 
RQ2: How do U.S. newspapers characterize high school and/or college 
students who initiate legal action to protect freedom of speech or press rights? 
 
RQ3: To what extent do U.S. newspapers provide a legal framework to 
contextualize the speech and press rights high school and college students 
currently possess? 
 
RQ5: How do U.S. newspapers characterize the role and importance of free 
speech and free press in college? 
 
RQ7: Do U.S. newspapers support college students’ freedom of speech and 
press? If so, to what extent? 
 
 
The focus on Barbara Papish’s academic record and activities as a student 
demonstrated the journalists’ attention not only to the legal claim but also to the 
personal characteristics of the students involved.  At times, it seemed as if it were not 




debate— Papish was often characterized in ways that made her appear as an 
aggressor picking a fight.  Since this case is one of the first to deal directly with 
student free speech rights, the legal context is vague and superficial.  It could be 
argued, in reference to RQ3, that there was little legal framework from which a 
reporter could draw significant legal context.  However, the strong—if lone—
editorial voice and characterizations in the news articles spoke to RQ7.   Because the 
coverage included only one article from the national press, the analysis results reflect 
news media coverage that was hyper-local.  Whether the national press as a whole 
would have taken the same approach, with similarly strong sentiments as found in the 






Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier 
Case filed: 1983 
Supreme Court ruled: 1988 
 
Signs of the Times: A Historical Perspective 
As the Hazelwood East High School newspaper, The Spectrum, wrapped up 
publication during 1983 school year, two articles piqued the principal’s attention.  
The stories—discussing pregnant students and the effects of divorce on teenagers—
were subsequently pulled from the paper, and the student editors objected.  After five 
years in the justice system, the case, Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, was granted certiorari 
by the Supreme Court and decided in January of 1988.  In the year preceding the 
ruling, a number of national and world events changed history. 
 
In many respects, it was a year of pushed boundaries and uncertain fears, as the Holy 
See condemned artificial insemination and for the first time an eyewitness described 
the Unabomber leaving the scene of a bombing in Utah.  In August 1987, the Federal 
Communications Commission rescinded the Fairness Doctrine, in a sense 
deregulating broadcast content but opening the door to years of similar questions over 
fairness and access.  This occurred just two months after then-President Reagan’s 
famous demand: “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall.”  This affront on communism 
was broadcast across the world and was seen by many as the beginning of an end to 





In the media world, invisible lines were also being crossed.  The debut of The 
Simpsons as brief cartoons on the Tracey Ullman Show was met with mixed emotion 
for its dysfunctional depiction of an American family and its glorification of 
rebellious children.  
 
In schools, parents and educators were advocating pedagogical change based on the 
1983 report from the National Commission on Excellence in Education, “A Nation at 
Risk.”  The report documented “widespread failure in American schools” (Lips, 
2008) and likened the state of education to a war-crime against students: “If an 
unfriendly foreign power had attempted to impose on America the mediocre 
education performance that exists today, we might well have viewed it as an act of 
war” (“A Nation At Risk,” 1983).  The Report chastised the political powers that sat 
idle as educational systems crumbled and also critiqued a dominant American 
mentality that the Report claimed failed to see the bigger picture and purpose of 
education.  So, the Report issued a challenge not only to reshape U.S. schools, but 
also to reshape the place of America in McLuhan’s larger “global village.” 
Our concern, however, goes well beyond matters such as industry and 
commerce. It also includes the intellectual, moral, and spiritual strengths of 
our people which knit together the very fabric of our society. The people of 
the United States need to know that individuals in our society who do not 
possess the levels of skill, literacy, and training essential to this new era will 
be effectively disenfranchised, not simply from the material rewards that 
accompany competent performance, but also from the chance to participate 
fully in our national life. A high level of shared education is essential to a free, 
democratic society and to the fostering of a common culture, especially in a 






It is a distinct combination of these dynamics that shaped the perspective of both the 
news media’s and the Supreme Court’s view of what happened at Hazelwood East. 
 
Findings 
This section summarizes the findings of 10 articles covering the court case 
Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier et al., 484 U.S. 260 (1988).  All 10 articles used in this study 
were from non-local state or national newspapers.  Of those, six were editorials or 
commentaries.  The coverage spanned one year, from March 3, 1987 to May 29, 
1988.  Appendix C provides a complete list of newspaper sources.  The articles were 
analyzed according to the central research question: 
RQ1: How do U.S. newspapers frame high school and college students’ right to 
freedom of speech and press?  
 
Analysis of the articles, editorials and commentaries focused on how the reporters: 
1. Established case background 
2. Relayed court rulings and judges’ opinions   
3. Explained effects of ruling 
4. Provided legal context 
5. Described community and expert response  
6. Described dissent; and 
7. Analyzed the role of the First Amendment in society and schools 
 
 
1. Establishing Case Background 
In establishing the case background, reporters generally focused on the original action 
that led to the lawsuit and the students’ claims, while at times supporting those claims 






Only one article, in describing the action that initiated the lawsuit, used the word 
“censorship.”  Others, including two opinion articles and one editorial, used 
euphemisms to describe what happened: 
“The case arose in 1983 when the principal of a high school in Hazelwood, Mo., a suburb of 
St. Louis, removed, without consulting the student editors, two pages from The Spectrum” 
(Hechinger, The New York Times, Jan. 17, 1988). 
 
“The case, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, No. 86-836, began in 1983, when the 
principal ordered deletion before publication of two full pages of the newspaper because he 
objected to two articles” (Taylor, The New York Times, Oct. 14, 1987). 
 
“He did not allow Spectrum, the school-financed newspaper, to publish articles on teen-age 
pregnancy and the impact of divorce” (Goldstein, The New York Times, May 29, 1988). 
 
“When the principal saw the proofs of the last issue of the school year in May 1983, he 
rejected two pages of the paper” (Staff, New York Times, Jan. 15, 1988). 
 
“The case began in May, 1983, when a high school principal in Hazelwood, Mo., deleted two 
pages from the school newspaper” (Taylor, The New York Times, Jan. 14, 1988). 
 
Interestingly, one article took a slightly different approach in its description of what 
caused the lawsuit: 
“The case, Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, grew out of a long-standing conflict 
between two theories of education” (Hechinger, The New York Times, Jan. 17, 1988). 
 
This description hints at a larger issue—one that lies deep within the heart of 
American pedagogy but is not explored to any significant extent in the remainder of 
the article.  This allusion to what was likely a complicated and profound conflict 
gives short shrift to the real issues involved with censorship and was an example of 
the news media oversimplifying what, in reality, should have been a more substantial 
discussion on educational theory. 
 The trend towards euphemistic word choice to describe what happened 
contradicted the language used in the Supreme Court ruling.  Both the dissent and the 
majority ruling in Hazelwood exclusively used the term “censor” and its many 




fact, the majority ruling used iterations of the word “censor” 34 times throughout the 
ruling, while the dissent used the term 22 times.  Whether journalists used other word 
choices besides “censorship” out of attempts to avoid the mundane or fear of 
repetition was beside the point.  Using any word other than the legal term denudes the 
seriousness of the charge and minimizes the students’ claim. 
 
The student journalists 
Reporters most commonly described the student editors’ claim as a “charge” that the 
principal’s actions amounted to prior restraint and therefore violated the students’ 
First Amendment rights.  While journalists tend to judge the quality of their own and 
others’ work by its sourcing and use of primary materials, only two articles included 
any significant account or analysis of the stories that were censored.  However, one 
opinion article and one straight news story used multiple sentences to describe the 
stories that were pulled: 
“The articles that the Hazelwood principal removed contained statistical information on teen-
age pregnancies in Missouri and nationwide.  They included accounts, based on interviews, 
on how three unidentified teenagers had been affected by unwanted pregnancies.  They also 
dealt with birth control, mainly in terms of what groups such as the Alan Guttmacher Institute 
and Planned Parenthood were saying” (Hechinger, The New York Times, Oct. 27, 1987). 
 
“The Spectrum’s embattled articles did not seem in any way disruptive.  The originals, 
furnished by the Student Press Law Center, an organization based in Washington that 
researches and reports on controversies involving high school and college publications by 
students, show that the articles dealing with teen-age pregnancies contained statistical 
information, both nationwide and for Missouri.  They included accounts, based on personal 
interviews, of how three teen-agers, not identified by name, were affected by unwanted 
pregnancies…They also warned that 75 percent of teen-age marriages end in divorce” 
(Hechinger, The New York Times, Jan. 17, 1988). 
 
“The issue here is the principal’s assertion that certain topics – even if they are of legitimate 
interest to students – are automatically taboo, even if the topics figure prominently in public 
discussion and are, as in the case at hand, treated seriously” (Hechinger, The New York Times, 





By including these descriptions of the stories in question, the articles demonstrated a 
level of independent journalistic investigation not achieved by the rest of the 
coverage.  As an editorial noted: 
“The student journalists made mistakes but deserved commendation as well as correction.  
They tackled tough subjects, where many school newspapers content themselves with 
publishing dull community billboards.  They did so in a serious way” (Staff, The New York 
Times, Jan. 15, 1988). 
 
2. Relaying the Court Ruling and Judges’ Opinions 
Reporters relied heavily both on direct quotations from the court ruling and on 
summary analysis to explain how the justices ruled in the case.  Almost every article 
cited a direct quotation either from the ruling or the judges’ majority or dissenting 
opinions—and sometimes used quotations from both.  Most of the quotations used 
reiterated the ruling’s position that restriction of student newspaper content was 
permissible because of students’ age and maturity level, as well as the formative 
nature of school activities.   
“ ‘A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational 
mission, even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school,’ 
Justice Byron R. White wrote in issuing the decision” (Watson, San Jose (CA) Mercury News, 
Jan. 14, 1988). 
 
“Justice White upheld the school authorities’ right to censor speech that is ‘ungrammatical, 
poorly written, inadequately researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable 
for immature audiences’” (Hechinger, The New York Times, Jan. 17, 1988). 
 
One article’s lead elevated the school’s position by implying the principal’s “right to 
censor” already existed, and the principal was merely defending this right: 
“School administrators and student editors faced each other last week before the Supreme 
Court as a school board defended a principal’s right to censor the student newspaper” 
(Hechinger, The New York Times, Oct. 27, 1987). 
 
This seemingly innocuous twist of rhetoric stripped power and position from the 




initiated the lawsuit—but this article instead placed the focus on the school’s defense 
of its “right to censor.” 
 
Other articles— two straight news stories and one editorial—chose to frame the case 
in terms of its overall significance: 
“the U.S. Supreme Court ruled Wednesday that school newspapers and other forms of student 
expression are not protected by the First Amendment” (Watson, San Jose Mercury News, Jan. 
14, 1988). 
 
“The Supreme Court gave public officials sweeping power to censor school-sponsored student 
publications yesterday, rejecting the complaints of three dissenting justices that it was 
approving ‘brutal censorship’” (Kamen, The Washington Post, Jan. 14, 1988). 
 
“The Supreme Court has upheld in broadest terms the power of public school authorities to 
control the content of school newspapers” (Staff, The New York Times, Jan. 15, 1988). 
 
3. Explaining the Effects of the Ruling 
More than the straight news stories, opinions and editorials tended to explain the 
immediate outcome of the ruling and potential effects by focusing on two aspects: the 
effects of the ruling on student press, and the larger issue of student freedoms.  The 
majority of these editorial and opinion pieces wasted no space in painting the ruling 
as the demise of scholastic journalism. 
“The remaining Associate Justices…set journalism for high school students back 20 years” 
(Hechinger, The New York Times, Oct. 27, 1987). 
 
“This decision gives the impression that journalists lose some of their free-press rights when 
they go through the high school door” (Hechinger, The New York Times, Oct. 27, 1987). 
 
“Now just about any educational reason will justify heavy editing and outright exclusion of 
student articles” (Staff, The New York Times, Jan. 15, 1988). 
 
“But the Court’s affirmation puts heavy responsibility on how educators will use that 
authority” (Staff, The New York Times, Jan. 15, 1988). 
 
“It is ironic that the same institution in which students learn of America’s bountiful freedoms 
has become a shelter for unrestrained and unjustified censorship” (Achorn, The (Harrisburg, 





“The outcome could have a lasting effect on student journalism and young people’s views 
about freedom of the press and responsibility” (Hechinger, The New York Times, Jan. 17, 
1988). 
 
One reporter, writing an opinion piece, interpreted the ruling as simply pragmatic, 
noting that even the very opinion piece he was writing was subject to content control 
by a higher-up.  The piece suggested that all writing, when part of a business or 
publication, is subject to some degree of scrutiny and content control, which at times 
appears as censorship. Instead of the devastating blow to student freedoms, as seen by 
other writers, the opinion viewed the ruling as a reality check. 
“one unintended positive feature is that student writers will now get a more realistic view of 
how the publishing world works…Student journalists now have to face the awful truth that all 
professional and amateur writers face: not everything they write will be published” 
(Goldstein, The New York Times, May 29, 1988). 
 
This analysis ignored the fact that as an arm of the government, public schools are not 
private book publishers and so must observe the letter and spirit of First Amendment 
as much as Congress or any other government branch.  Whether this omission of 
detail in his comparison was purposeful or the result of ignorance matters little since 
the overall effect was still the same: to give the impression that government 
interference with First Amendment expression is the same as editorial discretion at a 
private publisher. 
 
In addition to explaining the potential effects of the ruling, a handful of articles went 
so far as to discuss what was at stake ethically, pedagogically, and politically, if 
students were censored.  Much of this discussion took place within the confines of 
editorials and opinion pieces, in which the writers could take greater liberties in word 
choice and voice.  However, the lone editorial voice spent a great deal of space 




“The 5-to-3 majority is basically correct in upholding the authority of educators over students 
of this age.” 
 
“The court made a practical decision about responsibility and control of student expression at 
the high school level.  It is of enormous importance, however, that this power not be exercised 
to prevent students from investigating matters of high interest, sensitivity and relevance to the 
school community.  The decision is a challenge to educators to help their students tell the 
story fairly and accurately, not to squelch them.”  
 
“It’s a pity that the justices, who did not hesitate to sustain school officials beyond the strict 
needs of the case before them, could not find space to admonish school systems to wield their 
power with wisdom, care and restraint” (Staff, New York Times, Jan. 15, 1988). 
 
One columnist did not hesitate to elaborate on the high stakes involved in the ruling.  
“If hard issues that trouble teen-agers are to be off limits, there will be no need to shut school 
papers down – they won’t be read anyway”  
 
“This means that the Court may have to come up with a fair and workable definition that is 
educationally sound without ignoring students’ First Amendment rights.  Telling school 
administrators to keep hands off completely is educationally hard to defend.  But so is 
muzzling adolescent expression, with the effect of making school newspapers dull, 
intellectually bankrupt and unread” (Hechinger, The New York Times, Jan. 17, 1988). 
 
 
4. Providing Legal Context 
Because the 1969 Tinker case set precedent in regards to student freedoms, almost all 
the reporters and commentators who provided legal context for the Hazelwood case 
explicitly referenced Tinker.  In most instances, the writer used Tinker to demonstrate 
exactly how incongruous the Hazelwood decision appeared. 
“Student newspapers have come to rely on their First Amendment rights since a 1969 
Supreme Court declaration that students do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of 
speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate.’ In that case, the justices concluded that 
students had a right to wear black armbands to school as part of a non-disruptive protest of 
U.S. involvement in the Vietnam war” (Watson, San Jose Mercury News, Jan. 14, 1988). 
 
“The ruling was a departure from a key 1969 ruling, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent 
Community School District, in which the court said officials could not expel students wearing 
black armbands to protest the Vietnam War” (Kamen, The Washington Post, Jan. 14, 1988). 
 
There was one reporter—Stuart Taylor, a Harvard Law graduate—who suggested 
implicitly that Tinker was perhaps the incongruous ruling, and that Hazelwood was a 




“Under the Court’s precedents, government officials have very little latitude to limit 
expression in a ‘public forum’” (Taylor, The New York Times, Jan. 14, 1988). 
 
Another article suggested that even attorneys for the student journalists were 
unconvinced by the argument for scholastic press freedom: 
“Even an attorney for the students conceded that some editorial control is acceptable” 
(Hechinger, The New York Times, March 3, 1987). 
 
No other writer made mention of this concession, which is ambiguous at best.  While 
certainly a very interesting concession from the students’ attorney, and perhaps worth 
mentioning for context, the reporter doesn’t elaborate.  If some editorial control is 
acceptable, how much?  These questions point to an important need for journalists to 
have a thorough understanding of the issues they cover so they may accurately relay 
all important facts and contexts to the readers. 
 
One article interpreted the Hazelwood ruling to be limiting while also suggesting, 
without elaboration, that it did not override Tinker: 
“The ruling…continued a recent trend in which the Court has taken a narrower view of the 
constitutional rights of public school students than that suggested by its earlier rulings. The 
decision did not overrule any Supreme Court precedent” (Taylor, The New York Times, Jan. 
14, 1988). 
 
This brief mention of the ruling’s place in the larger scheme of precedent for student 
rights was accurate but irresponsible.  With no significant follow up, the reader was 
left to wonder how, exactly, Hazelwood and Tinker can coexist, and what information 
should be gleaned from the rulings.  With no direct mention of Tinker, readers may 
not have realized there was another precedent.  It is this kind of confusing and 
shallow exposition of student rights that may have helped to perpetuate 





Two articles, one of which was an opinion column, provided legal context by framing 
the larger, often political, dilemma of the case among adults and educators: 
“There is much agreement, shared by the dissenting Justices and spelled out in the Tinker 
decision on antiwar arm bands, that limits exist to student rights, in particular those of the 
student press.  But there is no consensus about how far school administrators can go in 
imposing their own views, or those of the political mainstream” (Hechinger, The New York 
Times, Jan. 17, 1988). 
 
“Demands for a complete hands-off stance by adults in charge of the school, and particularly 
by students’ faculty advisors, may therefore be unrealistic.  Yet the 1969 Tinker decision 
seems to set standards, especially concerning disruption of education, that adults should be 
able to live with.  Ultimately, the issue is the adult view of the students’ world” (Hechinger, 
The New York Times, Jan. 17, 1988). 
 
 
Finally, it is important to note that very few of the reporters or opinion writers made 
mention of other lower-court legal battles students were waging at the time.  While 
most mentioned the Supreme Court’s ruling in Tinker, only three articles hinted at the 
larger legal climate regarding students at the time.  Those three all explained that 
legal rights for students were dwindling, but none went into detail about other cases 
students were fighting: 
 “The court, continuing its curtailment in recent years of students’ constitutional rights.”  
 
“In earlier curtailment of students’ rights, the court three years ago said school officials did 
not need a warrant or probable cause to search students and two years ago said officials could 
discipline a student for using vulgar language” (Kamen, The Washington Post, Jan. 14, 1988). 
 
“The case was the Court’s third decision in the past two years limiting students’ constitutional 
rights in public schools.  Two years ago, it approved ‘reasonable’ searches, without warrant, 
of students and their lockers” (Taylor, The New York Times, Jan. 14, 1988). 
 
“the third time in four years that the Supreme Court has ruled that students do not have the 
same rights as adults” (Watson, San Jose Mercury News, Jan. 14, 1988). 
 
The brief mention of these other cases represented a missed opportunity for the 
journalists to provide much-need scope in regards to student freedoms.  Instead of 




extent to which students were fighting for their freedoms on many levels, and 
especially through the courts. 
 
5. Describing Community and Expert Response 
Quotations from experts, students, teachers, and journalism advocates illustrated the 
varied responses to the rulings. However, none of the articles analyzed quoted the 
student journalists at Hazelwood who filed suit.  This represented a significant failure 
to use a primary source, though there is no way to know whether the journalists tried 
to contact the students and were unsuccessful or never attempted to do so in the first 
place.  Journalists used other student journalists, teachers, and scholastic journalism 
experts as the main sources to document responses to the ruling.  Only one article 
quoted directly from a student journalist. 
“Tammy Mukoyama, features editor of the Eagle’s Eye, the student newspaper at Oak Grove 
High School in San Jose, argued that the court ruling could discourage students from 
exploring controversial subjects” (Watson, San Jose Mercury News, Jan. 14, 1988). 
 
The articles did not include any specific, analytical discussions of the ruling; instead, 
the articles mostly used generalizing statements from professionals and educators to 
discuss attitudes toward the ruling. 
“The ruling was denounced by many press groups and civil rights and civil liberties 
organizations but was praised by some educators and others” (Taylor, The New York Times, 
Jan. 14, 1988). 
 
“The ruling drew sharp criticism both inside and outside the court” (Watson, San Jose 
Mercury News, Jan. 14, 1988). 
 
Rather than quoting more extensively from student journalists who were affected by 
the ruling, most articles quoted from teachers and student press law expert Mark 
Goodman.  It should also be noted that most coverage of response to the stories came 




“ ‘Kids already feel like second-class citizens in this country, and this confirms it for them,’ 
said Nick Ferentinos, faculty advisor of the Epitaph, the student newspaper at Homestead 
High School in Cupertino.”  
 
“ ‘School newspapers are often the only avenue young people have for expressing their views, 
and this opinion says school officials can cut off that avenue whenever they disagree with 
what the students are saying,’ Goodman said” (Watson, San Jose Mercury News, Jan. 14, 
1988). 
 
Only one article directly juxtaposed a response from schools with a response from a 
journalism advocate: 
“School officials hailed yesterday’s ruling as an appropriate redefinition of the 1969 
decision…But Richard M. Schmidt, Jr., general counsel of the American Society of 
Newspaper Editors, said the ruling could open the door to increased use of censorship” 
(Kamen, The Washington Post, Jan. 14, 1988). 
 
6. Describing Dissent 
More than other cases analyzed in this study, most articles on the Hazelwood ruling 
included some description of the dissenting judges’ opinions.  In total, five articles 
and one editorial devoted space to covering the dissent.  Of these, four articles and the 
editorial reprinted direct quotes from Justice William Brennan, the outspoken voice of 
dissent for the Court.  Because dissents in Supreme Court rulings can also be used to 
gauge a ruling’s precedence, they are an important part of any case.  Dissents provide 
insight into the Court’s ruling by showing the full spectrum of the Court’s opinions 
and elucidating any concerns or potential issues the dissenting judge(s) would like to 
address.  A published dissent could even provide ample fodder for future litigation of 
similar cases.  Coupled with a majority ruling, dissents and concurrent rulings in any 
case expose each individual judge’s positions on an issue, thereby outlining the 
Court’s position as a whole and its weaknesses or strengths. 
“Justice Brennan conceded that educators have an ‘undeniable, and undeniably vital, mandate 
to inculcate moral and political values’ but that this is ‘not a general warrant to act as thought 




but not the one the Court teaches them today’” (Hechinger, The New York Times, Jan. 17, 
1988). 
 
“The court’s standard for allowing censorship, Brennan said, could allow school officials to 
suppress any speech that might run counter to the administration’s moral or political views, 
allowing authorities to ‘convert…our public schools into enclaves of totalitarianism…that 
strangle the free mind at its source.  The First Amendment,’ he said, ‘permits no such blanket 
censorship” (Kamen, The Washington Post, Jan. 14, 1988). 
 
While one article compared Brennan’s dissent to Dewey’s famous treatise on 
education, the single editorial voice was less impressed by Brennan’s position: 
“he vainly seeks a constitutional line clear enough for judges to say the principal crossed it.”  
 
“He is profoundly right, however, that educators teach a civics lesson in a most telling way 
when they supervise student expression” (Staff, The New York Times, Jan. 15, 1988). 
 
 
This lukewarm acceptance of Brennan’s dissent showed the editorial board would 
only go so far as to agree that free expression rights for students are important 
without making the leap that the principal (or any principal) would be authoritarian 
enough to completely ignore those rights however he saw fit.  This quibbling is an 
example, as seen in coverage of the other cases, of general uncertainty among 
professional journalists as to which rights students should have, and to what extent.  
 
7. Analyzing the Role of the First Amendment in Society and Schools 
Two opinion columns analyzed the role of the First Amendment in schools as a 
counterpart to the role the Amendment plays in society as a whole.  One column 
stopped short of suggesting students should have the full freedoms enjoyed by adults 
in society since schools must serve a variety of constituents; instead, it suggested 
student journalist do not necessarily have the same protections as their professional 
counterparts.  The other column insisted the Hazelwood ruling was simply a reality 




write and publish as they please, when in actuality, journalists are subject to the 
whims of those who pay the printing costs.  This oversimplified the ruling in a way 
that could be detrimental for students. 
“Although school newspapers have helped train many students for careers in journalism, 
student press freedom is not entirely comparable to freedom of the press at large.  Student 
papers, subsidized by school funds, generally need not worry about satisfying readers in order 
to maintain circulation.  On the other hand, principals and school boards worry about 
displeasing voters whose support they need” (Hechinger, The New York Times, Jan. 17, 1988). 
 
“So while all people have the right to voice an opinion in print, if they don’t have the 
resources to publish it themselves, they must find someone else to do so.”  
 
“Freedom of the press does not protect the writer from an editor’s knife and blue pen.”  
 
“Students must face the facts and limitations of the real world” (Goldstein, The New York 
Times, May 29, 1988). 
 
One article in particular stood out for its attempt to link contemporary student 
freedom issues to historical trends: 
“For decades the student press has taken a zig-zag course between docile publications that 
attract little attention and the more enterprising or provocative ones that are read and debated.  
During the campus upheavals of the late 1960’s, students came to equate supervision with 
suppression, and rebelled by creating an underground press that eluded adult influence 
altogether.  This same spirit of rebellion led to the Tinker case and the limits it placed on the 
authority of school administrators.  With last week’s ruling, the principals have regained lost 
ground, but they will be under an even greater burden to draw the difficult distinction between 
instilling values and repressing developing minds” (Hechinger, The New York Times, Jan. 17, 
1988). 
 
This passage emphasized some very important considerations that go untouched in 
other articles, especially the notion that the fight for student freedoms has historical 
roots similar to other major uprisings, even though the former is often perceived as a 
contemporary development. 
 
Because of its rejection of the Tinker precedent, much of the Hazelwood coverage 




RQ3: To what extent do U.S. newspapers provide a legal framework to 
contextualize the speech and press rights high school and college students 
currently possess? 
 
By devoting considerable space to the court ruling, the judges’ language, potential 
legal effects of the ruling and the dissent, newspapers seemed to place a high priority 
on the legal niceties of the case.  However, neither the depth nor the 
comprehensiveness of the legal context these stories presented were always consistent 
or accurate.  The lack of legal understanding exhibited within many stories 
represented a significant failure on the part of newspapers to adequately inform 
readers.  In doing so, the scope of the Hazelwood ruling, its applicability in public 







Kincaid v. Gibson 
Case filed: 1994 
U.S. Court of Appeals 6th Circuit ruled: 2001 
 
Distrust of Authority: A Historical Perspective 
The legal battle of Kincaid v. Gibson spanned almost seven years, from 1994 when 
the students’ yearbooks were first confiscated, to 2001, when the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit ruled that the students’ First Amendment rights were 
indeed infringed upon because of the administrator’s actions.  During those seven 
years, Bill Clinton and George W. Bush held the presidential office.  In the United 
States, two major bombing incidents (Oklahoma City and the Olympic Park bombing) 
rocked the country, and the worst school shooting to date bloodied the halls of 
Columbine High School in Colorado.   
 
Major headlines included the explosion of TWA flight 800 in the Atlantic Ocean, the 
acquittal of O.J. Simpson in the murders of Nicole Simpson and Ron Goldman, the 
transfer of Hong Kong from England to China and the death of Princess Diana.  In 
addition, in 1997 the death of Mother Theresa, the murder of child beauty queen Jon 
Benet Ramsey and the landing of the Mars Pathfinder captured the news media’s 
attention.  In 2000, the uneventful passage of the Y2K threat, the attack of the USS 
Cole and the election of George W. Bush made it a year of turning points and 




Florida and the Supreme Court’s subsequent refusal to decide the presidential election 
was a politically polarizing affair. 
 
These major events all led up to 2001 and the final ruling in the Kincaid case, decided 
on January 5, months before the nation—and indeed the world—changed 




This section summarizes the findings of a sample of 12 articles covering the court 
case Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001)(en banc).  This study looked at 
six articles from local newspapers and three from national newspapers.  Of the 12 
articles analyzed, three were editorials or commentaries.  The coverage spanned 
almost three years, from August 2, 1998, to January 11, 2001.  Appendix D provides 
a complete list of newspaper sources.  The articles were analyzed according to the 
central research question: 
RQ1: How do U.S. newspapers frame high school and college students’ right to 
freedom of speech and press? 
 
Analysis of the articles, editorials and commentaries focused on how the reporters: 
1. Provided case background 
2. Established student claims 
3. Established school claims 
4. Described what the court ruled  
5. Provided legal context via Hazelwood 
6. Described potential effects of the case 
7. Relayed expert testimony and community response 
8. Characterized the case via editorial and opinion columns; and 
9. Engaged in a larger discussion on the role and value of free press in a   






Coverage of the Kincaid case included a strong editorial and opinion presence that 
allowed a comparative analysis of the media’s reigning attitude toward the case.  The 
mix of local and AP/national coverage also indicated the perceived importance of the 
case in the news media world when compared with other compelling stories at the 
time. 
 
1. Providing Case Background 
Journalists used varying terms to describe exactly what happened to spark this 
lawsuit.  The difference in word choices created descriptions that conveyed varying 
levels of urgency: 
“KSU administrators in Frankfort confiscated nearly 2,000 yearbooks” (Riley, Daily News 
(Bowling Green, KY) Online, Sept. 10, 1999). 
 
“In 1994, KSU administrators confiscated nearly 2,000 yearbooks because they were of ‘poor 
quality’” (Staff, Daily News, Sept. 12, 1999). 
 
“University officials […]forbade the yearbook to be distributed” (Associated Press, Daily 
News, Jan. 7, 2001). 
 
“Kentucky State University’s 1994 seizure of a yearbook” (Staff, Courier-Journal (Louisville, 
KY), Jan. 11, 2001). 
 
“When the 1994 yearbook arrived from the printer, Betty Gibson, KSU vice president for 
student affairs objected to the color of the cover, the theme and what she believed was its poor 
quality, the opinion said.  After consulting with then-KSU president Mary Smith and others, 
Gibson and Smith ordered the yearbooks seized and locked up” (Yetter, Courier-Journal, Jan. 
6, 2001). 
 
“Gibson immediately ordered the yearbooks seized and locked away” (Cheves, Lexington 
Herald-Leader (Lexington, KY), Aug. 2, 1998). 
 
“Few of the students at Kentucky State University ever saw their purple-covered yearbooks in 
1994 before an administrator – unhappy with the books’ design – ordered them confiscated” 





While the most common word choice to describe the president’s action was some 
form of “confiscate,” use of words such as “seizure” and “locked away” conveyed 
more aggression in the school’s actions.  
 
2. Establishing Student Claims 
Some stories gave significantly more background to the students’ claims than others.  
For example, one story summed up the claims in one sentence, while another used at 
least three paragraphs to give full context to the situation: 
“Coffer and another student, Charles Kincaid, filed suit, alleging First Amendment press 
freedom violation” (Yetter, Courier-Journal, Jan. 6, 2001). 
 
“Kincaid and Ms. Coffer accused the administration of trying to keep ‘negative’ news out of 
The Thorobred News and of forbidding distribution of the 1992-94 yearbook, The Thorobred.  
Kincaid wrote letters to the editor of the newspaper and paid an $80 activity fee which he said 
entitled him to receive the yearbook.  Ms. Coffer worked on the newspaper and was editor of 
the 1992-94 yearbook.  Orwin said the administration never consulted a student publications 
board about confiscating the yearbooks.  He said the administration transferred the 
coordinator of student publications out of that job, against her will, after she took the position 
that the students had the right to determine the newspaper’s contents” (Associated Press, Sept. 
8, 1999). 
 
The extreme difference in detail and context could reflect a lack of interest in the 
subject on the journalists’ part, but it could also be the result of many other factors, 
such as story space, access to sources, etc.  While it is impossible to know for sure 
why some stories provided vastly more context, the overall effect was that the stories 
that were over-simplified seemed out of place, half-hearted and appeared perhaps 
even more sparse when taken among the other, more detailed articles.  In reading the 
news media coverage side-by-side, the articles with more detail and context read 
almost like different stories, or at least stories about a more significant event.  In 
addition, seven stories did include details of support professional groups offered to 





3. Establishing School Claims 
Almost every story described the school’s claim in similar terms: that the yearbook 
was of poor quality and not suitable for distribution.  Two stories included statements 
from university officials that the yearbooks were not withheld because they contained 
unpopular viewpoints, as alleged by the students.  Only one article contained a 
quotation suggesting the case’s insignificance: 
“ ‘I don’t think (the case) is important or sweeping at all’” (Cheves, Lexington Herald-
Leader, Aug. 2, 1998, parenthesis in original). 
 
 
4. Describing What the Court Ruled 
To describe the court’s ruling, only three articles used direct quotations from the 
judge’s opinion.  Otherwise, coverage of the rulings were relatively similar across 
stories, sticking to generic descriptions of the legal decision at each court level: 
“An appeals court today rejected arguments by two former Kentucky State University 
students that the school violated their First Amendment rights by forbidding distribution of a 
yearbook and allegedly interfering with the student newspaper” (Associated Press, Sept. 8, 
1999). 
 
“Two students who sued university officials over confiscation of the 1994 edition of The 
Thorobred presented sufficient evidence that their First Amendment rights were violated, the 
court said” (Associated Press, Daily News, Jan. 7, 2001). 
 
Again, coverage of this case lacked significant discussion of one dissenting opinion 
and one partial dissent.  Interestingly, one of the judges who originally ruled against 
the students when a 6th Circuit panel heard the case reversed his decision upon the 
final en banc ruling in 2001.  In ruling against the students, Judge James Ryan 
concluded he “was in error”(Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342 (6th Cir. 2001)(en 
banc), Ryan, concurring opinion).  He provided no further elaboration except that the 





In his partial dissent, Circuit Judge Danny Boggs concurred with the majority’s 
opinion that the panel decision should be reversed, but he disagreed that the en banc 
ruling should favor the students.  Instead, he contended there were discrepancies in 
material facts that still needed to be settled through trial.  Judge Alan Norris, who 
originally authored the panel’s majority decision against the student, maintained his 
position and authored a dissent against the en banc findings.  Norris again found that 
the yearbook was not a public forum, and as such the university retained discretion 
over what material was included and the manner in which the yearbook was created.   
 
This issue of whether a school publication constitutes a public forum, limited forum, 
or non-public forum—and the differences among these distinctions—is a vital part of 
the debate over whether scholastic journalists retain First Amendment protections.  
Because it was a matter of law not yet settled in the courts, the issue’s absence in the 
news media coverage is disquieting.  Since the news media do serve as the court of 
public opinion, leaving out significant facts (like legal distinctions) diminishes the 
public’s ability to discern truth, and ultimately affects the verdict, or the public’s 
thorough understanding of an issue. 
 
5. Providing Legal Context Via Hazelwood 
Of the four stories that gave some legal context regarding student First Amendment 
rights, every one referenced Hazelwood either directly or implicitly.  None of the 
articles that gave legal context referenced Tinker or any other case.  Within these four 




college publications.  To leave out this vital information suggested either a lack of 
understanding of the court case and its significance or a disregard for detail and 
context. 
“The judge based his ruling in part on a 1988 U.S. Supreme Court decision that permitted 
high schools to censor their schools’ publications.  But that high court decision specifically 
excluded from its ruling college publications” (Cheves, Lexington Herald-Leader, Aug. 2, 
1998). 
 
“In a footnote to Hazelwood, however, the Supreme Court justices refused to apply the 
decision to universities and colleges, saying they ‘need not now decide whether the same 
degree of deference is appropriate’” (Associated Press, Aug. 2, 1998). 
 
6. Describing Potential Effects of the Case 
Only a handful of the articles covering this court case went into detail about the 
potential effects of the case or its impact on colleges and free speech.  One editorial 
even went so far as to write in its headline “Decision is hardly a threat to the First 
Amendment” (Staff, Daily News, Sept. 12, 1999).  Other writers did not share that 
belief: 
“University administrators could censor any views they disagreed with.  They wouldn’t even 
see the irony, as the folks at Kentucky State don’t, in offering classes that examine the Bill of 
Rights on a campus that doesn’t believe in those bedrock principles” (Robert, Springfield 
News-Leader (Springfield, MO), June 4, 2000). 
 
“The national and state organizations jumping into the fray to oppose that decision believe 
that if college officials can censor a yearbook that bothers them, they then could take steps 
against student newspapers or student plays that offend administrators” (Associated Press, 
Aug. 2, 1998). 
 
“Journalism educators say the courts will make a mistake if they extend the Hazelwood 
decision to include college campuses, which are supposed to encourage free thought and 
diverse points of view” (Associated Press, Aug. 2, 1998). 
 
“ ‘We have enough problems helping the kids understand what their rights and obligations are 
under the First Amendment,’ Agin said. ‘I’d be sorry to see the courts throw that out and 
allow the students to be censored’” (Cheves, Lexington Herald-Leader, Aug. 2, 1998). 
 




Journalists turned to student press law experts and journalism professors to provide 
expert testimony regarding the case.  Significantly, all instances of expert testimony 
except one sided with the students and emphasized a need for First Amendment 
protections for students: 
“The courts will be making a terrible mistake if they expand the restrictive Hazelwood 
decision to include college campuses, which are supposed to encourage diverse points of 
view, journalism educators say” (Cheves, Lexington Herald-Leader, Aug. 2, 1998) 
 
“The legal tug-of-war over the 1992-94 edition of The Thorobred is a battle for college 
students’ right to free speech, said Mark Goodman, executive director of the Student Press 
Law Center in Washington” (Robert, Springfield News-Leader, June 4, 2000). 
 
“ ‘It is a concern to anyone who relies on the First Amendment, and we all do; it is not just for 
the press, as many people believe,’ said Harry Allen, a Western Kentucky University 
journalism professor” (Riley, Daily News Online, Sept. 10, 1999). 
 
8. Characterizing the Case 
Two editorials and one opinion column provided insight into journalists’ reactions to 
the case.  Both opinion columns and one editorial were sympathetic to the journalists, 
but one editorial expressed disbelief and irritation that the issue became a legal fight 
at all. 
“Having wasted $60,000 defending its indefensible act of censorship, KSU should not 
appeal” (Staff, Courier-Journal, Jan. 11, 2001). 
 
“There was nothing defamatory about this book. And nothing obscene except the 
administration’s reaction to it” (Staff, Courier-Journal, Jan. 11, 2001). 
 
“Now a more frightening issue is percolating through the courts” (Robert, Springfield News-
Leader, June 4, 2000). 
 
“The decision by Kentucky State University officials to withhold yearbooks from its student 
body may not have been the wisest one administrators ever made, but it doesn’t mean the dark 
forces of censorship are gathering to shred the First Amendment.”  
 
“Perhaps the administrators should have offered the yearbooks to any student who had a thing 
for purple, but they did have the right to dump them” (Staff, Daily News, Sept. 12, 1999). 
 
“For Pete’s sake, the yearbooks were the wrong color.  This is not a case of political dissent 
being stifled or an investigative report of administrative wrongdoing being deep-sixed.  This 






“With all due respect, this is not a case that will go down in journalism history” (Staff, Daily 
News, Sept. 12, 1999). 
 
 
The single editorial that spoke out against the students made a good point: yes, the 
student journalists chose a different color for the school’s yearbook, but if the school 
would not let them have even artistic authority, why did the editorial writer assume 
the school would let them print the other types of content he mentioned, such as 
political dissent or investigative journalism?  As a whole, this editorial missed the 
point, especially considering the case did go down in scholastic journalism history for 
the precedent it set for student journalists.  While this observation is in hindsight, it 
was arrogant at best for the editorial writers to suggest they knew what would or 
would not make journalism history.  And it was this arrogance that stood out among 
the editorial voices. 
 
9. Engaging in A Broader Discussion on First Amendment Rights 
One editorial and one opinion column went further than just characterizing the case: 
they set out to engage in a broader discussion about First Amendment rights.  
However, each came to a drastically different conclusion.  The editorial (Staff, 
Courier-Journal, Jan. 11, 2001) concluded that First Amendment rights are not 
automatically extended to college students, nor should they be.  The opinion column 
(Robert, Springfield News-Leader, June 4, 2000), on the other hand, chastised the 
school for being an example of anti-democratic practices. 
“A hard fact of life is that you cannot operate in total freedom on someone else’s dime.  When 
university officials basically own the presses, they can decide to start or stop them, and the 
state or federal government doesn’t have much to say about it.  That is also called freedom.”  
 
“Universities own the publication.  They are de facto publishers, and as such, if administrators 





“Freedom of the press is not really threatened when the publisher of the New York Times 
decides a special section is awful and dumps it.  Nor can reporters bring a First Amendment 
lawsuit when a publisher turns thumbs down on a story” (Staff, Daily News, Sept. 12, 1999). 
 
“Every censor wants to ‘maintain its image.’ But free expression isn’t about maintaining 
image.  It is about exchanging ideas, finding truth through debate, holding government 
accountable.  Sometimes free expression leads to the discovery that image is nothing more 
than a veneer hiding plenty of rot.”  
 
“It’s ridiculous, in a nation that prides itself on being free, that these questions are even being 
debated.” 
 
“We ought to be encouraging free expression, not stifling it.  It is the pulse of a free society” 
(Robert, Springfield News-Leader, June 4, 2000). 
 
The editorial’s ‘real-life’ approach to university publications was strict but also 
somewhat misinformed.  In fact, universities historically and legally have not been 
considered de facto publishers, and usually maintain less legal responsibility the more 
hands-off they are.  The authors also ignored the fact that the universities did not 
entirely own the presses—they are paid for by student fees, tuition, and, in the case of 
a public university, by the state government.  This makes public universities 
especially qualified for First Amendment protections. 
 
Perhaps more than any other case examined in this study, Kincaid’s newspaper 
coverage demonstrated journalists’ conflicting attitude toward student First 
Amendment rights.  Secondary RQ7 asks: 
RQ7: Do U.S. newspapers support college students’ freedom of speech and 
press? If so, to what extent? 
 
Depending on the article, editorial or commentary one were to read, the answer to this 
question could easily be yes or no.  The ambivalent editorial and commentaries 




censorship as a First Amendment violation and those who thought the students were 





Dean v. Utica 
Case filed: 2003 
Supreme Court ruled: 2004 
 
Authority or Authoritarian? A Historical Perspective 
The ruling in Dean v. Utica was issued in October of 2004, a year marked by 
terrorism and violence across the world.  Terror bombings at a subway in Madrid in 
March killed 191 and injured thousands more.  A CIA report released in early March 
disavowed the U.S. government’s claim that Saddam Hussein had stockpiles of illegal 
weapons prior to the start of the Iraq war in 2003.  In April, television news magazine 
60 Minutes II broke the story of prisoner abuse at Abu Ghraib, showing images of 
U.S. mistreatment of prisoners of war and revealing an ongoing investigation that 
would result in almost a dozen courts martial.  Further tainting public perception of 
the war, NFL star Pat Tilman’s death in Afghanistan in April of 2004 was confirmed 
later in 2004 to be a death by friendly fire.  In July, the 9/11 Commission released its 
much-anticipated report claiming U.S. government officials did not take terrorism 
threats seriously enough in the months and years leading up to the attacks of Sept. 11, 
2001.  And in September, a month before the ruling, Chechen terrorists invaded and 
took over a school in North Ossetia.  The confrontation escalated into a gun battle in 
which 300 died, including 186 children (“Top 10 News Stories of 2004,” Arizona 





In American media, Janet Jackson’s infamous “wardrobe malfunction” at the Super 
Bowl in January received incessant coverage and was just one example of how 
questions of values and morality were being explored in the media.  Also dealing with 
issues of morality, films such as Passion of the Christ and Fahrenheit 9-11 polarized 
many communities (“Top 10 Stories of 2004,” CNN), while television stations banned 
advertisements on gay marriage. 
 
Findings 
This section summarizes the findings of a sample of five articles covering the court 
case Dean vs. Utica.  This study looked at five stories that appeared in local 
newspapers: four breaking stories and one editorial.  The coverage spanned three 
years, from March 31, 2002 to March 27, 2005.  Appendix E provides a complete list 
of newspaper sources.  The articles were analyzed according to the central research 
question: 
RQ1: How do U.S. newspapers frame high school and college students’ right to 
freedom of speech and press?  
 
Analysis of the articles and single editorial focused on how the reporters: 
1. Established case fact and history 
2. Characterized the players and the game 
3. Set up the legal claims 
4. Provided expert testimony 
5. Relayed court rulings and judges’ opinions; and 
6. Explored the aftermath 
 
 
1. Establishing Case Fact and History 
 In setting up the legal and factual history of the court case, articles relayed 




subsequent reaction and censorship of the school.  The legal steps already taken in the 
case were documented, especially regarding legal action Dean took in response to 
censorship.  In some news stories—but not all—the legal context regarding students’ 
free expression rights in school was summarized, usually via citing Tinker, 
Hazelwood, or both. 
  
Historical case background 
Some news stories went so far as to describe the steps Dean took prior to her article 
being censored: 
“She had interviewed the plaintiffs and done research, including investigating the effects that 
diesel fumes can have on a person’s health.  She had tried to interview school district and 
township officials, but they refused comment” (Sampson, The Indianapolis (IN) Star, March 
27, 2005). 
 
“Dean worked for about a month on the article, researching diesel fumes from school buses, 
talking with Reymond and Johanna Frances, the couple behind the lawsuit, and attempting to 
talk with district officials, who all declined to comment on the story” (Carroll, Shelby-Utica 
(MI) News, Oct. 4, 2004). 
  
“Dean, intrigued, researched and wrote the article “Fumes, Drugs, and Sue” for the Arrow, 
Utica High’s award-winning student newspaper” (Sampson, The Indianapolis Star, March 27, 
2005). 
 
The extent to which Dean’s actions prior to being censored were chronicled appeared 
on one hand sentimental to the student, as if building her up by proving she practiced 
acceptable journalistic standards in writing the story that would later be censored.  
This documentation of Dean’s approach to her assignment as a journalist was offset 
by descriptions of the school’s response to a story that put the school in a harsh light. 
 
Utica High School’s actions 
In describing the school’s actions against Dean’s story, journalists never used the 
word “censorship.”  Instead, euphemisms were used to describe the principal’s 




“Her article was later pulled by the district’s administration” (Carroll, Shelby-Utica News, 
Oct. 4, 2004). 
 
“Principal Richard Machesky pulled the story” (Vandenabeele, The Detroit (MI) News, March 
31, 2002). 
 
“Machesky said the article was full of ‘journalistic defects’ and removed it from the paper” 
(Trela, Detroit Free Press, Oct. 13, 2004). 
 
“a story pulled from the award-winning Arrow newspaper” (Vandenabeele, The Detroit News, 
March 31, 2002). 
 
“their principal told them it could not appear” (Staff, The Detroit News, July 2, 1002). 
 
“reporter Katy Dean, whose story about it was quashed” (Staff, The Detroit News, July 2, 
1002). 
  
“But when the principal prohibited publication of the story” (Sampson, The Indianapolis Star, 
March 27, 2005). 
 
“When school district officials became aware of the subject of her article…they ordered the 
high school principal to suppress it” (Sampson, The Indianapolis Star, March 27, 2005) 
(emphasis added in all). 
 
 
That the term ‘censorship’ was never used could be a reflection of general confusion 
as to who is responsible for and in charge of content in student newspapers.  For 
example, if the journalists viewed principals as the logical and legal supervisor of 
content for student publications, the act of removing content would not likely be 
interpreted as censorship.  On the other hand, were journalists to regard students as 
the decision-makers, then any outside interference or rejection of content should be 
interpreted as censorship and labeled as such.  Similarly, the use of euphemisms for 
an otherwise loaded word could signify a marginalization by professional journalists 
who do not accept the scholastic model of journalism as equivocal to their own.   
 
Simply put, that journalists avoided using the term “censorship” contradicted even the 




“censor” seven times to describe the school’s action and the constitutional issue his 
opinion addressed.  The judges in the case declared “censorship” an accurate 
description of the legal issue, and while terms such as “pulled” or “removed” 
described how the administrators physically kept the article from print, they did not 
fully connote the severity of the school’s actions. 
 
Legal Context 
Most of the articles covering Dean vs. Utica lacked any significant context 
concerning the rights students have to express themselves in school.  Only one article 
described the rights of students as established in Hazelwood, and even that 
explanation ignored the dueling Tinker precedent.  The sole explication of students’ 
rights was vague at best: 
“The Supreme Court, in the 1988 Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier decision, gave 
public high school officials authority to censor school-sponsored publications, likening school 
administrators to publishers.  Officials must demonstrate some reasonable educational 
justification for the censorship…Where Hazelwood often causes disagreement is that it gives 
administrators less latitude to censor school publications that are open forums for student 
expression” (Vandenabeele, The Detroit News, March 31, 2002). 
 
This description of students’ First Amendment rights was rather lacking and general.  
It failed to raise issues of the legal and working definitions for “school-sponsored 
publications,” a term still being legally challenged and reworked in recent court cases.  
The intended benefit of contextualizing student rights is lost because the journalist 
either lacked the proper understanding of the Hazelwood case or chose not to explore 
the case minutia that would have more accurately depicted the current climate of 
student First Amendment rights. 
 




Journalists, like all other writers, rely on word choice to convey a specific message or 
to create meaning for their readers.  These words leave impressions in readers’ minds 
based on the connotation and context of the words as filtered by the readers’ own 
experiences.  In describing the principal’s action and the subsequent legal filing, one 
article used a negative characterization to describe the court case.  In calling it a 
“recent spat,” a legitimate First Amendment claim is reduced to a sophomoric 
argument.  This type of characterization was seen again in an editorial describing “the 
flap at the school paper.”  Both these characterizations minimize the serious nature of 
the student’s claims and the principal’s actions. 
 
Characterizing Dean 
Journalists used supportive phraseology in two of the articles and drew a picture of 
Dean akin to that of the courageous biblical David: 
 “Dean decided to fight” (Sampson, The Indianapolis Star, March 27, 2005). 
  
“Dean battled for her First Amendment rights to tell that story”  (Sampson, The Indianapolis 
Star, March 27, 2005). 
  
“students resolved not to be silenced” (Vandenabeele, The Detroit News, March 31, 2002). 
 
These descriptions were often tempered or expanded upon by expert testimony and 
sources selected by the journalist. 
 
3. Setting up the Legal Claims 
Each article explained Dean’s and the school’s claims yet did not necessarily 
critically examine them, as is discussed more fully in Chapter Six.  Often, the articles 
explained the school’s rationale for censorship more thoroughly than they did Dean’s 




establishing the school’s reasoning for censorship than to exploring Dean’s stance.  
The articles described the school’s legal claims as justified by Dean’s poor 
journalistic work. 
“school officials charged the article was biased and unbalanced” (Sampson, The Indianapolis 
Star, March 27, 2005). 
 
“The school district said the article was censored because it contained pseudonyms and 
factual inaccuracies, lacked adequate research and was unbalanced” (Trela, Detroit Free 
Press, Oct. 13, 2004). 
 
“[the story] was not consistent with ‘sound journalistic principles” (Staff, The Detroit News, 
July 2, 1002). 
 
Only one article explored the principal’s claim that the students did not have editorial 
control over the newspaper, thus legitimating his removal of the article and rejecting 
the student’s claim of censorship: 
“In a letter to Arrow staff, Machesky denied that his decision constituted ‘censorship.’ And he 
denied that the Arrow is considered an open public forum” (Vandenabeele, The Detroit News, 
March 31, 2002). 
 
The news coverage gave no further explanation of this claim.  To counter the school’s 
claims, articles often included more vague explanations of the claims Dean made: 
“Dean was asking the court to declare UCS had violated her First Amendment rights, and that 
the article be published in the Arrow with a suitable explanation that the article was 
unconstitutionally censored from a previous edition and attorney fees” (Carroll, Shelby-Utica 
News, Oct. 4, 2004). 
 
“Dean is not seeking monetary damages, but has asked the court to order the school to publish 
the article with an acknowledgement that her First Amendment rights were violated” (Trela, 
Detroit Free Press, Oct. 13, 2004). 
 
These two descriptions of Dean’s claims are at once at odds—one served as a rather 
specific guide to the student’s legal claims, the other only generally hinted at her 
claim. 
 




Quotations and indirect commentary from experts not associated with the case 
provided expert testimony.  Three groups provided most of the testimony—
educational administrators and their representatives, scholastic journalism advocates 
and lawyers associated with the ACLU.   Agenda-specific testimony advocated 
outright for either the school or student, while other testimony focused on the 
significance of the case for student First Amendment jurisprudence. 
“ ‘There’s not a lot of law in this area, so the more guidance we can get from the courts, the 
better off school districts are, and the better off the students are,’ said Andrew Nickelhoff, 
who represents Dean” (Trela, Detroit Free Press, Oct. 13, 2004). 
 
“Dean’s case was bolstered by statements from several educators and former journalists, 
including retired Free Press publisher Neal Shrine, who said it was properly researched and 
written” (Trela, Detroit Free Press, Oct. 13, 2004). 
 
Overall, the expert testimony served to better explain and expand the significance of 
the case by relating the high stakes to larger legal issues and professional journalism 
practices. 
 
5. Relaying Court Opinion 
Beyond expert testimony, some journalists went directly to the court’s ruling and 
judge’s opinions to provide context.  Often, headlines and leads were vehicles for 
passing along the exact statements and decisions of the judges.  Only two articles 
quoted entire phrases from the judge’s ruling, while the majority paraphrased or 
quoted specific wording from the decision.  In all, most articles devoted little space to 
the specific legal ruling and any nuances found therein.  Those that did quote at 
length selected segments that presented the judge’s reasoning behind his decision. 
“ ‘If the role of the press in a democratic society is to have any value at all — journalists, 
including student journalists — must be allowed to publish viewpoints contrary to those of 






“The case should have been resolved when it was filed, thus saving the school district a lot of 
money for a principle that’s indefensible” (Carroll, Shelby-Utica News, Oct. 4, 2004). 
 
The descriptive “indefensible” was used in one story to describe Utica’s actions 
against Dean.  Only one story went so far as to provide a detailed justification from 
the judge: 
“Tarnow also found that The Arrow had always been a “limited public forum” and had never 
had a practice of submitting stories to school officials for prior review.  Removing the story 
amounted to censorship, he ruled” (Staff, The Detroit News, July 2, 1002). 
 
Scant reference to the judge’s ruling and rationale established a level of simplicity 
within the story, making it clear and accessible to readers but also ignoring significant 
legal details found in the fine print of any court ruling.  Isolating the court decision 
from the rest of the story’s context could lead to a misguided reader perception on the 
importance of the ruling in a larger legal, social and educational framework. 
 
6. Exploring the Aftermath 
Given the ongoing nature of this case, not all stories presented a developed account of 
the aftermath of the situation.  Generally speaking, only stories written about the final 
court ruling went so far as to explore the aftermath of the case.  However, at all stages 
of the case, stories turned to reaction from Dean and the high school. 
 
Student and school reactions to ruling 
The school generally refused to comment, and review of the articles turned up not a 
single direct quotation from the school on the case’s outcome.  On the other hand, 
most stories provided paraphrased and direct reaction from Dean, including 
quotations from Dean on why the case was important. 
“’I think what we need to do is relate the First Amendment not to the past, but to the future, to 




someone understand how it affects them individually, then they’ll care more about it’” 
(Sampson, The Indianapolis Star, March 27, 2005, parentheses in original).  
 
While the legality of the ongoing case contributed to absence of comment from the 
school, the comparatively copious record of Dean’s reaction emphasized the student’s 
perspective on the case and further legitimized her claims while distancing the 
school’s position from the court’s outcome in the case. 
 
Describing the aftermath 
One story in particular stood out for its inclusion of Dean’s accomplishments after the 
case ruling was released.  The story noted that Dean was a “featured speaker at the 
‘Future of the First Amendment’ press conference in Washington, D.C.” (Sampson, 
The Indianapolis Star, March 27, 2005) because of her fight for First Amendment 
rights for students.  This seemingly peripheral piece of information contextualized 
Dean’s action as part of a larger, ongoing struggle for students to achieve First 
Amendment protections.  Other stories also detailed the aftermath of the case: 
“In 2003, Dean was awarded the Courage in Student Journalism Award from the Student 
Press Law Center, the National Scholastic Press Association and the Newseum, an interactive 
museum of news in Washington, D.C. that informs the public on how and why the news is 
made” (Carroll, Shelby-Utica News, Oct. 4, 2004). 
  
“Last year, she was awarded the Courage in Student Journalism award, presented by the 
Newseum, the National Scholastic Press Association and the Student Press Law Center, for 
her fight” (Trela, Detroit Free Press, Oct. 13, 2004). 
  
“In 2003, she was awarded the Courage in Student Journalism Award for her struggles” 
(Sampson, The Indianapolis Star, March 27, 2005). 
 
 Text in two stories suggested more wide-spread effects from the case, 
describing the fight between Dean and Utica as one in which “Student gets First 
Amendment lesson up close” (Sampson, The Indianapolis Star, March 27, 2005, 
headline).  One story went so far as to suggest how other students might react: “High 




when school officials disagree with reporting” (Trela, Detroit Free Press, Oct. 13, 
2004, lead).  A single editorial described the ruling as “a happy ending” (Staff, The 
Detroit News, July 2, 1002) after chastising the school for creating the drama in the 
first place by “spiking the story.” 
 
While coverage of Dean v. Utica provided many clues as to how news media frame 
student journalists who claim First Amendment protections, what was most telling in 
this analysis was how newspapers described the school’s actions.   These descriptions 
spoke directly to the central research question (RQ1) by answering exactly how 
newspapers framed the student’s First Amendment claim—as everything but 
‘censorship.’  In using euphemisms to describe the school’s actions—what the court 
rightly termed “censorship”—journalists rhetorically took sides, and Dean’s claims 
were minimized.  An all-too-common practice in most of the cases analyzed in this 
study, journalistic avoidance of the word “censorship” and the legal term “prior 







Hosty v. Carter 
Case filed: 2001 
Supreme Court decline cert.: 2005 
 
A Quiet Year: A Historical Perspective 
Domestically speaking, 2005 was a quiet year, especially when compared to the time 
periods surrounding other cases in this study.  The launch of YouTube dominated the 
media scene.  Arguably the most significant event of the year, Hurricane Katrina 
didn’t make landfall until months after the Hosty v. Carter decision.   This case was 
denied certiorari by the Supreme Court during its 2004-2005 term, which entertained 
only four First Amendment cases: two regarding Ten Commandments displays, one 
regarding religious accommodations in prison, and the fourth regarding government-
mandated sponsorship of beef marketing for cattle growers. 
Findings 
This section summarizes the findings of a sample of nine articles covering the court 
case Hosty vs. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc) cert. denied.  This study 
looked at two articles from local newspapers and seven articles from non-local state 
or national newspapers.  Of those, six articles were editorial or opinion columns.  The 
coverage spanned more than a year from June 27, 2005 to March 6, 2006.  Appendix 
F provides a complete list of newspaper sources.  The articles were analyzed 
according to the central research question: 
RQ1: How do U.S. newspapers frame high school and college students’ right to 
freedom of speech and press?  
 




1. Provided legal context 
2. Established case background  
3. Relayed court rulings and judges’ opinions  
4. Characterized the lawsuit  
5. Described responses to the ruling 
6. Explained potential effects of the ruling; and 
7. Editorialized the author’s response to the case 
 
Unlike some cases, coverage of the Hosty case did not reveal significant use of expert 
testimony; however, the editorial voice had a stronger presence than in other cases. 
 
1. Providing Legal Context 
In setting up the legal context of the court case, articles transmitted information 
through two major but separate contextual approaches:  via reference to the First 
Amendment rights of students in general, and via reference to the Hazelwood case in 
particular. 
 
Contextualizing the First Amendment rights of students 
While most stories offered some amount of context about student press rights, it was 
the editorial and opinion pieces that offered the most thorough context in this area by 
demonstrating the issues student journalists are facing around the country: 
“According to the Student Press Law Center, a New York principal censored an accurate story 
from a student paper that reported there were only two working bathrooms in a school of 
3,600 students.  An Indiana high school newspaper’s story about a tennis coach who illegally 
took more than $1,000 that team members paid for court time was muzzled by administrators” 
(Staff, The News-Gazette (Champaign, IL), Jan. 6, 2006). 
 
“While the past decades have hardly been a golden age for student rights, there was good 
reason to be optimistic in recent years.  Speech codes fell at colleges from New York to 
California” (Lukianoff, The Boston Globe, Sept. 3, 2005). 
 
“The courts have repeatedly found that government can’t decide what a free press prints.  To 
do so, they have relied on the First Amendment’s prohibition against Congress passing laws 
the abridge freedom of speech or of the press…In essence, the courts have substituted the 
word “Congress” with “judge” or “district attorney” or, until now, “college administrator” and 
found their interests in suppressing information just as invalid” (Banchero, Anchorage (AK) 





Referencing Hazelwood as a litmus test 
Repeated references used Hazelwood as a litmus test for what was happening in 
Hosty.  These references generally clarified the position that was made in Hazelwood, 
which was to not yet extend the court’s restrictions on high school press to colleges 
and universities. 
“While the case was being heard, the 1988 Hazelwood vs. Kulmeier [sic] decision was 
brought up numerous times.  In the Hazelwood case, authority was given to high school 
officials to oversee and censor student publications.  The court then ruled in the Hosty case, in 
a case separate of the lawsuit, that college administration – Carter in this case – had the 
authority to review and edit college publications before being printed” (O’Brien, Suffolk Life 
(Suffolk, NY) Newspapers, Oct. 12, 2005). 
 
“But what makes the finding in Hosty v. Carter even more terrifying is that it takes the 
Supreme Court decision in a 1988 case that said high school administrators could control the 
content of curricular student newspapers and applies it to college publications” (Banchero, 
Anchorage Daily News, July 2, 2005). 
 
“The case essentially extends to colleges the rationale established in the 1988 Supreme Court 
ruling in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.  In that case, justices found high school 
newspapers are subject to restrictions by school administrators” (Olsen, Fort Collins (CO) 
Coloradoan, June 27, 2005). 
 
“The case would have been a follow-up to a 1988 ruling that said public school officials could 
censor high school newspapers” (Holland, Associated Press, Feb. 21, 2006). 
 
“The court relied in part on a 1988 Supreme Court decision that allows high school 
administrators to censor student publications” (Cohen, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 22, 2006). 
 
 
By referencing and explaining Hazelwood, journalists were able to put the Hosty case 
in context with a larger struggle for students over press freedom.  This context served 
to demonstrate the minimal success students have had historically in earning the right 
to print without censorship. 
 
2. Establishing Case Background 
The case background was generally succinct, limited to a paragraph or two, and in 




While the recounting of case history provided a foundation for readers, it was the 
description and characterizations of what exactly happened on campus that lent the 
most insight into what happened and the circumstances surrounding the lawsuit: 
“The case came about when the student newspaper of Governor’s State University in Illinois, 
The Innovator, was halted from printing because the dean of the College, Patricia Carter, 
wanted to review and approve the publication before it was printed.  Carter called the printer 
where the newspaper was to be published and told them not to print it because there had been 
some articles in the paper that were critical of the administration at the university” (O’Brien, 
Suffolk Life Newspapers, Oct. 12, 2005). 
 
“Carter called the publisher and had the printing stopped” (O’Brien, Suffolk Life Newspapers, 
Oct. 12, 2005). 
 
“The students sued after a deal blocked the paper’s printing in 2000 until she could review the 
news stories” (Holland, Associated Press, Feb. 21, 2006). 
 
“The case was on appeal from three students who sued in January 2001 when a dean blocked 
the paper from being printed after several stories critical of the university administration 
appeared” (Cohen, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 22, 2006). 
 
“Last week’s ruling stems from the Hosty v. Carter case where Governors State University 
student journalists working for the now-defunct school paper, the Innovator, sued to prevent 
university Dean Patricia Carter from reading material before the newspaper was printed” 
(Olsen, Fort Collins Coloradoan, June 27, 2005). 
 
“The case, Hosty v. Carter, arose in 2000 when a dean at Governors State, Patricia Carter, told 
the printer of the student newspaper, The Innovator, to hold future issues of the paper until a 
school official had given approval of the paper’s contents” (Staff, The News-Gazette, Jan. 6, 
2006). 
 
“The decision was based on an appeal of a lawsuit against Patricia Carter, dean of student 
affairs and services at GSU, who shut down the Innovator for what she deemed ‘irresponsible 
and defamatory journalism’” (Staff, The News-Gazette, Jan. 6, 2006). 
 
“In 2000, Patricia A. Carter, dean of student affairs at Governors State University in Illinois, 
demanded that the off-campus printer of the college paper, The Innovator, hold off printing 
future issues until university officials could review content” (Banchero, Anchorage Daily 
News, July 2, 2005) (emphasis added in all). 
 
 
The emphasis in all these selections is added to highlight the word choices different 
journalists used to describe the administration’s censorship of the student newspaper.  
Similar to the way journalists described what happened in Utica, journalists in this 




“censorship” or “prior review” to describe the situation when in fact, these words best 
describe what happened. 
 
Were journalists to use the court ruling itself as a guide, or any court document 
related to the case including documents that initiated the suit, they would have found 
iterations of the words “prior review” and “censorship” as the preferred legal 
constructs.  The 7th district’s ruling used combinations of “review” or “prior review” 
12 times, and also used iterations of “censor” 12 times throughout the ruling.   The 
students’ petition for Supreme Court review used iterations of “censor” 15 times. 
 
3. Relaying Court Ruling and Judges’ Opinions 
In writing about the court’s opinion and what the judges said, articles rarely quoted 
directly from court documents.  Instead, they summarized the ruling in ways that 
suggested, on one hand, that it was a sweeping restriction of student press rights or, 
on the other, that it was merely asserting the right for college administrators to 
continue to oversee the content of student publications.  Opinion pieces on the case 
were less forgiving of the censorship and often pointed to institutional flaws that 
perpetuated a need for such censorship. 
Sweeping restrictions 
 
“On June 20 of this year, the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals made a ruling in the Hosty vs. 
Carter case that allows college administrators to review and edit student publications” 
(O’Brien, Suffolk Life Newspapers, Oct. 12, 2005). 
 
“But the appeals court also found that Governors State administrators had a right to regulate 
the paper’s contents because it was published under the auspices of the university” (Cohen, 
Chicago Tribune, Feb. 22, 2006). 
 
“Ruling allows administrators final say in newspaper content” (Olsen, Fort Collins 





“The appeals court ruling also said the newspaper must be designated a public forum, with 
students in charge of the content, before a censorship case can be considered” (Olsen, Fort 




“The 7th U.S. Circuit Court of appeals ruled that that [sic] university faculty could regulate the 
paper’s contents because it is published under the auspices of Governors State” (Holland, 
Associated Press, Feb. 21, 2006) (emphasis added). 
 
“The U.S. Supreme Court declined on Tuesday to hear an appeal from former student 
journalists at Governors State University, letting stand a lower court ruling that could allow 
college administrators to censor student publications” (Cohen, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 22, 
2006). 
  
“The 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that college administrators – under certain 
circumstances – have the right to review the content of student newspapers before they hit the 
press” (Olsen, Fort Collins Coloradoan, June 27, 2005). 
 
“The Seventh U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals recently became the focal point of journalists and 
constitutional scholars across the world when it effectively ruled that university administrators 
could regulate content of college publications – and other non-designated public forums like 
student-run arts festivals – if the school provides any portion of their funding” (Tuck, The 
Pilot (Southern Pines, NC), July 10, 2005)(emphasis added in all). 
 
None of the stories elaborated by explaining the niceties of the term “limited public 
forum” or under what circumstances censorship within these forums would be 
tolerated.  In fact, only one article quoted from the actual court ruling:  
“The Seventh District, which represents Illinois, Indiana and Wisconsin, ruled in Hosty that 
“speech at a non-public forum, and underwritten at public expense, may be open to reasonable 




Many of the opinion pieces went at least one step beyond the straight news stories, 
attempting to isolate terms used by the court and to extrapolate the larger institutional 
issues at stake because of this ruling.  However, even these more pointed discussions 
were brief and left many questions and details uncovered.  Still, some of the opinion 
pieces openly scrutinized the rule for its sweeping nature and for its vagueness. 
“Writing for the majority, Judge Frank Easterbrook gets tangled in the issue of what is a 




guy who proclaims his views in the Student Union from the publication of the university-
sponsored alumni magazine” (Banchero, Anchorage Daily News, July 2, 2005). 
 
“Using a slippery-slope definition of a public forum, the appeals court ruled that any forum 
not designated as public can be censored by its funding contributor… ‘In addition,’ the court’s 
opinion states, ‘a school must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of the 
intended audience in determining whether to disseminate student speech on potentially 
sensitive topics, which might range from the existence of Santa Claus in an elementary school 
setting to the particulars of teenage sexual activity in a high school setting.’”  
 
“The court argues that it can craft higher standards for the college press, like the high school 
press, because of a legitimate educational concern – protecting immature minds – and because 




On the whole, the dissenting opinion of four circuit judges Terence Evans, Ilana 
Rovner, Diane Pamela Wood and Ann Claire Williams, was again ignored.  The very 
first issue the dissenting opinion addressed was the legal difference between high 
school and college students: 
“The majority’s conclusion flows from an incorrect premise—that there is no 
legal distinction between college and high school students. In reality, 
however, “[t]he Court long has recognized that the status of minors under the 
law is unique in many respects.” Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 633 (1979). 
Age, for which grade level is a very good indicator, has always defined legal 
rights.” (Hosty v. Carter , 412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005) (en banc), Evans, 
Rovner, Wood and Williams, dissenting) 
 
This distinction was central in the plaintiff’s argument, and it was also addressed in 
part of the initial favorable ruling the students’ received from a 7th Circuit panel in 
2003.  In fact, this question of age and appropriateness is at the very heart of most 
scholastic journalism arguments and indeed strikes at the core purposes of education 
at every level.  To prove their point, the dissenting judges cited a litany of cases in 
which courts, both state and federal, have noted the distinction between high school 
and college students and respective rights to freedom of expression.  What’s more, 




for its controversial nature, a growing trend in light of Hazelwood.  This debate, too, 
speaks to the major concerns of both educators and lawyers about First Amendment 
in public high school and universities.  Yet the opinions of the four dissenting 
judges—fully a third of the 11 judges who ruled en banc for the 7th Circuit in this 
case—were all but absent in news media coverage. 
 
Finally, the dissenting judges minced no words in describing their opinion on the 
drastic repercussions this ruling could have on student First Amendment rights: “This 
court now gives the green light to school administrators to restrict student speech in a 
manner inconsistent with the First Amendment” (Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th 
Cir. 2005) (en banc) dissent).  This broad admonishment from some of the country’s 
top government-appointed legal minds should not have gone unnoticed. 
 
4.  Characterizing the Lawsuit 
Editorials and opinion columns represented journalists’ sentiments toward the Hosty 
case. Analyzing a sampling of descriptions the columns used to characterize the court, 
school and students involved made it apparent that not all professional journalists 
were in agreement over the final court ruling.  Some writers were quite forward in 
detailing how troubling they found the case, and their comments were indignant; 
others were more reserved in their disapproval. 
“The First Amendment is under attack, and I’m using the only weapon I can legally wield to 
defend it” (Tuck, The Pilot, July 10, 2005). 
 
 “Unfree Press: Ruling Against Student Paper is Alarming” (Tuck, The Pilot, July 10, 2005). 
 
 “Such prior review is a classic no-no” (Banchero, Anchorage Daily News, July 2, 2005). 
 





 “brazen act of censorship.” 
 
“If this were all the decision said, it would still be wrong; legal scholars have long understood 
that free speech means, at a minimum, that state officials cannot require publications to get 
state approval before publishing.  Then, perhaps satisfied with ignoring only one principle of 
First Amendment law, the court decided that Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier (1988), in which the 
Supreme Court ruled that public high school had substantial control over the content of a 
student newspaper produced as part of a journalism class, also applied to universities” 
(Lukianoff, The Boston Globe, Sept. 3, 2005). 
 
“Madigan, courts threaten to muzzle young journalists.” 
  
“Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan is arguing on the wrong side in a case that threatens 
the independence of college and university journalists.” 
  
 “troubling college newspaper censorship case” (Staff, The News-Gazette, Jan. 6, 2006). 
 
“In the meantime, they have reason to be disappointed in the Supreme Court’s decision and 
grateful that the IPFW administration recognizes the importance of First Amendment 
protections and the right to learn by doing” (Staff, The Journal Gazette, March 1, 2006). 
 
 
5. Responding to the Ruling 
Articles spent little space tracking the responses to the ruling from students, 
professionals, and academics.  In fact, exploration of coverage of the Hosty case 
turned up only a smattering of stories that included reactions, which ranged from 
student disappointment, to disagreement by state officials over any lasting effect, to 
worry within the academic community about how such a ruling might affect 
enrollment in journalism schools. 
“The ruling has set a precedent that many college journalists fear will do much harm to their 
student publications and to their experience as a journalist” (O’Brien, Suffolk Life 
Newspapers, Oct. 12, 2005). 
 
“The Illinois attorney general’s office, which defended Carter, on Tuesday played down the 
possible implications on student press freedoms” (Cohen, Chicago Tribune, Feb. 22, 2006) 
 
 “university newspaper staffs are reeling” (Staff, Tribune, June 28, 2005). 
 
“ ‘It is a sad day for journalism in the United States,’ said Irwin Gratz, president of the 
Society of Professional Journalists, in a statement to the press. ‘Students will now spend eight 
years with prior review and censorship as part of their journalistic experience…how can we 
expect these young people to grow to become forceful advocates of the First Amendment?’” 
(O’Brien, Suffolk Life Newspapers, Oct. 12, 2005). 
 
“ ‘If we are going to be baby-sat until we are 23 or 24, how will our potential employers ever 





It is important to note that there has been no significant follow-up coverage to 
document lasting effects of this ruling on Governors State publications or any other 
local student press that might have been affected by the ruling.  Given the 
significance of this ruling, the dearth of post-event analysis may have reflected a low 
priority level for student issues within the news media. 
 
6. Explaining Potential Effects of the Ruling 
The editorial and opinion coverage of the Hosty case was rather extensive compared 
to other cases.  In the half dozen opinion articles, commentators and editorial writers 
devoted a significant amount of space to explaining just what, exactly, would happen 
to student journalists and student publications under the new legal guidelines that 
could emerge from a ruling against the students.  Some columns and editorials even 
suggested readers should be aware of a larger societal effect that would diminish 
appreciation for civil liberties in the U.S. 
 
Threats to higher education and society 
 
“the Hosty decision threatens to take us back into those prior, darker ages” (Tuck, The Pilot, 
July 10, 2005). 
 
“The ruling in Hosty v. Carter is bad news for students, bad news for reporters and bad news 
for those who know that overthrowing the liberty of a nation – or of a college – begins by 
subduing freedom of expression” (Banchero, Anchorage Daily News, July 2, 2005). 
 
“If student groups’ rights are no longer presumed, and the only way students can be sure their 
group has rights is to prove that in court, students’ rights mean little indeed.”  
 
“It discredits the special importance of academic freedom at universities.”  
 
“It disregards the fact that 99 percent of college students are adults, as opposed to high school, 
where most are minors” (Lukianoff, The Boston Globe, Sept. 3, 2005). 
 
“To subject students journalists to the constraints imposed on high school students is to 





Threats to student journalists 
 
“But it’s disquieting to think that the Northern Light owes its existence not to the U.S. 
Constitution but to the benevolence of university administrators.  It’s a lesson I wish this 
generation of students didn’t have to learn.” 
 
“Now all publications that take student fees are fair game.”  
 
“The decision sets back the rights of college journalists by condoning whatever authoritarian 
impulses university administrators may harbor” (Banchero, Anchorage Daily News, July 2, 
2005). 
 
“Taken to its most pessimistic extent, the Hosty decision has revoked the ability of most 
college publications to report the news objectively and aggressively.”  
 
“If administrators can shut down your publishing ability because they give you money and 
don’t approve of content, then college journalists will be forced to be less aggressive in news 
judgment.”  
 
“And instead of being a watchdog, a newspaper might more resemble a cowering puppy” 
(Tuck, The Pilot, July 10, 2005). 
 
 
7. Editorializing About the Case 
The opinion and editorial voices commented on the censorship and the consequences 
of muzzling students’ First Amendment rights. 
 “The worst legal decision of the summer” (Lukianoff, The Boston Globe, Sept. 3, 2005). 
 
“The importance of having an uncensored press cannot be understated.  For centuries the 
press has worked as a check on public figures and government, and the ability to aggressively 
pursue information without restrictions has been the key to that ability.” 
  
 “The press has always been a check on bad ideas.”  
 
“I discern two reactions among the industry: dread and uncertainty.” 
  
“But now that this type of censorship is being institutionally recognized, we are heading down 
a dangerous path.”  
 
“I find it dangerous to incrementally allow students to experience the benefits of a free press” 
(Tuck, The Pilot, July 10, 2005). 
 
“A university, above all else, should be a marketplace of ideas, where students feel free to 
explore issues and views from all quarters” (Staff, The Journal Gazette, March 1, 2006). 
 
“The summer of 2005 will be remembered as a rough season for student rights” (Lukianoff, 





Where other newspapers hedged, the majority of editorials and commentaries 
covering the Hosty case minced no words: Students were censored, and censorship 
was a dangerous action. The majority of the editorials and commentaries expressed 
disapproval over the court’s ruling, and even the characterizations of the case, the 
students, and the school were mostly anti-censorship.  Journalists reacted harshly to 
what they saw was a blatant infringement on First Amendment rights and a warning 
that the court could be opening the door to worse instances of censorship.  Above all, 
the newspaper coverage of Hosty demonstrated that in rare instances, newspapers do 
frame student First Amendment claims in a way that legitimizes and supports them.  
What’s more, this case coverage demonstrated that journalists could indeed be 
protective of their own—adopting the role of First Amendment advocate when the 
injustice was too one-sided to ignore.  When the editorials and commentaries showed 
contempt for the actions of the schools, the word “censorship” was more common.  
However, when editorials and commentaries showed conflicting attitudes toward the 
school’s actions, “censorship” was often replaced with a euphemism. 
 
Additionally, that this case has essentially dropped off journalists’ radar demonstrates 
a short-sighted interpretation of the ruling’s repercussions.  The rather superficial 
legal interpretation that this ruling is “bad news” gives little context and speaks only 
to a general understanding of what the ruling really means for student journalists and 






Morse v. Frederick 
Case filed: 2005 
Supreme Court ruled: 2007 
 
Year of the Bust or Year of the Bong? A Historical Perspective 
When the Supreme Court heard arguments for Morse v. Frederick in March of 2007, 
the first signs of what would ultimately be a major mortgage bust appeared.  Between 
the hearing and the Court issuing its decision in June that year, major newsmaking 
events occurred.  That year, criticism of President George W. Bush and his 
commanders in Iraq heightened after May 2007 became the deadliest month for allied 
forces since the start of the war.  But the Virginia tech shoot was perhaps the most 
reported event of 2007, occurring on April 16 and leaving 33 people dead.  Endless 
media roundtables followed the shooting, discussing psychologically difficult 
students, campus security, and who should have known what shooter Cho Seung-Hui 
would do.    
 
Also in April of 2007, New Mexico passed a law allowing the use of marijuana for 
medicinal purposes.  The passage of this legislation occurred in close proximity to 
both the case hearing and ruling and made marijuana use once again a front-page 
debate.  It might also be important to note that this state legislation allowed some 
medicinal marijuana use and directly contradicted the Supreme Court’s ruling in 2001 






This section summarizes the findings of a sample of 48 articles covering the court 
case Morse v. Frederick (No. 06-278, slip. op. (U.S. June 25, 2007)).  This study 
looked at 20 articles from local newspapers and 28 articles from non-local state or 
national newspapers.  Of those, 17 articles were editorials or commentaries.  The 
coverage spanned more than six years, from April 8, 2002 to July 24, 2008. Appendix 
G provides a complete list of newspaper sources.  The articles were analyzed 
according to the central research question 
RQ1: How do U.S. newspapers frame high school and college students’ right to 
freedom of speech and press? 
 
Analysis of the articles, editorials and commentaries focused on how the reporters: 
1. Established case background 
2. Provided legal context  
3. Characterized the student and his speech 
4. Characterized the principal and her actions 
5. Talked up the competition 
6. Analyzed and described the court’s opinion   
7. Described community and expert response 
8. Established editorial and opinion positions; and 
9. Analyzed the role of the First Amendment in society and schools 
 
1. Establishing Case Background 
As with other cases, most articles covering Frederick v. Morse established case 
background by describing Frederick’s act of holding up the banner and his subsequent 
suspension by the principal.  Through a mix of straight news stories and editorial 
coverage, newspapers established the fact that Frederick used his banner as a ploy to 
get on television as the Olympic torch was passing through Juneau.  Most 
descriptions of what happened read similarly: 
“In this case, the student unfurled a banner reading ‘BONG HITS 4 JESUS’ on a sidewalk as 




phrase and meant only to attract national TV cameras.  The principal angrily pulled the banner 
down and suspended the student” (Staff, USA Today, June 26, 2007). 
 
 
Not every story included specific details about the incident, but some used a play-by-
play approach to set the scene, describing how Frederick crossed the street to leave 
school property and how he recited Thomas Jefferson at the principal when she first 
approached him to take down the sign (Richey, Christian Science Monitor, March 19, 
2007).  Different writers described the event differently, some calling it a 
“confrontation” (Morris, Juneau Empire, Jan. 28, 2007), others describing it as a 
battle between youthful immaturity and adult authority.  One editorial was heavy with 
disdain towards Frederick’s actions: 
“A high school senior in Juneau, Alaska, decided that the Olympic torch passing through his 
city in 2002 was a perfect time to whip out his “Bong Hits 4 Jesus” banner.  It wasn’t like he 
was at school, right?  Well, the reference to marijuana use got him suspended anyway, for 
violating the school’s policy against promoting illegal substances at a school-sanctioned 
event.  Joseph Frederick sued, claiming his free speech rights were violated, dude.  He 
managed to win a lower court ruling that his civil rights suit could proceed.  Now, the 
Supreme Court has stepped into the dispute, agreeing to hear an appeal by the Juneau School 
Board and principal Deborah Morse.  Not wanting to get beat by a high school kid, the School 
Board has hired former Whitewater prosecutor Kenneth Starr to argue its case” (Staff, St. 
Petersburg Times, Dec. 2, 2006). 
 
Only one editorial, in describing what happened, thoughtfully considered the 
dynamics of the situation as they related to Frederick’s free speech claim: 
“Frederick said what he said – not inside a classroom, but outside, where the marketplace of 
ideas still functions – and all of Juneau was free to laugh at him, to scold him, to ignore him” 
(Staff, Juneau Empire, May 7, 2006). 
 
In this editorial, the authors seemed to share the previous opinion column’s notion 
that Frederick’s actions were worthy of disdain, but the article’s mention of a 





As a whole, diminutive editorial and opinion voices served to criticize the case.   
Common characterizations of the case framed it as a ridiculous stunt (notably a scene 
from a classic Hollywood movie on youth rebellion), as a David and Goliath-esque 
battle, or as an epic saga sucking the life out of the justice system: 
“The case sounds like something out of Ferris Bueller’s Day Off, the 1986 film featuring a 
wisecracking senior who bedevils the dean of students” (Staff, USA Today, March 21, 2007). 
 
“Anyone who’s seen the movie Ferris Bueller’s Day Off will quickly grasp the dynamic in a 
second free speech case the Supreme Court decided Monday: Wiseguy high school senior 
provokes administrator.  Administrator reacts angrily.  Battle of wits ensues” (Staff, USA 
Today, June 26, 2007). 
 
 “The whole thing is, to put it mildly, ridiculous” (Staff, Juneau Empire, May 7, 2006). 
 
 “A silly banner and stupid court appeal” (Staff, Juneau Empire, May 7, 2006). 
 
“Thus does a high school prank become a federal case” (Milbank, The Washington Post, 
March 20, 2007). 
 
“the case invited a certain amount of reefer madness” (Milbank, The Washington Post, March 
20, 2007). 
 
“How did something so daffy get to be a constitutional crisis?” (Staff, The Austin American-
Statesman, March 20, 2007). 
 
“It’s rare that arguments about something as stupid as a banner declaring ‘Bong Hits 4 Jesus’ 
make their way to the U.S. Supreme Court” (Staff, The Austin American-Statesman, March 
20, 2007). 
 
“Yesterday at the Supreme Court was a day for rebels from the old frontier” (Barnes, The 
Washington Post, March 20, 2007). 
 
“eccentric story line” (Staff, The New York Times, March 20, 2007). 
 
 “strange saga” (Zimmerman, Christian Science Monitor, March 22, 2007). 
 
 
Two editorial or opinion articles framed the case as one that actually merited judicial 
review, calling the case: 
 “a classic conflict” (Barnes, The Washington Post, March 13, 2007). 
 
 “an epic Supreme Court battle” (Barnes, The Washington Post, March 13, 2007). 
 
“one that, classically, pits official authority against student dissent” (Greenhouse, The New 





Two other editorials framed the court case as one worthy of judicial attention because 
of the unique nature of the case:  
“The ruling miscast the case before the court as about drugs.  But it was about a student’s 
right to speech” (Seattle Times Staff, Juneau Empire, June 27, 2007). 
  
“Terms such as ‘police state’ come to mind” (Staff, Juneau Empire, March 19, 2007). 
 
 
Interestingly, straight news stories were more convinced about the significance of the 
case and joined a handful of opinion and editorial pieces that highlighted the case’s 
precedence.  More than 20 articles used language that suggested the case was 
significant for students and schools alike, not for its uniqueness but for its potential 
for legal precedence. 
“has become a significant legal test of students’ speech rights—and of how far school 
officials can go in limiting such rights to try to maintain order in schools” (Biskupic, USA 
Today, March 7, 2007). 
 
“the court’s decisions could provide lasting and far-reaching consequences” (Barnes, The 
Washington Post, March 20, 2007). 
 
“The Supreme Court should now begin to settle the choppy seas of speech, and the case of 
Frederick v. Morse is an appropriate place to begin this difficult task” (Calvert & Richards, 
The Washington Times, October 6, 2006). 
 
“Justices to Hear Landmark Free-Speech Case; Defiant Message Spurs Most Significant 
Student 1st Amendment Test in Decades” (Barnes, The Washington Post, March 13, 2007). 
 
“Under the school’s theory, meanwhile, educators could censor any speech that contradicted 
their goals or ideas.  And that might be the scariest idea of all” (Zimmerman, Christian 
Science Monitor, March 22, 2007). 
 
“In its most significant ruling on student speech in almost two decades” (Lane, The 
Washington Post, June 26, 2007). 
 
“Whenever the nation’s highest court hears a case that could ultimately restrict free speech, 
the nation should hold its breath” (Staff, The (Springfield, Mass.) Republican, March 23, 
2007). 
 
“It’s kind of nuts, but Morse v. Frederick is an important speech issue, and First Amendment 
rights must be regularly redefined.  All of our constitutional rights are decided one case – in 
this case, one silly prank – at a time” (Staff, The Austin American-Statesman, March 20, 
2007). 
 
“Case called most important student free speech debate since Vietnam War” (Morrison,  






After discussing the significance of the case, some articles speculated on the potential 
impact a pro-student or pro-school ruling would have on a multitude of issues, 
including classroom lessons, student rights, administrative authority, and the judicial 
process. 
“By suing for his rights and winning, Frederick, now a student at the University of Idaho, 
made himself into a civics lesson for current and future Juneau-Douglas students. By asking 
the Supreme Court to step in, the board and the district risk making him a civil liberties 
chapter in history books coast-to-coast” (Staff, Juneau Empire, May 7, 2006). 
 
“Furthermore, it’s not much of a civics example for young citizens, though in this case it did 
turn out to be a lesson” (Staff, Juneau Empire, March 19, 2006). 
 
“One hopes there were some thoughtful debates in the school’s civics classes that year – and 
again this month – because of the case” (Staff, Juneau Empire, March 19, 2006). 
 
“School should be a place where teachers and administrators educate students on the 
importance of the First Amendment and the role of freedom of speech in American society, 
Collins said.  If the court rules against Frederick, it could have the opposite effect” (Morrison,  
Juneau Empire, March 18, 2007). 
 
“On the other side are free-speech advocates who worry that a Supreme Court endorsement of 
the principal’s approach would open the door to widespread censorship of students” (Richey, 
Christian Science Monitor, March 19, 2007). 
 
“which would let administrators censor criticism of any kind” (Zimmerman, Christian 
Science Monitor, March 22, 2007). 
 
“Ruling in Alaska banner case tightens limits on students’ speech rights” (Staff, USA Today, 
June 26, 2007). 
 
“A ruling against Frederick and his ‘Bong Hits 4 Jesus’ banner would undermine the rights of 
others who might want to express opinions that school officials find detrimental to their 
educational mission” (Staff, The (Springfield, Mass.) Republican, March 23, 2007). 
 
“But if schools can limit speech on any subject deemed to be important, students could soon 
be punished for talking about the war on terror or the war in Iraq because the government also 
considers those subjects important” (Staff, The New York Times, March 20, 2007). 
 
“If Starr and the administration prevail, students might lose any semblance of free expression.  
If the other side wins, teachers might lose any semblance of order in the classroom” (Milbank, 
The Washington Post, March 20, 2007). 
 
“ ‘Up to this point, we thought that a principal enforcing an anti-drug policy was safe to do 
so,’ she says. ‘Now school administrators are walking on eggshells’” (Biskupic, USA Today, 





“The case is being closely watched by school administrators and anti-drug officials who are 
concerned that a ruling upholding the appeals court could undercut school efforts to foster a 
drug-free atmosphere” (Richey, Christian Science Monitor, March 19, 2007). 
 
“Somewhere, a teenager with an abnormal interest in the court and a normal zest for mischief 
might be thinking: Cool idea, Justice Stevens – I’ll create a banner to test whether banning 
‘Wine Sips 4 Jesus’ would infringe my religious freedom.  Endless distinctions can – actually, 
must – be drawn once a subject becomes a matter of constitutional litigation” (Will, The 
Washington Post, July 1, 2007). 
 
“His case illustrated how the multiplication and extension of rights leads to the proliferation 
of litigation.  It also illustrated something agreeable in a disagreeably angry era—how nine 
intelligent, conscientious justices can civilly come to a strikingly different conclusion about 
undisputed facts” (Will, The Washington Post, July 1, 2007). 
 
As the case progressed, a growing consensus emerged from the articles: journalists 
sensed that however the court ruled, the judgment’s impact would be significant, even 
if the Bong Hits banner, itself, was not. 
  
2. Providing Legal Context 
To provide a legal frame of reference in which to examine student free expression 
rights, most journalists cited Tinker, or some combination of Tinker, Hazelwood, and 
Bethel v. Fraser.  Among opinion, editorial and straight news pieces, more than 11 
articles specifically referenced the Tinker ruling as the standard for student free 
speech rights, while eight articles referenced a combination of the three.  Three 
articles referenced Hazelwood only.  Those that did reference Tinker explicitly cited 
the oft-referenced quote from the ruling: 
“The court said that students do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate’” (Will, The Washington Post, July 1, 2007). 
 
“Their standard is a landmark 1969 Supreme Court ruling that allowed students to wear black 
arm bands to protest the Vietnam War, because students didn’t give up their free speech rights 
‘at the schoolhouse gate’ unless their actions significantly disrupted or interfered with school 






References to Bethel and Hazelwood were less uniform, with some articles 
emphasizing the “vulgar, lewd, and offensive speech” prohibited in Bethel (Morrison, 
Juneau Empire, March 18, 2007) and others describing restricted speech as those 
“messages deemed harmful” (Barnes, The Washington Post, March 13, 2007).  One 
article described Bethel as permission to “ban sexually explicit student speech” (Lane, 
The Washington Post, June 26, 2007), even though the speech in Bethel was actually 
sexual innuendo, and did not depict a graphic sexual act. 
 
As another means of context, one article mentioned increased tensions between 
authority and rights in a post-Columbine world.  This reference emphasized a 
perceived link between taboo topics and violent or harmful acts by students: 
“Such policies—many inspired by the slayings of a dozen students and a teacher by two 
outcasts at Colorado’s Columbine High School in 1999 – have banned students from wearing 
clothing or posting signs that focus on drugs, guns or incendiary topics such as 
homosexuality, abortion and religion” (Biskupic, USA Today, March 7, 2007). 
 
This same article was the only one to also demonstrate further research into 
contemporary student rights cases.  The author gives brief descriptions of two other 
instances that occurred after the year 2000 in which students felt their First 
Amendment rights had been violated. 
 
3. Characterizing the Student and His Speech 
Claims made by both Frederick and Morse in initiating the lawsuit were largely 
uncontested—in other words, Morse did not deny tearing down the banner, nor did 
Frederick deny using the banner as a nonsensical way to get on television.  Therefore, 
articles described the claims in relatively neutral terms that need not be repeated here.  




the litigant and the defendant.  Described by one newspaper editorial as “the 
protagonist in a case” (Staff, The Washington Post, March 21, 2007), Frederick was 
generally characterized as a truant, attention-hungry youth in most of the editorial, 
opinion, and straight news coverage. In fact, no one seems to accept his argument that 
he was asserting his right to say anything at all.  Additionally, Frederick’s reputation 
outside of the case was repeatedly brought into focus, a practice that drew attention 
away from Frederick’s First Amendment claim.  By contrast, Morse’s reputation 
beyond the case was never investigated. 
“It’s hard to believe that Frederick was really asserting his constitutional rights that day, as he 
claimed, and not just being a nutty teen craving attention. (We can suppose that here because 
we have freedom of expression” (Staff, Juneau Empire, March 19, 2006). 
 
“Rebellious high school senior Joseph Frederick” (Staff, The Austin American-Statesman, 
March 20, 2007). 
 
“In January 2002, in Juneau, Alaska, Joseph Frederick had the sort of idea that makes a 
teenager seem like one of nature’s mistakes” (Will, The Washington Post, July 1, 2007). 
 
“A defiant high school student named Joseph Frederick” (Barnes, The Washington Post, 
March 13, 2007). 
 
“Frederick, a high school rebel who at the time was fond of quoting Thoreau and Voltaire” 
(Barnes, The Washington Post, March 13, 2007).  
 
“a second-semester senior impatient to move on in the world” (Barnes, The Washington Post, 
March 13, 2007). 
 
“though he was not a particularly happy student at Juneau-Douglas High School.  One day, he 
refused a vice principal’s order to leave a student commons area where he was reading Albert 
Camus, and the police were called.  The next day, he remained in his seat while others stood 
for the Pledge of Allegiance and was sent to the principal’s office” (Barnes, The Washington 
Post, March 13, 2007). 
 
“The creator of the banner, now living in China, was arrested for distributing marijuana while 
in college” (Milbank, USA Today, March 20, 2007). 
 
“Joseph Frederick was arrested while attending college in Texas for distributing marijuana” 
(Barnes, The Washington Post, March 13, 2007). 
 
“a high school senior who pulled a sophomoric stunt to get on TV” (Staff, The (Springfield, 
Mass.) Republican, March 23, 2007). 
 
“Frederick subsequently was arrested in Texas for marijuana possession” (Staff, The Austin 





“Joseph Frederick, who has been teaching and studying in China, pleaded guilty in 2004 to a 
misdemeanor charge of selling marijuana at Stephen F. Austin State University in 
Nacogdoches, Texas, according to court records” (Skinner, Juneau Empire, June 26, 2007). 
 
“Frederick and his father say through their attorney that they are the victims of abuse by 
people who oppose their lawsuit.  They sit in Asia in a form of exile, and they wait” (Morris, 
Juneau Empire, January 28, 2007). 
 
“Joseph Frederick is teaching high school English and studying Mandarin in China.  He will 
not say exactly where, the better to protect his solitude” (Associated Press, Juneau Empire, 
March 5, 2007). 
 
Descriptions of Frederick’s speech were equally unflattering; reporters wrote that his 
sign was “pointless” (Staff, Juneau Empire, May 7, 2006) and called it a “teenager’s 
attempt at humor” (Richey, Christian Science Monitor, March 19, 2007).   Opinion 
and news articles alike found little value in Frederick’s speech itself. 
“Frederick’s bong-hits banner may be childish and inane” (Calvert & Richards, The 
Washington Times, October 6, 2006) 
 
“somewhat absurd, vaguely offensive, mostly nonsensical message of protest” (Barnes, The 
Washington Post, March 13, 2007). 
 
“The banner was a foolish vulgarity, unworthy of court-affirmed protection” (Zimmerman, 
Christian Science Monitor, March 22, 2007). 
 
 “his juvenile banner” (Zimmerman, Christian Science Monitor,  March 22, 2007). 
 
 “wacky teen prank” (Staff, The Austin American-Statesman, March 20, 2007). 
 
4. Characterizing the Principal and Her Actions 
In their characterizations of the principal, opinion, editorial and straight news 
coverage distinguished between the woman as a person and her actions as an 
authority figure. On the whole, Morse’s characterizations were generally less frequent 
and less harsh—and at times even sympathetic—than those referring to Frederick. 
“This is a story about a principal who overreacted” (Staff, The (Springfield, Mass.) 
Republican, March 23, 2007). 
 
 “Morse’s appalling argument” (Zimmerman, Christian Science Monitor, March 22, 2007). 
 





“his frazzled principal trying to maintain order” (Barnes, The Washington Post, March 13, 
2007). 
 
 “disciplinarian principal, Deborah Morse” (Barnes, The Washington Post, March 13, 2007). 
 
 “Principal Morse reasonably determined” (Starr, USA Today, March 21, 2007). 
 
Only two articles—one an editorial and one an opinion column—suggested Morse 
should have responded differently: 
“Morse should have recognized Frederick’s banner for the harmless prank it was.  She should 
have clucked in dismay and walked away from a confrontation” (Staff, The Austin American-
Statesman, March 20, 2007). 
 
“The case would not have reached the U.S. Supreme Court if the principal had quietly shared 
some history with Frederick by reciting for him a quote by Hubert H. Humphrey, ‘The right to 
be heard does not automatically include the right to be taken seriously’” (Staff, The 
(Springfield, Mass.) Republican, March 23, 2007). 
 
 
5. Talking Up the Competition 
One of the most unique aspects of the coverage of Morse v. Frederick was the space 
devoted to covering the school’s counsel, Kenneth Starr.  As former litigator in the 
Monica Lewinsky scandal, Starr’s celebrity-status did not go unnoticed in the news 
media coverage.  When Starr was retained for counsel as the case progressed to the 
Supreme Court, the focus on his actions and words was a significant portion of the 
coverage.  He even had his own opinion column published, while attorneys for 
Frederick had no such opportunity.  At least seven articles, opinions and editorials 
focused some of their space on discussing Starr and his approach to the case: 
“Adding flair to the quixotic mission, the district enlisted attorney Kenneth Starr (yes, that 
Kenneth Starr, investigator of President Clinton’s shenanigans), who knows a thing or two 
about jousting at windmills” ((Staff, Juneau Empire, May 7, 2006). 
 
 “Famed attorney Kenneth Starr” (Morrison, Juneau Empire, August 29, 2006). 
 
“But Mr. Starr, by contrast, was happy to talk about the case and the alignment against him of 
many of his old allies” (Greenhouse, The New York Times, March 18, 2007). 
 
“This was Mr. Starr’s third argument in a high profile Supreme Court case since the last 
chapter of his public career, as the independent counsel in the various investigations of 




McCain-Feingold campaign finance law and the next year in a case on the recitation of the 
phrase “under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance” (Greenhouse, The New York Times, March 
20, 2007). 
 
 “The Juneau School District has enlisted some big-name help in hopes of overturning the  
ruling that could potentially cost it money” (Morrison, Juneau Empire, May 3, 2006). 
 
“School Board secures former Clinton investigator Kenneth Starr as pro bono attorney in 
attempt to reverse ruling in First Amendment banner case” (Morrison, Juneau Empire, May 3, 
2006). 
 
“Carlson said Starr, whose investigation led to the impeachment of President Clinton by the 
U.S. House of Representatives, has the reputation and qualifications to take the case” 
(Morrison, Juneau Empire, May 3, 2006). 
 
6. Analyzing and Describing the Court’s Opinion 
Coverage of the court’s ruling was divided among use of direct quotes from the 
opinion, descriptions of the ruling and its applications or limitations, and discussion 
of the dissenting opinion.  Most coverage highlighted, in one way or another, the 
discontent felt among the judges in issuing the opinion with the judges holding such 
differing rationales for the majority decision: 
“There were additional shades of opinion within the chief justice’s majority” (Greenhouse, 
The New York Times, June 26, 2007). 
  
“Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. spoke, at least nominally, for five of the six” (Greenhouse, 
The New York Times, June 26, 2007). 
 
“Two members of the majority, Justices Samuel A. Alito Jr. and Anthony M. Kennedy, made 
it clear that they gave Roberts the fourth and fifth votes he needed on the understanding that 
yesterday’s ruling applied only to advocacy of illegal drug use” (Lane, The Washington Post,  
June 26, 2007). 
 
“Justice Stephen Breyer, while siding with the majority, asserts that Frederick and his bong-
hits banner make for an inadequate foundation on which to limit students’ right political 
speech” (Seattle Times Staff, Juneau Empire, June 27, 2007). 
 
“The Supreme Court fractured on a case involving student speech rights this week” (Staff, 
The Washington Post, June 2, 2007). 
 
Significant coverage was given to the debate held inside the Supreme Court during 
oral testimony and before its ruling in the summer of 2007.  Much of the coverage 




the outcome of the ruling was already apparent given certain circumstances.  Perhaps 
for reporters like Linda Greenhouse, a Yale Law School graduate; Joan Biskupic, a 
Georgetown Law graduate; and Fred Barnes, a seasoned legal reporter, the case 
outcome was more readily discernable given their deep understanding of the Supreme 
Court’s practices and personalities. 
“A majority of the court seemed willing to create what would amount to a drug exception to 
students’ First Amendment rights” (Greenhouse, The New York Times, March 20, 2007). 
 
“But some justices seem uneasy about labeling as protected free speech what Justice Anthony 
M. Kennedy called Frederick’s ‘sophomoric’ message” (Barnes, The Washington Post, March 
20, 2007). 
 
“Mr. Starr’s biggest ally on the court was the man who once worked as his deputy in the 
solicitor general’s office, Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr. The chief justice intervened 
frequently throughout both sides of the argument, making it clear his view that schools need 
not tolerate student expression that undermines what they define as their educational mission. 
‘Why is it that the classroom ought to be a forum for political debate simply because the 
students want to put that on their agenda?’ Chief Justice Roberts asked Mr. Starr” 
(Greenhouse, The New York Times, March 20, 2007). 
 
“When the case was argued Monday before the Supreme Court, the justices bantered about 
what other banners would or wouldn’t be permissible: ‘Vote Republican’? ‘Smoke Pot, It’s 
Fun’? ‘Rape is Fun’? ‘Extortion is Profitable’?” (Staff, USA Today, March 21, 2007). 
 
“Justice Samuel Alito[…]seemed more concerned by the administration’s broad argument in 
favor of schools than did his fellow conservatives.  ‘I find that a very, a very disturbing 
argument,’ Alito told Justice Department lawyer Edwin Kneedler, ‘because schools 
have…defined their educational mission so broadly that they can suppress all sorts of political 
speech and speech expressing fundamental values of the students, under the banner of getting 
rid of speech that’s inconsistent with educational missions’” (Sherman, Juneau Empire, 
March 20, 2007). 
 
By reporting the heated debate held within the Supreme Court courtroom that day, 
readers received a glimpse of how the justices would approach their ruling. 
“ ‘So if the sign had been ‘Bong Stinks for Jesus,’ that would be…a protected right?’ asked 
Ruth Bader Ginsberg” (Milbank, USA Today, March 20, 2007). 
 
“Justice David Souter was among the few justices questioning even that basic premise. ‘I can 
understand if they unfurled the banner in a classroom that it would be disruptive,’ Souter said, 
‘but what did it disrupt on the sidewalk?’” (Biskupic, USA Today, March 20, 2007). 
 
Interestingly, the most comprehensive account of the exchange of dialogue among 




journalist with significant legal reporting experience—and was highly critical of the 
Court’s approach.  A section of that opinion (Milbank, USA Today, March 20, 2007) is here: 
“All that was missing in the chamber yesterday was black light and Bob Marley.  And to think 
Douglas Ginsburg withdrew his nomination to the high court because he had used marijuana. 
 
“If the justices sounded as if they were doin’ the doobies yesterday morning, the case invited 
a certain amount of reefer madness.” 
 
“The justices seemed frustrated with both sides.  Starr got only 90 words into his argument 
before being interrupted by Kennedy, then Souter, each demanding to know how the banner 
had been disruptive.  ‘I’m missing the argument,’ Souter told the former Whitewater 
prosecutor.” 
 
“Mertz, arguing for the student, fared even worse than Starr and Kneedler.  HE got out only 
one sentence – ‘This is a case about free speech; it is not a case about drugs’—before Roberts 
interrupted” (Milbank, USA Today, March 20, 2007). 
  
 
Once the Court’s ruling was released, opinions of the dissenting judges received 
much less play in both straight news and opinion or editorial columns.  Reporters 
often just listed the names of dissenting judges and a short summary or quote from 
their argument.  This approach gave short shrift to the concurring, partially dissenting 
and dissenting opinions that were filed, which in essence limited the majority ruling 
in critical ways and disagreed with much of the majority ruling’s understanding of the 
case’s precedence.   
 
For instance, Judge Clarence Thomas’ concurring opinion was written simply to 
make known his opinion that “the standard set forth in Tinker v. Des Moines 
Independent Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503 (1969), is without basis in the 
Constitution” (Morse v. Frederick, Thomas concurring).  Essentially, Thomas used 
his concurring opinion as an opportunity to dismantle the arguments made in Tinker.  




been given time or space in that market alongside the majority opinion.  This way, 
citizens could have evaluated the argument’s many facets, including some of 
Thomas’ extreme opinions.  For example, at one point, Thomas stated that Morse 
should have won because, as originally understood, the Constitution does not extend 
First Amendment rights to students4.   
 
The concurring opinions of Justices Samuel Alito and Anthony Kennedy took the 
opposite approach from Black by strictly limiting the Court’s prohibition against 
student free speech rights to that speech which advocates illegal drug use.  This 
limitation is critical because it “correctly reaffirms the recognition in Tinker v. Des 
Moines Independent  Community School Dist., 393 U. S. 503, 506 (1969), of the 
fundamental principle that students do not ‘shed their constitutional rights to freedom 
of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate’” (Morse v. Frederick, Alito and 
Kennedy concurring).  Furthermore, the Justices cautioned against the notion that 
schools could censor speech that interferes with the educational mission, since such a 
goal could be defined so broadly and subject to manipulation.  This interpretation 
echoed sentiments found in Tinker and is an imperative distinction that must be made 
in order for education officials and average citizens alike to understand the scope of 
the ruling.  In short, for the news media to fulfill its role as the fourth estate, people in 
the U.S. must know for what those in positions of power will stand, especially 
Supreme Court justices. 
                                                
4 Extending Thomas’ reasoning on this subject would likely cause some to wonder 
how he would then justify the right for women to vote or blacks to be free from 





7. Describing Community and Expert Response 
Only four articles contained any significant survey of responses to the ruling from 
students, teachers, or community members.  Six articles included some type of expert 
testimony from someone not directly related to the plaintiff or defense.  For the most 
part, community sentiment sided with Frederick, as students and parents struggled to 
understand why the school reacted as harshly as it did. 
“ ‘Certainly from a moral perspective I understand and support the district, but from a legal 
perspective I think Mr. Frederick was in the right,’ she said” (Morrison, Juneau Empire, May 
7, 2007). 
 
“I think the true cost is probably quite heavy, and we’ll probably never know what it is,’ he 
said. ‘What they did to this kid is unpardonable,’ he said. ‘This is the kind of thing they did in 
Russia’” (Morris, Juneau Empire, Jan. 28, 2007). 
 
“ ‘Something like that is something that all students wish they could do but don’t actually 
have the guts to do it,’ said Lesley Kalbrener, an editor for the JDHS student newspaper, The 
Ego. ‘It actually kind of makes him a hero’” (Morrison, Juneau Empire, May 7, 2007). 
 
 
Experts surveyed included the executive director of the Association of Alaska School 
Boards, Alaska executive director of the America Civil Liberties, general counsel 
from the National School Boards Association, president of a civil liberties 
organization, a scholar from a First Amendment advocacy group, a director for the 
American Association of School Administrators, the ACLU national legal director, 
and a lawyer with the National Coalition against Censorship.   Among the stories as a 
whole, there was a relative balance between experts cited on behalf of Frederick and 
those cited on behalf of Morse.  However, within each story, such balance was not 
always present.   
 




In total, eight editorials and six opinion columns were analyzed.  The columns ranged 
from offering full support to Morse to unequivocally backing Frederick, although 
many were more ambivalent about the cause.  Some even expressed extreme 
frustration at the very existence of the case. 
“This legal tit for tat must end.  Let’s drop the bong hits case once and for all” (Staff, Juneau 
Empire, March 19, 2006). 
 
 “Enough already; drop the bongs hits issue” (Staff, Juneau Empire, January 25, 2008). 
 
“Issues of drug use and drug policy are matters of serious contention. High school students 
must be able to debate them frankly—and that might even involve students taking the position 
that bong hits are not that bad” (Staff, The Washington Post, June 27, 2007). 
 
“In particular, the case should be considered not simply to resolve the question about pro-drug 
speech in public schools but perhaps more importantly to resuscitate the high court’s 
moribund and muddled jurisprudence of student free-expression rights” (Calvert & Richards, 
The Washington Times, October 6, 2006). 
 
“But in this case, both sides are wrong[…]so the Supreme Court should dismiss” 
(Zimmerman, Christian Science Monitor, March 22, 2007). 
 
“Bong Hits 4 Jesus? I have a better idea: Schools 4 Free Thinkers.  Now there’s a slogan we 
should all display” (Zimmerman, Christian Science Monitor, March 22, 2007). 
 
 “Protect student speech—even ‘unwise’ bong banner” (Staff, USA Today, March 21, 2007). 
 
“The court should use this case to reaffirm Tinker’s famous pronouncement that students do 
not shed their right to free speech ‘at the schoolhouse gate’” (Staff, The New York Times, 
March 20, 2007). 
 
“The court should ensure that administrators cannot define a school’s basic educational 
mission so broadly[…]that they have the power to suppress any meaningful speech with 
which they, or their school boards, disagree” (Staff, The Washington Post, March 21, 2007). 
 
“I disagree with ‘Bong Hits 4 Jesus,’ but I will defend to the death your right to display it on a 
banner” (Staff, Juneau Empire, March 19, 2006). 
 
“But whether he set out to save civil liberties, to impress his friends, or even seriously to 
advocate dope for the Lord, he was on a street in America.  That means that as long as he 
wasn’t harassing anyone or creating a hazard, he can make his point” (Staff, Juneau Empire, 
March 19, 2006). 
 
 “no one in this country was free to shut him up” ((Staff, Juneau Empire, May 7, 2006). 
 
“The court should make this a banner year for free speech by ruling in favor of the student” 
(Staff, The (Springfield, Mass.) Republican, March 23, 2007). 
  
 “The majority worries that illegal drugs are a serious danger in schools.  This argument gets  
some sympathy but not enough to trample on the First Amendment” (Seattle Times Staff, 






In making their case for or against Frederick, journalists in a handful of editorial and 
opinion pieces engaged in a discussion over the role of freedom of speech in schools 
and the role of the government in limiting speech.  Overall, the tendency was to urge 
on the side of caution before restricting First Amendment rights: 
“Neither has the power to forbid people of any age from mentioning drugs or anything else in 
a public place” (Staff, Juneau Empire, May 7, 2006). 
 
“Indeed, the idea of someone – or even everyone – deciding what is right to say is the very 
oppression that the Constitution’s drafters sought to prevent” (Staff, Juneau Empire, March 
19, 2006). 
 
“Free speech is the bedrock upon which American freedoms grow.  The concept, enshrined in 
the Constitution, protects written and spoken ideas and messages, regardless of how popular, 
right, or stupid they may be” (Staff, Juneau Empire, March 19, 2006). 
 
“Students do not enjoy the same free-speech rights in school that adults enjoy.  Schools 
legitimately can restrict student speech that disrupts the educational process, for instance.  On 
the other hand, schools can’t tell students to shut up just because the faculty doesn’t like what 
a kids has to say” (Staff, Richmond Times, March 29, 2007). 
 
“But the line around protected speech is appropriately wide, even when it’s subversive or 
sophomoric.  The student’s attorney was on target when he told the justices that this sort of 
expression is ‘the kind of speech we must tolerate, no matter how unwise it is” (Staff, USA 
Today, March 21, 2007). 
 
“Yet both sides of this dispute have lost sight of schools’ true educational purpose: to foster 
critical and independent thought” (Zimmerman, Christian Science Monitor, March 22, 2007). 
 
“If we really want schools to teach democracy, we must not insulate them from democratic 
dissent” (Zimmerman, Christian Science Monitor, March 22, 2007). 
 
 
Journalists generally avoided comparing their own First Amendment rights to the 
freedom of speech that Frederick was fighting for.  Instead, they kept the discussion 
largely confined to the idea that all citizens have the right to express unpopular and 
even bizarre ideas so long as they do not hurt, or in the case of school, disrupt the 
educational prerogative.  However, by not taking the opportunity to show the 




the journalists right to document it—journalists failed on some level to provide a real 
demonstration on the value of First Amendment rights in our society.  The conflicting 
institutional attitudes in the editorials and commentaries demonstrated that, in fact, 
many journalists see no similarities between their profession and Frederick’s claim. 
 
Coverage of Morse v. Frederick was distinct from the seven other cases analyzed in a 
significant way: journalists seemed to take more liberties in word choice, 
characterizations and overall story framing.  These liberties were rarely to the 
student’s benefit, and did nothing to aid in understanding the case.  Frederick was 
consistently framed as the instigator of an immature prank.  Because the case began 
under such unique—albeit even comical—circumstances, the tone with which many 
journalists and commentators wrote erred on the side of levity and at times even 
sarcasm.  Such an approach diminished the significance and legal weight of the 
case—it was almost as if journalists’ viewed the court case as a bigger joke than 
Frederick’s sign.  The job of journalists, and perhaps especially when reporting on 
legal matters, is not to write with preconceived notions of right or wrong, worthy or 
unworthy, but to let the facts speak for themselves.  When journalists’ disdain or 
irritation at a story seeps into the article, and they write about the events and subjects 





Chapter 6: Conclusion 
 
This chapter reexamines the study’s key findings presented in Chapter Five to draw 
larger conclusions about the nature of news media coverage of student First 
Amendment issues.  Based on the findings of the previous chapter, the conclusion 
focuses on the four most common frames found throughout the coverage of all eight 
cases.  These frames reflect: 
 
1. Loaded characterizations of students and their claims, including frames of: 
a. Everything But “Censorship”; 
b. Student as aggressor/student as instigator; 
 
2. Conflicting institutional attitudes established via editorials and opinions, including 
frames of: 
 a. Students as wards of the state; 
b. Students as citizens-in-training; 
 
3. Inadequate attention to detail; and 
 
4. Superficial legal context.   
 
Within each of these four most common approaches to news coverage as developed 
in Chapter Five, the more specific frames address nuances in articles, editorials and 
opinion columns.  Each approach is discussed in depth in this chapter, including the 
specific frames the articles employed.  In addition, this conclusion addresses potential 
explanations for the quality and quantity of news media coverage in these cases. 
 
Finally, this conclusion argues that U.S. newspapers cover student First Amendment 




limiting the public’s ability to understand the repercussions and the larger place of 
student First Amendment rights in society. 
Loaded Characterizations of Students and Their Claims 
Journalists’ rhetorical choices can have a significant impact on how the public 
perceive and internalize news stories.  As media author Denis McQuail (2005) notes, 
journalists interpret and link discrete facts to tell a story.  In doing so, many 
journalists “depart from pure ‘objectivity’ and [… ] introduce some (unintended) 
bias” (p. 379).  This bias—unintended or not—is evident in the words journalists 
choose to describe the actions of each actor involved in the court cases, including the 
school or administrator and the students.  
Everything But “Censorship” 
This study revealed that U.S. newspapers do a very poor job of covering student First 
Amendment cases.  But of all the failures in their reporting, the most significant 
failure was journalists’ avoidance of the word “censorship” or the legal phrase “prior 
review” to describe school or administrator actions against a student.  In fact, in most 
cases, journalists consistently used everything but the word “censorship” to describe 
the school’s actions against the students. 
 
Reporters and commentators repeatedly—and almost to a fault—resorted to 
euphemisms such as: “halted,” “blocked,” “seized,” “removed, without consulting,” 
or “ordered deleted.”  Such euphemisms worked to lessen the gravity of the 




discipline—an educational prerogative and not a Constitutional infringement.  Why 
did journalists select terms that, on the surface, were so patronizing given the legal 
severity of the situations? Was it a balanced and thoughtful attempt to imply a lesser 
degree of interference by the school or administrator?  Was it merely a result of 
varying word choice to keep the story interesting?  These are questions this study 
cannot answer, but to use descriptors like the ones above instead of the legally 
recognized terms for each action minimized the students’ claims.  To say a story was 
“pulled” gives an entirely different perspective than to say it was “censored” or 
subject to “prior review.”  Since the latter terms reflect the actual legal claims 
students presented to the courts, it was inappropriate and marginalizing for journalists 
to refrain from characterizing the administrators’ actions as censorship and prior 
review, regardless of the journalists’ reasons for doing so.   
 
Journalists have an obligation to choose words that accurately reflect the legal charge.  
One would not characterize a bank robbery as a “situation wherein people took 
money that did not belong to them.” Readers should expect clear and accurate use of 
language especially in reporting on a conflicting legal case.  Language and word 
choice matter, and journalists owe rhetorical care and precision to every story—and 
every person—they cover.  In this way, perhaps journalists should use both the legal 
terminology and action descriptors to frame not only what happened, but also the 
legal ramifications of the schools’ or administrators’ actions.  For instance, the phrase 
“a story was censored when a principal deleted it from the student newspaper” might 




administrator took (“deleted”) while still conveying a serious legal charge (“a story 
was censored”). 
Student as Aggressor/Student as Instigator 
Many of the descriptors journalists used to characterize the students’ actions or claims 
were hardly neutral.  What’s more, they were not usually flattering for the student.  
Instead of letting the students’ actions and claims speak for themselves, journalists 
too often used loaded words.  These loaded words more often than not framed the 
students in a negative light, marking the students as aggressors and instigators instead 
of as simply students or plaintiffs. 
 
Coverage of Morse v. Frederick is an excellent example of poor word choice and the 
“student as aggressor” frame many reporters used.   Negative, positive, or otherwise 
loaded characterizations are par for the course in editorial and opinion pieces, but 
journalists are expected to show greater selectivity in straight news coverage.  That 
was not the case in Morse v. Frederick.  Articles describing Frederick as rebellious 
and defiant set the tone for stories that largely discredited the student and his claims.  
Journalists also did not hold back in using negatively charged words to describe his 
speech: rebellious, juvenile, wacky, absurd, foolish, childish, inane were the words du 
jour in much of the coverage.  Certainly readers would be likely to come to the 
conclusion that yes, Frederick’s banner was ridiculous and nonsensical, but it is not 
the journalist’s responsibility to lead them there.  If the pen is mightier than the 
sword, Frederick would indeed have been fighting a losing battle as journalists 




their boundaries as purveyors of fact and instead took on the role of moral arbiter, 
stealthily usurping that role from readers.   
 
When students were not being framed as aggressors in some way, they were often 
described as instigators even when it was the schools’ acts of censorship that 
precipitated the students’ legal action.  In Dean v. Utica, student Katy Dean at times 
appeared solely responsible for creating the problem.  The phrases “Dean decided to 
fight,” “Dean battled,” and Dean “resolved not to be silenced” conveyed a level of 
determination that framed Dean as the instigator in the legal battle.  To truly describe 
how the lawsuit started, journalists just as easily could have used phrases like “the 
school decided to censor” or “the principal resolved to keep the story from print.”   
 
The preoccupation with Barbara Papish’s anti-authority behavior in Papish v. Board 
of Curators also illustrates the “student as instigator” frame, conveying Papish as a 
student looking to pick a fight with whomever was willing to indulge her.  Likewise, 
the students in Kincaid v. Gibson were also framed as instigators, with the suggestion 
being that their poor color choice for the yearbook—and not the administrations’ 
refusal to distribute them—was the instigating act.  In fact, coverage of many of these 
cases demonstrated a similar cart-before-horse problem, wherein the context of what 





Conflicting Institutional Attitudes 
Editorials and opinion columns are the ideal and expected place for journalists to 
voice their opinions.  However, the editorial and opinion coverage of the eight cases 
analyzed showed no clear consensus on the extent of student First Amendment rights.    
Instead, the editorials and commentaries reflected a divide among professional 
journalists on whether students should actually enjoy significant First Amendment 
protections in high school and college.  Though it would be inappropriate to say 
journalists were clearly for or against such protections, analysis revealed a slight shift 
in favor of student rights.   
 
Wards of the State v. Citizens in Training 
Editorials and commentators justified these conflicting attitudes through two 
approaches: characterizing students as either “wards of the state” or as “citizens in 
training.”  Journalists who viewed students as “wards of the state” were less likely to 
support student First Amendment rights and suggested education’s sole purpose is to 
act in the parent’s stead and inculcate socially accepted behaviors and values.  This 
frame was evident in the editorial and opinion coverage of Hazelwood, Kincaid, 
Tinker and at times, Morse.  Editorials and commentaries covering these cases 
generally reflected a conservative approach to student rights and tended to favor 
(though not overwhelmingly so) the schools’ prerogatives to maintain order over 
students’ claims for free speech or press.  Hazelwood commentary, for instance, was 
relatively muted.  Though a few voices seemed disenchanted by the ruling, more 




turning into chaotic daycare centers where no real education takes place because 
students run amuck.  In Kincaid, editorials and an opinion column were split between 
viewing the school’s censorship as ridiculous and believing the case was not really 
about censorship but rather the school’s right to oversee activities it funds.   
 
Editorial and opinion coverage of Morse expressed hesitancy on some journalists’ 
part to support student speech that in any way related to illegal drugs.  Had Frederick 
advocated something other than illegal “Bong Hits” for Jesus, it would have been 
easier for journalists’ to support his speech.   Still, there was a strong contingent of 
opinion voices that did not support the student’s right to speak as he did under almost 
any circumstance.  On the other hand, journalists’ editorials and commentaries 
advocated in a more general way broad First Amendment protections for speech that 
is juvenile or even offensive. 
 
Those editorial and opinion voices that more explicitly supported student speech and 
press tended to justify their stances by framing students as “citizens in training.”  The 
journalists who used this approach concluded that students should learn to practice 
and value civil liberties so they may better participate in adult democratic life.  
Editorial and opinion coverage of Dean and Hosty used this frame extensively, noting 
the high stakes involved, including issues of academic freedom, the liberty of the 





The single editorial voice in Papish similarly sided with the student, though not 
necessarily because the writers viewed students as “citizens in training.”  Instead, the 
editorial writers criticized the school for stomping on the marketplace of ideas rather 
than encouraging diverse, if at times unpopular, discourse.  This was the same 
rationale consistently used in editorials and commentaries that were supportive of 
Frederick in Morse v. Frederick. 
 
Taken in total, the editorial and opinion columns in all the cases represented a 
significant dichotomy among journalists. There were those who believed strongly in 
scholastic journalism and student free speech as a training ground for professional 
journalism and as a hands-on lesson in civics and democracy, and there were those 
who saw student press and speech as expression to be tolerated (or not) by school 
officials for the good of the school and the educational environment.  Indeed, this 
same split is evident among the courts themselves. The eight cases analyzed 
represented five rulings in favor of student speech and press rights and three rulings 
against such rights, and the trend among editorials and commentaries toward 
equivocating on student First Amendment rights reflected similar hesitation among 
the courts.  
 
Inadequate Attention to Detail 
Analysis of what is included in a story provides great insight into how the story was 
constructed and the inferences readers can make.  Equally telling is what is left out—




aspects of all case coverage was how little student voice was present.  Journalists 
generally thrive on first-hand accounts and interview material, but it was evident in 
the majority of the coverage that students were not interviewed for the stories.  Not 
only did journalists fail to obtain first-person reports from students involved in the 
legal case, but they also rarely took general student perspective into account at all.  In 
other words, journalists usually did not even ask students at the school or university 
involved how they felt about the case or how the potential outcomes would affect 
education or student life.   
 
Because many of the stories within the coverage of the same court case contained 
similar responses from the lawyers involved, it is likely these quotations or 
paraphrased accounts were pulled directly from a written statement provided by the 
attorneys for each side.  Understandably, it can be difficult to obtain personal 
interviews with parties involved in a legal suit, but from analyzing most of the 
coverage, it is evident that most journalists did not even try.  Had they attempted such 
contact, readers would expect to see phrases like “the student refused to comment” or 
“the principal could not be reached for comment.”  However, these phrases were rare 
in the coverage, implying few attempts were made to obtain first-hand interviews on 
the matter. 
 
The case of Healy v. James is a unique instance of this “sin of omission.”  Not only 
was there no student voice, there were no stories at all.  Coverage of this case in the 




activity, it was as if this case never happened.  The historical perspective on this case 
in Chapter Five gives significant insight into why this may have occurred.  
Nonetheless, the lack of coverage is an indictment against journalism when a case 
involving a significant claim for freedom of speech can reach the highest court in the 
nation and receive no news media coverage.  It demonstrates that such issues are such 
a low priority for journalists that when faced with other significant events, they are 
actually not a priority at all. 
 
Judges’ dissenting opinions also received little attention in the coverage.  Coverage of 
the dissenting cases in only two cases (Tinker and Hazelwood) was extensive enough 
to warrant discussion in the findings section.  When legal cases reach a level of 
precedence significant enough to attract news media attention, the resulting coverage 
often provides the public with their only access to the legal debate.  In not providing 
both sides of the argument, or the judges’ perspectives, readers are left ignorant to the 
possibility that there were other positions on the case besides the position that won.  
Though cliché, it is no understatement to suggest that the news media, like courts, 
tries cases in the “court of public opinion.”  In doing so, readers should expect the 
responsible journalist to report all aspects of the “trial”—in other words, not just the 
prevailing opinion.  To leave out significant discussion of dissenting arguments and 
opinions is to essentially equally truncate public debate of the cases; the public’s 
participation in this “court of public opinion” will only go so far as the media’s report 
of what happened inside the real courtroom.  Otherwise, the public has little 





Superficial Legal Context 
Journalists repeatedly attempted to provide legal context in their stories by citing 
previous cases and established legal credit.  In fact, almost every story cited another 
case or paraphrased the legal context of student freedom of expression laws.  For this, 
some credit is due.  However, the legal context reported most often relied heavily on 
journalists listing a variety of cases, including Tinker and Hazelwood, without 
actually differentiating between the two or fully explaining the precedent involved in 
each.  Such little understanding of the two cases and their significant differences was 
reported that the legal context provided was actually hardly contextual at all.  From a 
legal perspective, it is important to remember that both Tinker and Hazelwood, while 
being Supreme Court cases, are legal suits in which two discrete questions were asked 
of the court: Respectively, do students have First Amendment rights in school, and 
was the Spectrum a limited public forum for student discussion?   
 
Conflicting standards for student speech and press rights exist because these two 
cases set up simultaneously significant yet conflicting standards.  However, by 
reading each case ruling, and by consulting legal texts and media law professionals, 
one reaches the understanding that the two are, essentially, mutually exclusive.  Most 
legal context of the two cases diluted the rulings so much as to suggest the court ruled 
the opposite way on the same question nearly two decades apart.  This is simply not 
the case, and the obvious lack of understanding on the journalists’ part skewed their 




potentially useless.  Therefore, the reader was left with little real context to aid in 
understanding the state of student speech and press rights. 
 
As mentioned above, the lack of coverage and analysis devoted to dissents in each 
case represents a blatantly unbalanced approach to these cases.   Not only is this an 
issue of attention to detail, but it also creates problems for journalists who should 
provide useful legal context.  Journalists, in their “fourth estate” and “watchdog” 
functions, are tasked with approaching stories with balance, fairness, and objectivity.  
These approaches demand the inclusion of all relevant facts and contexts, so 
dissenting opinions should be addressed.  Especially given that later court rulings 
were based in part on dissents in earlier cases, the general absence of significant 
dissent coverage was irresponsible and made it next to impossible to have a clear 
understanding of the legal importance of each case. 
  
It must be noted that journalists are not expected to be experts in every field on which 
they report.  However, the public—and the First Amendment itself—has tasked 
journalists with reporting accurately, fairly, and completely on issues that are in the 
public interest.  This expectation was repeatedly unmet in coverage of these eight 
cases. 
 
This study found that news media coverage of these eight cases failed to adequately 
cover and present the legal issues.  The four dominate frames—loaded 




inadequate attention to detail and superficial legal context—marginalized the 
students’ positions and made it all but impossible for readers to develop a full, 
contextual understanding of each case.  But so what?  Simply put, if the news media 
are not properly covering student speech and press cases, then the public’s reliance on 
them for information is misguided and ill-advised.  What’s more, the public is not 
likely to receive an accurate perception of these cases, their significance, and their 
context in a comprehensive understanding of student freedoms.  
 
This failure to adequately cover student First Amendment rights strikes at the heart of 
a larger question: if the news media, and in turn the public, habitually downplay the 
significance of students’ speech and press rights, are those rights to be considered 
important at all?  And if they are not, then what student rights, if any, are important?  
And, finally, and perhaps most importantly, how should this attitude be reconciled 
with the public perception that education should foster values of democracy?  The 
answers to these questions no doubt define what it means to live in a democratic 
country and illustrate the true meaning of the phrase “with liberty and justice for all.” 
 
Perhaps it is not enough to insist high school students be treated as adults in training; 
they must be treated as democratic leaders in training.  Doing so could have myriad 
effects, some likely positive, other perhaps less desirable.  The result may be a greater 
appreciation for the Constitutional rights of our country, or it may simply be a greater 
tendency to “rock the boat” for students just learning to flex their independent 




fight for democracy—that outcome may not be so undesirable.   As Inglehart (1985), 
a longtime advocate of student press rights, would suggest: 
Perhaps quietude, dignity, and respectful acceptance are hallmarks of virtue to 
some educators, but most educators are even more delighted with rollicking, 
contentious, demanding students who won’t allow ideas and concepts and 
knowledge to languish in the library but instead transfer the distillates from 
seminar settings to the rowdy speech of campus or even to the startling 
columns of the student newspaper, yearbook, magazine or pamphlet.  The 
frontier of freedom of expression may well be in the commitment to wide-
open and vigorous debate on the campuses of the nation. (p. 210-211) 
 
The Missing News Media 
The research presented here describes a phenomenon: the way news media frame 
student freedom of speech and press issues.  It does not address why news media 
coverage was framed or constructed in the ways analyzed here.  However, some 
discussion of what might guide the nature of news media coverage is appropriate 
because it speaks to the considerable research still to be done in this area. 
 
A Misguided Watchdog 
As mentioned in the introduction, students in the U.S. lack quantifiable political 
agency until they are of age to vote, and even then, the average 18-year old is usually 
not considered a major player in world and country affairs (though en masse, young 
people are often the target of political and social campaigns).  Because of this reality, 
for journalists, “adult” issues often eclipse student issues as priorities for coverage, 
even when the latter are considered by the courts to be of grave importance.  In this 
sense, the concept of “watchdog” as indoctrinated into the news media and 




“watchdog” construct demands a focus on government and related power plays;  
situations that come across as less subversive or in which a power grab is less 
ubiquitous may not trigger an immediate alarm.    
 
In this way, students, who are not policy makers and who have little to offer in games 
of political bait and switch, may not be considered part of the “public” journalists and 
news media serve, especially since newspapers make little attempt to draw a young 
audience.5  Adults, through the right to vote, work, form unions, donate funds, run for 
office, and receive other legal entitlements, form a “marketplace” that, because of its 
size and collective power, maintains a level of importance over smaller marketplaces, 
like those formed by students or minority groups.  In this sense, the “watchdog” 
construct may very well perpetuate the marginalization of students and student issues 
in the news media.  While the “watchdog” concept encourages journalists to commit 
to a single point of focus—the government—it does not similarly pressure journalists 
to consider other focuses.  Perhaps the term “watchdog” as a metaphor perpetuates 
this inadequacy, while a term like “neighborhood watch” might encourage more 
evenhanded scrutiny of all aspects of society and politics.  
A Misunderstanding of Significance 
Another explanation for limited news media coverage of student First Amendment 
issues could be journalists’ (and the public’s) misunderstanding of the significance of 
student First Amendment rights.  Regardless of the philosophical and educational 
reasons to be aware of these issues, there remains a larger, perhaps more compelling 
                                                




issue: what becomes law for one, becomes law for us all.  When the Supreme Court, 
or even a district court, rules on an issue of student freedom of speech, it does not just 
affect that student in that school.  It affects an entire community, a state, or the 
country as whole.  Court rulings are not socially exclusive, and when a new precedent 
is entered into the books, it alters the course of future rulings indefinitely.  However, 
as demonstrated in Chapter Five, the real impact of these court rulings are often left 
entirely unexplored, perhaps because journalists and the news media view them as 
discrete circumstances.   And while the legal question presented in courts during these 
First Amendment cases may be discrete, the long-term affects of precedent are not.  
This reason alone demands the news media rethink their approach to covering student 
speech and press issues. 
 
But perhaps a simpler, more compelling reason news media should consider how they 
cover student First Amendment issues is this:  A core, if not paramount value in the 
U.S. is that public education is the essential means by which core values of 
democracy are fostered in future generations.  So, for future democracy to succeed, 
ignorance of what happens in the corridors of public schools is not an option. 
 
 
Suggestions for Further Research 
In designing and undertaking this study, many other interesting approaches came to 
mind.  First, one of the cases in this study, Morse v. Frederick, generated 
considerable international coverage.  Newspapers from England to Korea to Australia 




and court systems.  A content or textual analysis of this coverage would likely yield 
interesting results on international attitudes towards these institutions. 
 
Initial designs of this study planned to include analysis of coverage of two other data 
sets: trade press coverage of these cases and newspaper coverage of state student 
freedom of expression laws.  Because of this study’s scope and the desire to maintain 
a cohesive focus on the central data set, these data sets were ultimately eliminated.  
However, preliminary review of each set indicates there still exists a need for in-depth 
analysis.  Trade coverage of these cases, such as that in academic and professional 
journals, was relatively minimal, but expanding an analysis to include trade coverage 
of student press issues in comparison with the same types of issues professional 
media face could prove fruitful.  Analysis of newspaper coverage of the state of 
student freedom of expression laws could build on the findings presented here by 
examining proposed and actual legislation that would affect every student and school. 
 
While not prolific enough to consider a frame, expert testimony used throughout the 
coverage in this study suggests a small, finite group of experts in the area of student 
freedom of expression.  Further research into these experts and their advocacy roles 
could develop a better understanding of the fight for student freedom of expression 
and how it compares to similar fights waged by other groups who are legally 






This study provides the missing foundation for research into scholastic speech and 
press freedoms.  Such little scholarly attention has been given to this area of research, 
and yet more and more scholars are beginning to recognize its importance: AEJMC 
recently added a scholastic journalism division, and the American Journalism 
Historian’s Association at its 2009 conference awarded this researcher’s scholastic 
press-focused paper top honors. 
 
This study is not an end to understanding the complex relationships between the 
media, education, student freedoms, and democracy.  No doubt, there is a link, but it 
will take concerted effort by scholars and journalists alike before additional 
significant connections and understandings are made.  Happily, this research ends 
with an invitation to three communities.  This research is in essence an invitation to 
First Amendment scholars to consider students as part of the “big picture.”  It 
constitutes an invitation to media scholars to consider scholastic journalism as 
essential to understanding the larger machine of professional journalism.  It proffers 
an invitation to education scholars to consider the role of schools in nurturing 
democracy, and the outlet of student press and speech as factors in the vibrancy of 
that democracy.  And finally this research presents an invitation to professional 
journalists, who guide public concern through news media coverage, to consider for 
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